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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis poses the question: what is religious conversion? First I unpack this, and 
highlight some initial difficulties concerning the vagueness and context-sensitivity 
involved in the question. I propose a model for religious conversion on which it 
involves three dimensions: the doxastic dimension (concerning belief); the affective 
dimension (concerning emotion); and the dimension of praxis (concerning behaviour). 
The various changes that constitute a religious conversion involve reciprocal 
influences between each pair of these dimensions. I explore each dimension in turn, 
and, in the final chapter, integrate them into a view about the dynamics of religious 
conversion, and its philosophical implications. My discussion of the role of belief in 
religious conversion centres on the question of how religious beliefs are formed, and 
on their justification. I argue that religious experience is key in belief formation, and 
give grounds for thinking that even if epistemic justification of such beliefs will 
obtain only infrequently, and will be difficult to establish, such beliefs could also be 
justified either pragmatically or morally. My discussion of the role of emotion 
considers views on which emotion is purely cognitive and views on which it is purely 
non-cognitive, and argues that emotion involves both cognitive and non-cognitive 
components. I explore the influence of emotions on belief formation. I claim that 
emotions can be assessed in terms of rationality, and can sometimes be rational, 
which means that the influence of emotions, while it can sometimes lead to self-
deceptive or irrational beliefs, can also bestow additional justification on beliefs. My 
discussion of the role of praxis in religious conversion considers views on which 
behaviour is expressive, and views on which behaviour is instrumental, and claims 
that neither approach is satisfactory. Behaviour involves both cognitive and non-
cognitive aspects. I explore the ways in which behaviour influences both emotion and 
belief, and belief and emotion influence behaviour, and discuss the notion of 
‘acceptance’ and its role in conversion. I propose a model of religious conversion on 
which the process involves the layering of each of the three dimensions in a 
cumulative and self-perpetuating spiral, whereby a single change makes further 
change more likely due to the intimate links between the three dimensions. I show 
that this integrative model is key in explaining the shift in religious understanding that 
occurs in conversion. Having proposed this model, I consider some implications. I 
claim that due to the nature of the dimensions of religious conversion, conversion can 
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be indirectly voluntary, and therefore is something for which we are morally 
responsible. This means that while there are excusing factors (such as inculpable 
ignorance or force) we can be ultimately responsible for our own state of religiosity. I 
explore the idea of religious conversion as moral change, and conclude that while 
specific conversions will be difficult to evaluate, there is the possibility of both ethical 
and unethical conversions. Whether or not a conversion is ethical will depend in part 
on its justification. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
My central aim is to elucidate the concept of religious conversion and understand 
what it is and what it involves. Loosely, I am interested in the phenomenon whereby 
an adult (or adolescent) who was previously non-religious or irreligious, undergoes 
some kind of change, the end result of which is that they are religious. In this secular 
age, more people are raised without being inculcated into a religious faith. Therefore 
it is more interesting than ever before to look at the phenomenon whereby people who 
were not previously religious find an impulse within them to dramatically shift the 
pattern of their lives. 
The inspiration for this thesis comes from an event in my life. One afternoon, I 
was visiting my adolescent sister in Florida having not seen her for almost a year, 
since she had emigrated there from England with the rest of my family. She shared 
with me that she had undergone a religious conversion, and I enquired further. She 
said that since living in Florida she had met many religious people, whom she 
respected and liked. They seemed happy, successful, and had direction and purpose. 
She was accepted by them, and began attending a church, where she made friends. 
She began participating in religious events, attending ‘revivals’, church groups, and 
social events. She enjoyed it, she felt good about it, and she declared that now she 
believed in God. She was a Christian. From a desire to understand my sister, came a 
desire to understand her conversion. My usual recourse, as a philosopher, was to 
research the phenomenon and to attempt some kind of philosophical analysis of the 
concept of religious conversion. My initial research showed that while religious 
conversion is a subject of some popularity in other disciplines, such as theology, 
psychology, sociology, and anthropology, there has been surprisingly little 
philosophical research on this subject. This was surprising to me, especially given the 
pervasiveness of the phenomenon throughout history. Having identified a gap in 
philosophical research, and having had a strong desire sparked in me to understand 
the phenomenon, I set upon the current project.  
 At the outset, I was drawing on a strongly analytic philosophical background, 
and my methodology was to attempt a conceptual analysis of ‘religious conversion’, 
identifying the necessary and sufficient conditions. After struggling with this for a 
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time, I came to see the project as futile – no such conditions were forthcoming, and I 
was unsatisfied with all of the suggestions inspired by the literature. What came next 
was a change in methodology, which sprung from a deep change in my own approach 
to the subject. I came to see the limitations of the method of conceptual analysis – the 
attempt to rigidify and systematise was still an impulse, but I came to understand that 
often it does not so much clarify a concept as abstract it to the point of irrelevance. 
Each ‘definition’ seemed out of touch with the real, lived experience of the actual 
convert. I (painfully) veered away from the predominant tradition that formed my 
philosophical education, or at least came to see that it is not enough on its own; and 
the result is a more person-centred and integrative approach. I have tried to remain in 
touch with the experiences, lives, practices, feelings and beliefs of those who actually 
undergo religious conversions, and it is my hope that in addition to filling an obvious 
gap in the philosophical research, this work will also have relevance more generally, 
to anyone who is interested in religiosity as one of the most intriguing shared human 
traits. 
 The personal nature of the investigation is appropriate given the nature of the 
topic – the subject itself calls for an immersion in the form of life in which it occurs. 
This is reflected too in the writing style adopted in places, and from time to time, 
departing from the prevailing convention in academic writing, I have felt free to use 
the first personal pronoun. I will use examples taken from case studies, and my view 
has been influenced by accounts taken from my own interactions with people I’ve 
discussed this topic with, who felt compelled to share their own experiences with me. 
This is not used in any sense to prove that certain things are the case, so the lack of 
scientific rigour should not be taken to be a disadvantage – these examples are merely 
illustrative. However, what these examples might show is how we (as members of a 
community in which the concept of religious conversion has a use) understand the 
concept of religious conversion. As this phenomenon is one that, in part, gets its 
import and significance from the role that it plays in our lives and the lives of those in 
our community, this understanding is relevant to and partly constitutive of the 
phenomenon under investigation.  
 I will attempt to navigate the territory without making assumptions about the 
existence of objects of religious worship (for example God) or the nature of the 
universe, as ‘surely, in a multi-cultural world we need a theoretical approach to the 
study of religions that is not from the outset prejudicial to any religion’, or non-
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religious world-view.1 In the literature there are what we might call ‘religious’ and 
‘non-religious’ understandings of religious conversion, distinguishable by what they 
presuppose in their explanation of the phenomenon. They diverge on ‘whether the 
subject-matter of religion is regarded as ontologically primary or as an ontologically 
secondary phenomenon’.2 I will remain neutral, and try to capture both what the 
religious person considers important, and what non-religious disciplines can explain. 
It might already be glaringly obvious from these introductory remarks on the 
phenomenon of religious conversion that what we mean by the term ‘religious’ and 
the term ‘conversion’, are philosophical questions in their own right. These questions 
will be my focus in Chapter One – Religious Conversion, and my strategy will be to 
unpack the concept of ‘conversion’ in its most general sense, and then engage with 
attempts to analyse the concept of ‘religiosity’. I will argue that conversions in 
general involve a paradigm shift analogous to the changes involved in scientific 
revolutions. I will give an interpretation of ‘conversion’ on which conversion is any 
radical shift from one position or perspective to another. I will also argue that 
religiosity is not a definable concept, but rather a vague and context-sensitive concept 
that is understood in virtue of family resemblances. This feature of language makes it 
possible for the same words to have different meanings in different contexts, and 
given that (as I will argue) religious conversion involves a shift in context, this means 
that they can involve linguistic shifts too, which result in religious language having a 
different meaning post-conversion. Thus a religious conversion, at first glance, will be 
a radical shift from a non-religious perspective to one describable as religious. I claim 
that while this will not involve exactly the same features in all cases, and is therefore 
not definable in a straightforward way, it involves certain identifiable dimensions. By 
exploring these dimensions and the interplay between them we can come to better 
understand the phenomenon. Each of the three chapters that follow will focus on one 
of these dimensions, and the philosophical questions that they raise. 
In Chapter Two – The Doxastic Dimension, I will focus on the belief-related 
aspects of conversion. As I am concerned with religious conversion in general as 
opposed to conversion to this or that particular religion, we cannot expect there to be 
                                                 
1  Harrison, V.S., ‘The Pragmatics of Defining Religion in a Multi-Cultural World’, International 
Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 59, No. 3, (Jun., 2006), p. 149. 
2 Thrower, James, Religion – The Classical Theories, Edinburgh University Press, (1999), p. 3.  
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any specific beliefs common to all conversions.3  Rather, I will consider the nature of 
belief and draw some general conclusions about the nature of religious belief in 
particular. In order to better understand the process of religious conversion, I explore 
the main ways in which religious beliefs are formed, namely, via reasoned argument, 
via religious experience, and via testimony. 
I will then consider the justification of religious beliefs. I distinguish several 
ways in which a belief could be justified, which I call ‘moral’, ‘epistemic’ and 
‘pragmatic’, and discuss each in turn. On the topic of moral justification, I discuss 
Clifford’s principle, which links the ethics of belief to the epistemic justification, in 
that it is wrong to hold a belief that you have insufficient evidence for. I also discuss 
James’s recommended loosening of this principle, and the exceptions he makes. I 
make a case for the possibility that it can be morally licit to hold religious beliefs, 
even if they have insufficient evidence, epistemically speaking. On the topic of 
epistemic justification I focus on the connection between religious experiences and 
religious belief. I discuss two arguments for religious belief from religious 
experience, the argument from credulity and the argument from analogy. I raise 
serious doubts about both of these arguments, and conclude that while genuine 
religious experiences might struggle to qualify as meeting adequate standards for 
justifying religious belief, it is also not impossible that they could. On the topic of 
pragmatic justification I claim that some religious beliefs might function as ‘hinge’ 
beliefs, and thus have a special status, meaning that they can be pragmatically 
justified if they play an appropriate role in one’s network of beliefs. 
In Chapter Three – The Affective Dimension I will discuss the emotional 
aspects of religious conversion, and argue that religious conversion will involve a 
shift in the emotional experiences, dispositions, and moods of an individual. I 
consider what this means in more detail by exploring the nature of emotions, 
including whether we should understand them cognitively or non-cognitively. I argue 
that emotions involve both cognitive and non-cognitive aspects. I also explore the 
reflexive interaction between belief and emotion, including how emotions affect 
belief formation and retention, as well as affecting the significance that certain beliefs 
have for an individual and the connections that are perceived to exist between beliefs.  
                                                 
3 It might turn out that some specific belief or beliefs are necessary for religious conversion to some 
specific religion or religious sect. Whichever beliefs these turn out to be will be part of the ‘belief set’ 
necessary for conversion to that particular religion or sect. 
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My discussion turns next to the topic of self-deceptive belief, where I argue 
that beliefs formed under the influence of emotions risk being self-deceptive, and 
some religious beliefs will be of this type. At first, it may appear that all beliefs 
formed under the influence of emotion are epistemically unjustified, due to the fact 
that they are not formed purely in response to evidence. However, I argue that if the 
emotions can be defended as capable of being rational, then some beliefs can actually 
gain additional justification from the emotions that influence them. I claim that 
emotions can be epistemically, pragmatically, or morally justified, and make a case 
for the conclusion that the emotions can be rational.  
In Chapter Four – The Dimension of Praxis, I consider the practical dimension 
of religious conversion, which includes actions and behaviours that change as a result 
of the conversion process. Under this heading are included things like praying, 
attending a place of worship, using new symbols or language, and participating in 
rituals and ceremonies. I will consider to what extent participation in rituals involves 
belief, and to what extent it involves emotion. This can be framed in terms of the 
debate between intellectualist and expressivist accounts of ritual engagement, which 
reduce the explanation of ritual to cognitive or to non-cognitive aspects respectively. I 
will argue that neither account adequately captures everything that is important about 
religious ritual, but that engagement in ritual involves both cognitive and non-
cognitive components. Having discussed the interaction between the cognitive and 
non-cognitive in this context, I continue by outlining the points of interaction between 
praxis and emotion and between praxis and belief. Having shown in the previous 
chapter that emotions influence belief and beliefs influence emotions, here I show that 
beliefs and emotions influence behaviour, and that behaviour influences beliefs and 
emotions. Lastly, I discuss the role of acceptance, which I take to be a positive 
epistemic state that we can voluntarily adopt with respect to a proposition. I explore 
the role that acceptance plays in religious conversion and the way that this illuminates 
the interaction that occurs between the three dimensions of conversion which I have 
discussed. 
Finally, in Chapter Five – The Conversion Process, I give a general summary 
of my account of religious conversion. No dimension has clear priority over the other 
two, causally or conceptually. Rather, what emerges is the image of a spiral, where 
any single change in any given dimension will bring about changes in other 
dimensions, thereby leading to a reinforcing or strengthening of religiosity. I will 
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complete my account by introducing the notion of understanding, and will suggest 
that conversion involves a new or deeper religious understanding, in which all the 
three dimensions of religiosity I’ve discussed play a vital role: when something is 
fully understood, it is believed, felt, and lived.  
With the model of religious conversion now in place, I examine the ethical 
status of religious conversion. I argue that each dimension of religious conversion has 
a voluntary component sufficient for moral responsibility, so there is a moral 
dimension to belief and emotion, as well as action. As these components are 
constituents of religious conversion, there is a moral dimension to religious 
conversion. The conclusion is that whether or not we convert is a normative question, 
and one that we are morally accountable for in our own lives. I close the chapter by 
indicating some of the ways in which religious conversion involves moral change.   
In summary, this thesis will propose a model of religious conversion, and 
demonstrate some of its consequences. Some aspects of this model will be shown by 
analogy, while others are more explicit, but where the degree of precision is less than 
ideal, this is because the subject matter does not allow for more precision, and 
sometimes an analogical model can serve better. 
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CHAPTER 1  
RELIGIOUS CONVERSION 
 
If we compare a proposition to a picture, we must think whether we are comparing it 
to a portrait (a historical representation) or to a genre-picture. And both comparisons 
have a point.1  
 
I will embark on this study of religious conversion by delineating the meaning of  
‘religious conversion’. I take ‘religious conversion’ to be a conversion of a religious 
type, so I will break the exploration down into an elaboration of what I shall mean by 
a ‘conversion’, and what it is for something to be ‘religious’. This strategy will be 
productive given that there is surprisingly little philosophical literature on religious 
conversion, so this approach will allow research on these more general concepts to be 
usefully applied to the narrower field I consider here.  
In its most general sense, conversion is not a strictly religious phenomenon, 
but can refer more generally to significant changes in a person’s outlook or beliefs.2 I 
shall suggest that one thing that occurs in conversions is a shift in ‘mental field’ (of 
the kind described by William James) whereby certain things gain or lose salience for 
the convert. I will also explore an analogy between the radical interior changes that 
occur when an individual undergoes conversion and the kind of radical changes that 
occur in scientific revolutions. This will lead to some general conclusions about the 
nature of conversion, including that it involves something analogous to a paradigm 
shift. I shall also draw some comparisons between what happens in conversion and 
the kind of Gestalt switch (as in the famous ‘duck rabbit’ case) that enables a given 
object or event to be perceived in a new way. A picture will emerge in which what 
essentially changes in the course of a religious conversion, is analogous to what 
changes when we are looking at a duckrabbit and we stop seeing a duck and start 
seeing a rabbit.  
In the second part of the chapter, I shall turn to the concept of religiosity, and 
consider what it is for something or someone to count as ‘religious’. I will outline the 
                                                 
1  Wittgenstein, Lugwig, Philosophical Investigations, [1953], 3rd ed., trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, 
Oxford: Blackwell, (2001), §522-23. 
2 Non-religious conversions may include but are not limited to: pseudo-religious conversions, scientific 
conversions, political conversions, social conversions, and personality conversions. 
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way we can and do distinguish between specifically religious conversions and 
conversions of other kinds. The religiosity of an institution is whatever distinguishes 
it from other institutions (political institutions like states, or social institutions like 
clubs) in such as way as to allow us to classify it as religious. The religiosity of a 
person is whatever is special about them that allows us to properly call them 
‘religious’, as in ‘Peter is religious’. Part of what might be involved in calling a 
person ‘religious’ is that they belong to a ‘religion’, and part of what it means to call 
something a ‘religion’ is that its members are ‘religious’. Thus these concepts are 
linked. While linked, these concepts of religiousness are logically distinct because a 
person could (in principle) be religious without belonging to a religious institution and 
conversely could belong to a religious institution without being religious. I will use 
the term ‘religiosity’ to include both the religiousness of institutions and the 
religiousness of individuals. 
In discussing religiosity, I will take the opportunity to examine various 
philosophical approaches to the problems of definition, starting from the Socratic idea 
of a common essence shared by all and only instances of the definiendum, and will 
examine some particular definitions of religiosity offered in the literature on religion. 
I conclude that attempts to define the concept fail, and show that a more flexible 
approach is needed to adequately explain the concept of religiosity. The approach I 
adopt is inspired by the fluid approach to language that is found most famously in 
Wittgenstein. With this ‘family resemblance’ view as a starting point, I offer a view 
that takes into account contemporary research on linguistic vagueness and context-
sensitivity. I claim that the term ‘religious’ is vague, but is not thereby unusable. I will 
also show that some religious language should be seen as context-sensitive so that its 
meaning changes depending on the linguistic context. Thus, given that a person’s 
linguistic context changes when one undergoes a conversion, part of what a 
conversion involves will be a change in the meaning of one’s language. I conclude 
that we can pick out cases of religiousness whenever we have sufficient contextual 
information, but may struggle to do so otherwise. 
The overall goal of the chapter will be to show that there is no single set of 
necessary and sufficient conditions for religious conversion – the features one gains or 
loses in the process of conversion cannot be specified in this way. Thus, the 
definitional approach fails. However, I maintain that there are some things that play a 
part in many or most instances of religious conversion, although in different ways and 
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to different degrees. This alleviates the concern that might be raised that without a 
definition we cannot successfully apply the term – in fact, the context can help to 
guide our application of the term even when some features are absent or diminished. 
The claim that certain features are usually present in religious conversion will lead us 
forward to the idea that there are three highly significant ‘dimensions’ of conversion, 
each of which will be explored in turn in the three subsequent chapters. 
 
1.1. Conversion. 
 
Many people hold that conversion produces ‘not a change but a revolution in 
character’, 3  which captures the weight of significance implied by the term 
‘conversion’: merely minor or insignificant changes will not be sufficient to count as 
conversion. I will introduce some of the changes that are typically associated with 
conversion. Such changes should be significant in some key way or ways, reflecting 
the import of the term ‘conversion’, and justifying the application of the term 
‘conversion’ rather than merely growth, development, change, or shift, or other less 
extreme terms. I will consider the nature of conversion through the lens of an analogy 
with scientific revolutions. Through this, I begin to develop a model of conversion on 
which converting involves a paradigm shift.  
 
1.1.1. William James and the ‘mental field thesis’. 
 
William James gives an account of religious conversion 4  that proceeds from his 
empirical research, in particular, from elaborately detailed case studies of religious 
converts.5 He introduces a psychological concept that I will call the ‘mental field 
thesis’. We could think of a ‘mental field’ as the domain of things that might become 
present to an individual’s awareness at any one time or be unconsciously active at that 
time. We can think of the mental field through a spatial metaphor: the field has a 
                                                 
3 Begbie, Harold, Twice-Born Men, New York, Fleming H., Revell Company, (1909), p. 18. 
4 He understands conversion as ‘the process, gradual or sudden, by which a self hitherto divided, and 
consciously wrong inferior and unhappy, becomes unified and consciously right superior and happy, in 
consequence of its firmer hold upon religious realities.’ James, William, The Varieties of Religious 
Experience - A Study in Human Nature, [1902], Pennsylvania State University, Electronic Classics 
Series, (2002), p. 188. 
5 This is an application of his general philosophical methodology, as he says: ‘one can see no farther 
into a generalization than just so far as one’s previous acquaintance with particulars enables one to take 
it in’. James, p. 214. (Citing Professor Agassiz.) 
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centre, and a periphery, and there is also space which counts as being beyond the field 
altogether. Within this mental field some objects of thought or attention will be 
central, and others will be peripheral – still within the field, but less pertinent and less 
easy to access. The state of our mental field changes, and ‘[a]s our mental fields 
succeed one another, each has its centre of interest, around which the objects of which 
we are less and less attentively conscious fade to a margin so faint that its limits are 
unassignable.’6 Certain things will be part of an individual’s mental field at one time 
but not at another, or will move between the centre and periphery of his 
consciousness. For example, when I am in a supermarket, the location of the fruit 
aisle may be in the forefront of my mind and my weekly food budget in the periphery, 
but these things are very unlikely to even be in the peripheral reaches of my 
consciousness when I am in a job interview, or taking a philosophy exam. In general 
we expect that anything relevant to current interests and aims will be central and 
anything that bears on or connects to the current context in any way will be 
peripheral. There is no hard and fast rule here – of course, one may find oneself 
daydreaming about fruit during a philosophy exam, even though this is likely to be 
detrimental to one’s aims and interests in such a context. We can see my general 
guideline more as an ‘ideal’ than a descriptive claim.  
When in a particular context or mode, certain things are more salient, certain 
behaviours are more germane, and we are more likely to use certain language, make 
certain assumptions, and ignore/focus on different things. For example, when I read a 
philosophy paper I will be more likely to focus on the structure of a sentence and its 
logical implications than I will be when I read light fiction. Engineers notice different 
aspects of a product than its consumers do. I may be inclined as a professional 
amongst peers to use technical jargon that I wouldn’t use in non-professional 
contexts, and in my hometown I might use colloquialisms I wouldn’t use elsewhere. 
Most of the changes of focus and shifts of salience that we undergo each day are not 
to be thought of as ‘transformative’ because they are all short lived (albeit often 
recurring), and do not exclude other modes of being, or dramatically change the 
pattern of our lives. Many things can account for a temporary shift, and James says 
the phenomenon is partly due to ‘explicitly conscious processes of thought and will, 
but is due largely also to the subconscious incubation and maturing of motives 
                                                 
6 Ibid, p. 227. 
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deposited by the experiences of life.’7 This idea of subconscious incubation is an 
interesting one – it means that something that seems insignificant at the time that it is 
experienced may actually have a cumulative influence in conjunction with later 
experiences, or in light of new experiences can seem much more significant.8  
Each individual has certain modes that are more ingrained, permanent, and 
frequently adopted. James refers to these as ‘the habitual centre of his personal 
energy’.9 When one is occupying an unfamiliar mode, there is a greater propensity 
towards feeling out of one’s ‘comfort zone’ and considering things on the far 
periphery of our mental field involves greater cognitive effort. Individuals with wider 
mental fields are likely to be more intelligent and capable, being able to make 
associations across a wider field of subjects and draw connections between related 
theories and suchlike with greater ease. We all experience shifts in the habitual centre 
of our personal energy when we engage in certain things. For instance, the process of 
training may be thought of as bringing certain things deliberately into the centre of 
one’s mental field so as to permanently shift the habitual centre of personal energy. 
Sometimes less deliberately, there is sometimes also a shift when certain aspects of 
our life circumstances change in a significant way, for instance, if we move to a new 
city and pick up the slang, or we take up a new subject and begin integrating the 
methods and terms into our thought patterns. When we are in the midst of anything 
immersive, from child rearing to a long-term research project, this will be at the 
forefront of our mind almost all of the time, and will pop up and invite connection to 
almost any seemingly unrelated thing.  
When there is oscillation, we have what James calls a ‘wavering and divided 
self’10. However, when there is a radical and more permanent alteration, ‘whenever 
one aim grows so stable as to expel definitively its previous rivals from the 
individual’s life’, as James puts it, then ‘we tend to speak of the phenomenon, and 
perhaps to wonder at it, as a “transformation.”’11 Such transformations are involved 
when we talk about conversion: when one comes ‘to lie permanently within a certain 
                                                 
7 Ibid.  
8 When we turn to the dynamics of the conversion process in §5.1 we’ll see more directly how a single 
and seemingly trivial experience can allow for another small incremental change, which cumulatively, 
leads to the possibility of wide-scale changes, and hence conversion can be made possible by even a 
small shift. 
9 Ibid, p. 194. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid, p. 193. 
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system; and then, if the change be a religious one, we call it a conversion’.12 To 
conclude this point, we might understand a religious conversion as a process whereby 
the habitual centre of a person’s energy permanently shifts to a more religious one.  
 Giving an account of conversion based on inner events like the shift in mental 
field just described seems to make it susceptible to the objection that conversion 
would be difficult to measure and to ascribe. A ‘shift in the centre of personal energy’ 
is not going to be determinable even by a sincere first-person report, since even if a 
person is self-aware enough to recognise which things are more salient than others, 
being able to reliably rank these things over a long enough period of time will be 
much harder. Indeed, it may be impossible, since when certain things cease to be 
salient they may not even be noticed or remembered, so cannot be compared or 
accounted for in this way.  
James’s method of overcoming this concern is to focus on the outward criteria 
of these inner events, by thinking about specifiable results we would expect in 
genuine conversions.13 His pragmatic approach focuses on concrete outcomes that, 
when present, allow us to claim that something counts as a genuine conversion rather 
than not. For James, these outcomes are not merely symptomatic of a conversion, but 
actually constitute it. Whenever we understand the meaning of a term, or a concept, 
we know the criteria for its application, and ‘what we discover in the course of 
[grammatical] investigation, when we ask, “[u]nder what circumstances, or in what 
particular cases, do we say…?”, are our criteria.’14 So if we understand the term 
‘conversion’, we know the criteria for its application, and we can elucidate these 
criteria by answering the question of under what circumstances we apply the term.15 
Let us focus on a case of religious conversion. My sister says that she has had 
a religious conversion. It may not, as the first objection claimed, be possible to know 
whether this is the case on the basis of a shift in salience patterns, or in the mental 
                                                 
12 Ibid, p. 194. In the next section I’ll discuss what it is for a change to count as ‘religious’. 
13  Ibid, pp. 242-3. The elements we would expect are: a sense of well-being and harmony; the 
perception of previously unknown truths (which he says will often/usually be ineffable); a new and 
more beatific way of seeing the world. 
14 Cavell, Stanley, The Claim of Reason, Clarendon Press Oxford: Clarendon Press, (1979), p. 30. 
15 The notion of a ‘criterion’ can be contrasted with the notion of a ‘symptom’, which is something that 
we have learnt from experience coincides with the criteria. For instance, it is a criterion for tonsillitis 
that there is a certain bacillus present, and it is a symptom of tonsillitis that the patient has an inflamed 
throat: ‘Then to say “A man has [tonsillitis] if this bacillus is found in him” is a tautology or it is a 
loose way of stating the definition of ‘[tonsillitis]’. But to say, “A man has [tonsillitis] whenever he has 
an inflamed throat” is to make an hypothesis’. Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Blue and Brown Books, Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2nd Ed., (1969), p. 25. Wittgenstein refers to ‘angina’, but for consistency and correctness I 
have edited this to ‘tonsillitis’ in square brackets.  
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field. These are still interesting, and we will come to see in the remainder of the thesis 
that the change in mental field is linked with changes in various other dimensions that 
can be outwardly measured. What we note as having changed in my sister’s case is 
that she now believes that God exists, loves him, and is joyful more often. She has 
started going to church, consolidating friendships with other religious people, 
donating to the poor, and praying on a daily basis. When we ordinarily apply the term, 
these are the sorts of things that we have in mind, so without assuming any specific 
set of criteria at this point, we seem to have a plausible candidate for meeting the 
outward criteria for having had a conversion. If the criteria are met, then we say that 
there really has been a genuine conversion, and otherwise we don’t.  
Yet the sceptic might claim that even when the criteria are present she may 
still not have had a conversion: she could be faking. This threatens to undermine the 
criteria as useful, as their presence wouldn’t be able to reliably tell us whether 
someone has had a conversion or not. Yet, as Cavell notes, ‘to accommodate that fact, 
to make the fact comprehensible, even, one could say, to state that fact, one has to say 
something like, “He was pretending; rehearsing a part; he was hypnotized…”’16 An 
easy way out would be to claim that should any of these explanations be appropriate, 
then the criteria simply were not met. ‘But this is empty. For now we can preserve the 
certainty of the connection between a criterion and what it is a criterion of only at the 
price of never knowing with certainty that the criterion is satisfied…’.17 A different 
way of preserving the usefulness of criteria is required. 
One such way would be to point out that ‘feigning’ and ‘mocking’ have 
criteria of their own. Often it will be obvious when the criteria are not properly 
satisfied because we can identify such cases. We can only identify cases of not 
meeting the criteria genuinely (as we do in cases of feigning) if we know what the real 
deal looks like too. We are in no doubt that a person is not sincere when, on a hot day 
in a long queue they say with an over-animated smile and a strong emphasis: ‘You 
know, I just love waiting around all day.’ We can identify this as a case of sarcasm, 
and we do so by knowing both the criteria for a sincere utterance of this sentence, and 
how this utterance diverges from it using conventions that commonly indicate 
sarcasm. 18  We learn what these various special circumstances are as part of our 
                                                 
16 Cavell, p. 40. 
17 Ibid, p. 41. 
18 Ibid, p. 43. 
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development of language; understanding criteria is necessary both for understanding 
the words, and understanding the behaviours themselves.19 When someone meets the 
criterion for pain it is not always reasonable to claim that it is pretence: ‘if over 
months you observe someone suffering from an obvious injury that may even prove 
fatal in the end, it would be plain ridiculous to insist that this might have been just a 
pretence.’20 This applies to how I could identify pretence in my sister’s case. Since I 
am familiar with her moods, behaviour patterns, acting skills, sense of humour, and so 
on, I’d have a case that would be as good as any could be for a verdict on whether the 
criteria are genuinely met, or were being utilised for pretence. In this case, given that 
my sister has always been terrible liar and not an especially talented actress, and has 
no motivation for deception in any case, I am well placed to claim that the lack of 
typical markers for pretence is a sign that there is no pretence. The sustained effort 
and intricacy of a pretence that lasted a lifetime, for no apparent reason, cannot 
sensibly be called pretence.  
Even if/when my sister is feigning some aspect of a conversion, we can only 
tell that what she is feigning is conversion by knowing that these are the criteria that 
indicate that phenomenon rather than another. As Cavell puts it (discussing the case of 
pain) ‘what he is feigning must be precisely pain … These circumstances are ones in 
appealing to which, in describing which, we retain the concept (here, of pain) whose 
application these criteria determine.’21 It is because we have a full understanding of 
the concept and the criteria of pain that we are able to make judgments about when 
certain behaviours are simulating pain-behaviour, and when they are not pain-
behaviours at all. Cavell puts it well when he says: 
 
Criteria are “criteria for something’s being so”, not in the sense that they tell us of a 
thing’s existence, but of something like its identity, not of its being so, but of its being 
so.22 
 
Here we might distinguish these two senses of ‘being so’ as follows. Something being 
so is an existential sense, claiming that something is in existence. Something being so 
is a predicative sense, where it is being claimed that something (existent or non-
                                                 
19 Ibid. 
20 Schroeder, Severin, Wittgenstein, The Way Out of the Fly-Bottle, Wiley, (2006), p. 210. 
21 Cavell, p. 45.  
22 Ibid. 
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existent) is a certain way. When it is claimed that criteria are ‘criteria for something’s 
being so’ in the predicative (rather than existential) sense, this means that criteria 
cannot infallibly tell us what is the case, i.e. we cannot go from the criteria of pain to 
a certainty of the presence of pain in a metaphysical way. But this does not alter the 
fact that whenever there is pain, the criteria tell us what things will be the case.  
Given that the satisfaction of the criteria for religious conversion ensure the 
suitability of applying the concept of ‘undergoing a religious conversion’, as the 
discussion so far has claimed, the presence of the criteria are enough to apply the 
concept. So although there may sometimes be cases of faking, in the case under 
discussion, where my sister satisfies the criteria of having had a religious conversion, 
she has had a religious conversion, and if one stipulates that she hasn’t had a 
conversion, one is merely distorting the meaning of the term ‘religious conversion’ 
beyond that with which we are familiar.23  
The objection that we cannot apply the term ‘conversion’ based on the 
presence of inner events was countered by claiming that we can do so by the presence 
of outward events. As the inner events are conceptually linked to the outwards events 
and are criteria for the application of the concept, we can apply the term ‘conversion’ 
whenever the criteria are met. I considered a further objection to this proposal, namely 
that the criteria can be met when someone is faking, and so the concept should not 
really be applied even though the criteria are met. This was countered by noting that 
the concept does apply in the sense that we use the criteria to ascertain that what is 
being faked is precisely that concept, and that there are also criteria that allow us to 
ascertain when something is a pretence and when it is not.  
 This section has aimed to show that that there are inner characteristics of 
conversion that involve shifts in salience patterns and in the Jamesean mental field, 
and that we ordinarily attribute a conversion to those who exhibit certain features we 
take as criteria for the application of that term. What exactly these are will be 
explored later in the thesis. Now, I’ll elaborate on the conversion phenomenon by 
analogy with scientific revolutions, which I claim can add a fruitful layer to our 
understanding of conversion. 
 
                                                 
23 Cf. Cavell’s: ‘[I]f that isn’t – if he isn’t having – a toothache, I don’t know what a toothache is.’ (p. 
69). 
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1.1.2. An analogy between conversion and paradigm shifts. 
 
In normal scientific progress there is an accepted methodology and a set of 
background and explicit assumptions and beliefs against which new hypotheses are 
tested. Hypotheses will be considered true when they are verifiable using the accepted 
scientific method and are compatible with and supported by the accepted assumptions 
and beliefs. If new hypotheses are found to be unverifiable or incompatible with other 
verifiable theses, they will be rejected or amended. Thus ordinary scientific progress 
is cumulative and non-revisionary. When one occupies a non-religious standpoint, one 
uses the assumptions that come along with this standpoint to assess and integrate 
religious phenomena. For example, one might reduce religious experiences to 
scientifically explainable mental processes, without reference to a transcendent being. 
The background against which ordinary scientific progress is made is called a 
‘paradigm’ by Kuhn, and this is described by Bird as a ‘strong commitment by the 
relevant scientific community to their shared theoretical beliefs, values, instruments 
and techniques, and even metaphysics.’24 One’s paradigm is a complex network, and 
a single datum that conflicts with some aspect of the network is more likely to be 
explained away, rejected as an anomaly, or even ignored, than taken as a legitimate 
challenge to the paradigm. In a pragmatic sense, this is prudent to avoid minor 
mistakes taking up lots of time and energy and detracting from more important 
concerns. If every anomaly were treated as potentially foundation-shaking, much less 
progress would or could be made. In cases where there is a small anomaly in a well-
established paradigm ‘[t]he decision to opt for a revision of a disciplinary matrix is 
not one that is rationally compelled; nor is the particular choice of revision rationally 
compelled.’25  
Scientific paradigms can be maintained for years, decades, or even centuries, 
with anomalous data being accounted for in all manner of ways, sometimes in 
extreme and implausible ways. However, sometimes the accumulation of anomalous 
data reaches a tipping point where it can no longer be ignored. Or at other times, one 
single new datum is overwhelming and, though inconsistent with the existing 
paradigm, cannot be ignored. There may be a loss of confidence in the paradigm at 
                                                 
24 Bird, Alexander, ‘Thomas Kuhn’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (Spring 2013 Edition), 
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/thomas-kuhn/>.  
25 Ibid. 
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this point, which Kuhn calls a ‘crisis of confidence’.26 A possible response to the new 
datum/data will be increased motivation to engage with the topic creatively in order to 
reduce or resolve the cognitive dissonance that will be experienced. One outcome of 
such efforts might be the detection of a pattern in the anomalous data, or an idea that 
can form the basis for a new understanding of the territory that radically undermines 
some previously accepted aspect of the current paradigm. When this happens, we call 
it a ‘revolution’, and a new paradigm replaces the old. Thus, we can understand a 
Kuhnian scientific revolution as involving a paradigm shift, where some aspect of the 
paradigm changes, which requires a radical revision of previously accepted facts, 
methods, or standards. Scientific revolutions aren’t cumulative, and are revisionary.27  
Returning to our analogy with religious conversion, something like 
‘anomalous data’ is encountered when one has a religious experience or witnesses a 
miracle, which may undermine the individual’s existing paradigm, for example by 
contravening the laws of nature. It may also be interesting to note that the majority of 
conversions occur at times of great distress – when an alcoholic ‘hits rock bottom’, 
when a loved one dies, when one narrowly avoids death, as well as during 
adolescence: another kind of crisis.28 These may also be the times when individuals 
are the least cognitively proficient, so it would not be an unexpected result if it turned 
out that individuals at such times would be less likely to be able to find a place in their 
current paradigm for something seemingly anomalous (although I am not aware of 
any research that may have been conducted that could illuminate this). When a crisis 
of confidence in one’s worldview requires one to make sense of the conflicting datum, 
the ‘territory’ might shift in a way similar to the shift that is experienced when one 
stops seeing a duck here, and sees a rabbit instead: 29  
 
 
Try now to flip a few times between seeing this as a duck, then a rabbit. It is 
                                                 
26 Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, [1962], Chicago: University of Chicago Press, (1970), 
pp. 66–76. 
27 Bird, ‘Kuhn’. 
28 Christensen, C.W., ‘Religious Conversion in Adolescence’, Pastoral Psychology, (Sept., 1965). See 
also James, p. 197 and pp. 209-10. 
29 It isn’t clear (and Kuhn himself was not sure) whether the duck rabbit case is ‘just an analogy or 
whether it illustrated some more general truth about the way the mind works that encompasses the 
scientific case too.’ (Bird, ‘Kuhn’. Emphasis added.) 
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quite likely that this involved a small movement of the centre of your focus: for 
myself, focussing towards the left I see the rabbit, while moving my focus towards the 
right I see a duck. Interestingly, I also see a duck more readily than a rabbit, although 
I have reason to think it may be different for different people. This shift in focus is 
analogous to the shift in what is at the centre of your mental field. It is not only a 
metaphorical claim that shifting one’s attention to a different thing will result in 
seeing things in a different way, and this thought will be taken up further in later 
chapters.  
There are some disanalogies between the experience of the duckrabbit and the 
kind of Gestalt switch that we experience in a conversion or revolution. Firstly, we 
can flip backwards and forwards between viewing the image above as a duck and as a 
rabbit (it is harder to view it as a duckrabbit). Flipping backwards and forwards 
between the religious and non-religious perspectives in this way can occur through 
experiences of empathy with another’s worldview, but it is not as simple and easy as 
in the duckrabbit case because the religious and non-religious world-views are not 
simple single line images. In this sense we are dealing with something closer to a 
mandala than a duckrabbit. Secondly, nothing much else changes when I see a duck 
rather than a rabbit, while the conversion or revolution case involves far more 
widespread and radical shifts. One change in our worldview, one Gestalt switch, can 
instigate wide scale revision: a change in scientific paradigm may have consequences 
for technology, engineering, ethics, politics, law, and many other areas of life in 
greater or lesser ways. In the life of religious convert too the results will be far-
reaching: as will become clearer in subsequent chapters, even something as simple as 
a change in one single belief, will have implications for emotions, behaviours, and 
other beliefs too (among other things) and these changes in turn trigger further 
changes, and this may continue until the resemblance to the starting position is faint.  
Consider Salvador Dali’s ‘Gala Contemplating The Mediterranean Sea Which 
At Twenty Meters Becomes The Portrait Of Abraham Lincoln’:  
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Fig. 1 
 
If you were to stand close to the picture, you would see a woman standing in 
front of a window. If you were to stand at twenty meters distance you could see the 
image as a picture of Lincoln. (For the same effect, squint or cross your eyes and look 
at Fig. 1.) This image can also be used to illustrate the notion of a Gestalt switch. At 
first one part of the painting is seen as Gala’s arm, but at a certain distance it becomes 
Lincoln’s nose. At first one group of pixels is seen as Gala’s head, but then it 
becomes Lincoln’s eye. Once you are standing at the required distance, this switch 
has occurred, it no longer makes sense to see the painting in the old way, and from 
that distance it may no longer be possible. Once certain parts of the image are viewed 
differently we are no longer free to see the image in certain other ways. Once we start 
viewing part of the picture in a certain way, it can no longer function as part of the old 
pattern. Just as, while a convert remembers what their life used to be like, they no 
longer have the same view of it. Once you are seeing the image as the face of Lincoln, 
you no longer see the window, the woman, or the sun. When you are standing close to 
this painting, you need to walk some distance for your perspective to change, and this 
‘walk’ is part of what I shall be exploring in this thesis. How does one take these 
steps, and what must happen along the way? This will be the focus of subsequent 
chapters of the thesis.  
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 An advantage of this picture of conversion as analogous with scientific 
revolution, or with a paradigm shift, is that it can also help to answer the question of 
how to distinguish between conversion and mere growth (which may be analogous to 
ordinary scientific progress). One thing that makes the distinction more challenging to 
draw is that conversions can be extended over longer periods of time, and can be 
‘prepared   for by conditions which extend over a   long period’,30 so it seems that 
the distinguishing mark cannot simply be a temporal difference: it might not always 
be the case that conversions are sudden while growth is gradual. Yet, as Ferguson 
points out, the fact that conversions can extend over time just as growth does, ‘invites 
the supposition that since the process is extended it must, therefore, not be radically 
different from the process of growth: Conversion is gradual; growth is gradual; 
therefore, conversion equals growth. (One would think that the distinguishing marks 
should be associated, not with duration but with dynamics).’31 Ferguson is right to 
claim that the difference between growth and conversion is one of dynamics. On my 
view the dynamics of growth will be more like ordinary scientific progress, where 
new beliefs can cumulate and connections between them can be added, but without 
challenging the paradigm already in place. The dynamics of conversion will involve a 
paradigm shift; potentially triggered by something like a Gestalt switch and in this 
sense will be more like a revolution. 
 
1.2. The nature of religiosity. 
 
The Socratic approach to understanding what ‘religiosity’ is might be to discover 
through the dialectic ‘what feature all and only religions share in virtue of which they 
are religions’.32 I shall consider the attempts that have been made to provide (non-
circular and substantive) definitions of ‘religious’ and ‘religion’. My prognosis for 
this method is that most definitions limiting themselves to the prominent 
characteristics of only one major religion or to one feature of religion will be 
deficient, because religiosity is a diverse phenomenon. On the other hand, definitions 
that attempt to capture all of these diversities by being more general will thereby 
include things that are not religious at all. Moreover, religiosity is an evolving 
                                                 
30 Furgeson, H., ‘The Definition of Religious Conversion’, Pastoral Psychology, (Sept. 1965), Vol. 16, 
Iss. 6, p. 11. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Stone, p. 337. 
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phenomenon. Thus any rigid definition will capture only a synchronic perspective of 
something that should be treated diachronically, and will be a merely a still frame of a 
moving picture. I argue in the next section that a single definition cannot be provided. 
By reference to specific examples I shall show that they fail on one or more of three 
counts: they are circular; they do not include all of the necessary conditions; or they 
do not provide sufficient conditions. I shall then conduct a post-mortem on this kind 
of approach, explaining why the definitionalist project fails. 
 
1.2.1. The inadequacy of definitions of religiosity. 
 
Definitions of a term attempt to capture necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
application of that term. The provision of a definition would thereby allow one to 
either apply or withhold the term from any particular instance by measuring against 
the definition. Pihlström argues that attempts to demarcate religiosity in this way are 
committed to essentialism, which means that the application of the term would 
depend on certain essential ‘religious-making’ properties being present. He says:  
 
If such an essentialist view were true an explicit definition of religion would be a 
meaningful goal, and its possibility would be a necessary presupposition of any 
normative discussion of religion and religiosity, If, however, no essentialism is 
invoked, or if essentialism is rejected as a hopelessly outdated form of metaphysics, 
then the question arises whether any religion vs. pseudo-religion (or religion vs. 
superstition) boundary can be drawn at all.33 
 
I agree that for a successful definition to be possible it would be a requirement for 
there to be features that would enable us to distinguish things of the ‘religious’ type 
from other types without such features, and that if there is no essential feature, then 
definitions will fail.  
It might be the case that ‘the term “religion” does not pick out phenomena that 
are naturally grouped together. In other words, religions do not possess some common 
defining feature that the term “religion” picks out.’34 Rather, ‘the various religions do 
                                                 
33 Pihlström, Sami, ‘Religion and Pseudo-Religion: An Elusive Boundary’, International Journal for 
Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 62, No. 1 (Aug., 2007), p. 4. 
34 As quoted in Harrison, V.S., ‘The Pragmatics of Defining Religion in a Multi-Cultural World’, p. 
139. 
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not have any defining features, or essence, in common’.35 If this is the case, this 
doesn’t make the search for definitions inexplicable, or even futile. It is a natural 
human tendency to try to impose this rigour onto the world. And through the project 
of testing various definitions one may clarify the concept by highlighting useful sub-
groups of what might count as religious by showing that certain religions share a 
certain group of features and not others. However, it would be a mistake to insist that 
there must be a definition or to apply a blanket definition that is unsuccessful. 
Wittgenstein advises well when he says: ‘Don't say: ‘There must be something 
common…’—but look and see’.36 I will spend the remainder of this section looking 
and seeing, and this will give us more reason to reject the essentialist thesis than to 
accept it. I will argue that despite this, we can still successfully draw boundaries 
between the religious and non-religious, despite this not being achieved in the manner 
essentialists have attempted.  
 I claimed that definitions typically fail for one of several reasons: they are 
circular; they admit too much; or they admit too little. The least interesting definitions 
are those that are tautological or circular, for instance this definition, which Shrubsole 
calls ‘one of the least illuminating of modern definitions’:37  
 
The true essence of religion is found in the religiosity or religious frame of mind 
[which is] the aggregate of all those phenomena which are invariably termed religious 
in contradistinction to ethical, aesthetical, political and others’38  
 
This gives no indication of what actually distinguishes the religious from the ethical, 
aesthetical, or political, merely claiming that the essence of religion is in its 
religiosity, or religious frame of mind. If this were expanded on it might avoid 
circularity, but here the only hint is that this involves phenomena that are termed 
‘religious’. 
Some definitions include too little, by ruling out things that we want to call 
religious from counting as religious. Some specific faiths offer definitions of 
religiosity that focus on what membership to that specific faith involved. For 
                                                 
35 Ibid, p. 141. 
36 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §66. 
37 Shrubsole, O.A., ‘The Relation of Theological Dogma to Religion’, International Journal of Ethics, 
Vol. 17, No. 4, (Jul., 1907), p. 409. 
38 Tiele, Elements of the Science of Religion, William Blackwood and Sons, (1867). 
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example: ‘Religion is the belief in an ever living God.’39 Definitions of this type, that 
accurately define some specific religion or part of a religion, sect, denomination, 
tradition, or religious standpoint may well be useful in the context of that group, as a 
way of highlighting or demarcating what is important and unique about that particular 
group. However, even if such ‘narrow’ definitions are accurate in this narrow domain, 
the aim of this thesis is not to capture merely what is specific to a particular group, but 
is rather to achieve a higher degree of generality. This definition would rule out by 
fiat any polytheistic religion (whose adherents would not accept a single God), as well 
as any religion that does not include belief in any God, for example Daoism and 
Buddhism. It also rules out certain forms of Judaism where such a belief is not 
regarded as essential for being a practising member of the religion, since ‘for the Jew, 
religion cannot be so easily identified with the affirmation of a given content of 
belief.’ 40  Therefore it is not inclusive enough, and does not express a necessary 
condition, so is not acceptable as a general definition of religiosity. One may attempt 
to justify this exclusion, but this is likely to be arbitrary or ad hoc unless reasons can 
be offered that don’t stem from the assumption that their chosen faith is the only real 
faith. People of different faiths wouldn’t accept justifications of this type.41  
An example of a definition that includes too much is the following: ‘we might 
define religion as the instinct which impels all beings to seek that which is regarded as 
best’42 As ‘what is best’ is something that needs further unpacking it could also be 
construed so as to include all manner of things as religious, for example Olympic 
sports, which aim at what is best in terms of human physical ability. Another example 
is, ‘a practice that expresses and advances the ultimate concern of a large number of 
people’43 Then, as Jim Stone points out, the stock market and the drug trade would 
count as religions.44 Another is that the ‘essence of religion consists in the feeling of 
                                                 
39  Martineau, as cited in Alston, William, ‘Religion’, Paul Edwards (ed.), The Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, Vol. 7 London: Macmillan, (1967), p. 140. 
40 Borowitz, Eugene B., A New Jewish Theology in the Making, Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 
(1968), p. 44. Cited in Harrison, ‘The Pragmatics of Defining Religion in a Multi-Cultural World’, p. 
134. 
41 This can have important consequences. For instance, in America during World War II, many people 
were refused exemption from fighting on conscientious grounds because the government did not 
recognise their religion as genuine according to accepted definitions. These were, notably, people from 
Quaker or Hopi faiths, and for many of these people the definitional question meant a choice between 
being compelled to fight in a war they could not support and imprisonment for desertion if they upheld 
their pacifism. 
42 Shrubsole, p. 411. 
43 Stone, Jim, ‘A Theory of Religion’, Religious Studies, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Sep., 1991), p. 337. 
44 Ibid. 
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absolute dependence.’45 According to Freud this conflates the cause of religion with 
the meaning of ‘religion’.46 Additionally, the feeling in question could be shared by 
those who feel we depend on the natural world, and to a lesser extent, people who are 
absolutely dependent on other people due to illness or disability. Another definition 
that has been offered is: ‘a religion is a conceptual system that provides an 
interpretation of the world and the place of human beings in it, bases an account of 
how life should be lived given that interpretation, and expresses this interpretation and 
lifestyle in a set of rituals, institutions and practices.’47  But this doesn’t rule out 
Maoism (or other political systems that involve public ceremonies and rituals.)  
Some definitions occupy the unfortunate position of failing on both of the 
above counts, for instance that religion is ‘a propitiation or conciliation of powers 
superior to man’.48 Not all religions serve this function, for instance Buddhism. This 
also includes as religious things we may wish to exclude, such as paying bribes to a 
superior extra-terrestrial race of oppressors, which would meet this definition. 
Another example is that ‘a religion is: (1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) 
establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by (3) 
formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and (4) clothing these 
conceptions with such an aura of factuality that (5) the moods and motivations seem 
uniquely realistic.’49 This rules in Marxism, which meets all of these requirements, 
and rules out Quakerism, which does not incorporate symbols in this way. 
Definitions of ‘the religious person’ have often taken some definition of 
religion as prior to it, and then the religious person is simply defined in terms of their 
connection to a ‘religion’. Harrison contends that ‘two criteria of religiosity have been 
widely regarded as individually necessary and jointly sufficient: if a person was (1) 
affiliated to a religious institution, and (2) held religious beliefs, then he or she could 
be classified as ‘religious’ as opposed to ‘nonreligious’.’ 50  This is problematic 
because the first criterion rules out anyone who does not have a particular institutional 
affiliation, more isolated individuals, or those who reject the mainstream religion in 
                                                 
45 Schleiermacher, as cited in Alston, ‘Religion’, p. 141. 
46 Freud, Sigmund, ‘The future of an Illusion’, The Standard Edition of the Complete Works of Freud, 
Vol. XXII, ed. James Strachey, London: The Hogarth Press Ltd., (1964). 
47 Yandell, Keith, Philosophy of Religion: A Contemporary Introduction, London: Routledge, (1999), 
p. 16 as quoted in Harrison, ‘The Pragmatics of Defining Religion in a Multi-Cultural World’, p. 138. 
48 Frazer, as cited in Alston, ‘Religion’, p. 140. 
49 Clifford G., The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays (New York: Basic Books, 1973), p. 90, 
as quoted in Harrison, ‘The Pragmatics of Defining Religion in a Multi-Cultural World’, p. 139. 
50 Harrison, Victoria S., ‘On Defining the Religious Person’, Theology, Vol. 110, (Jul., 2007), p. 243. 
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their society, even if such people have religious beliefs, feelings, and a religious 
identity and lifestyle. A study has shown that while only fifteen percent of the British 
population actively participate in institutional religion, ‘between two-thirds and three-
quarters of British people indicate fairly consistently that they believe in some sort of 
God’.51 So it seems that requiring religious affiliation will neglect the fifty to sixty 
percent of British people who have religious beliefs but aren’t affiliated with a 
religious institution. Likewise, some people consider themselves religious despite not 
having expressible religious beliefs, for example some mystics and those affiliated to 
religious institutions that do not emphasis religious beliefs, and those whose religious 
life centres on praxis, and affective rather than intellectual aspects of religiosity. This 
strongly suggests that religious affiliation and religious beliefs are inadequate as 
criteria for identifying what makes someone religious, since they rule out many 
people who we would intuitively want to call religious.  
One criterion that might distinguish religious from non-religious people is 
sincere self-affirmation – indeed, ‘Many have concluded that the only possible 
criterion of whether a person is religious or not is whether or not that person says that 
she is.’ 52  A consequence of this would be that anyone sincerely claiming to be 
religious or non-religious would be so, even if this seems very counter-intuitive to 
everyone else. Thus we would need to contend that some kinds of Buddhism do not 
constitute a religion because their members do not see their brand of Buddhism as a 
‘religion’ nor themselves as ‘religious’. For example, there is a movement with 
meditation centres all over the world that are explicitly Buddhist, communicate the 
teachings of Buddha, practice meditation to develop Samadhi and Panya 
(concentration and wisdom) along with Sila (morality, as outlined in the Buddhist 
eightfold path) and yet also explicitly say that they are ‘non-sectarian’, ‘scientific’, 
with no ‘meaningless rites and rituals’ and do not self-describe as religious.53 It would 
also be a consequence of taking self-ascription as definitive that the man who founded 
‘Pastafarianism’ and worships ‘The Spaghetti Monster’ would count as authentically 
religious just as much as Christians who worship the God of traditional theism.54 One 
                                                 
51  Davie, Grace, Religion in Britain Since 1945: Believing without Belonging, [1994] Blackwell, 
(1995), pp. 74f. As quoted in Harrison, ‘On Defining the Religious Person’, p. 245. 
52 Harrison, ‘On Defining the Religious Person’, p. 244. 
53 S.N. Goenka, Vipassana meditation discourse given at Dhamma Dipa meditation center, UK. 
54 This example is taken from the media: 
 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/howaboutthat/8635624/Pastafarian-wins-religious-
freedom-right-to-wear-pasta-strainer-for-driving-licence.html 
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may claim that this man is not sincere, but many others clearly are, even if this 
sincerity is the product of obvious delusion. This problem can only be avoided if it is 
possible that a person might be irreligious when they sincerely claim to be religious 
and might be religious when they sincerely claim not to be, so ‘even an outright denial 
of religious identity may not constitute decisive evidence that a person is 
irreligious’.55  
There are several further problems with taking self-affirmation as a criterion 
for being religious. Firstly, there is an epistemological problem arising from the fact 
that it will be hard to know in all cases whether a self-declaration of religiosity is 
sincere. Secondly, there is a problem about equivocation, in that we cannot be sure 
that those who affirm they are religious will be using the term ‘religious’ in the same 
way. Someone may use the term in a restricted way. For example, someone might say 
they are not religious because they do not adhere to the religion of their parents or 
community, or because they do not observe it with the strictness of others they deem 
paradigmatic of the ‘religious man’.56 Schleiermacher thinks that some people take 
themselves to be non-religious because they reject formal doctrines and institutions 
but that they might nevertheless be religious. 57  In this case they would have 
miscategorised themselves because they were working with an impoverished account 
of religiosity.  
The third and most difficult problem arises if it is possible that a person could 
be mistaken about their religiosity. That people can lack self-knowledge and can fall 
prey to self-deception suggests that they could.58 One might fail to ascribe religiosity 
to oneself in the same fashion we might expect someone to be unaware that they are 
boring, or be unable to admit to themselves that they have an addiction. A person 
might uncritically claim to be religious when they think that this is pious and desirable 
despite not exhibiting the features typically associated with religiosity, or they might 
declare they are not religious as in their circle agnosticism is fashionable, but hold 
beliefs ‘that make it very difficult to accept her denial’.59 This suggests that there may 
                                                 
55 Harrison, ‘On Defining the Religious Person’, p. 246. 
56 These semantic issues will be explored further in §1.2.3. 
57 Schleiermacher, as cited in Harrison, ‘The Pragmatics of Defining Religion in a Multi-Cultural 
World’, p. 135. 
58 See §§2.1 and 3.2 respectively for defense of these points.  
59 Harrison, ‘On Defining the Religious Person’, p. 247. ‘Bréchon claims that a significant number of 
those who declared themselves to be without a religion nevertheless [end p. 246] claimed to be 
committed to such quintessentially religious objects of belief as the existence of God, life after death 
and miracles.’ Harrison, ‘On Defining the Religious Person’, p. 246-7. 
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be some religious-making feature or features that a person can possess without their 
knowledge, or at least, that there may be a feature that is definitive independently of 
self-attribution. Self-attribution, then, is neither necessary nor sufficient to classify 
someone as religious, or their institution as religion. While self-attribution may be an 
interesting thing to study for its own sake, as a guide of whether someone is religious, 
it will be unreliable.  
So far, then, none of the attempts to give a definition or criterion for religiosity 
have been successful. One might be tempted to think at this juncture that the problem 
is not with definition per se, but with trying to provide one overarching definition for 
all religions. It might alleviate the problem faced by some of the definitions 
considered here, as well as others not considered, to claim that ‘religion’ is too broad 
a term to define, as it encompasses sub-categories within this catchall. There are, 
some have contended, distinctly different types of religiosity, each of which might 
have a separate definition. Thus the problem with finding a definition that 
encompasses enough but not too much can be solved by instead dividing the loose 
term into several more specific ones and trying to define those. The definitions we 
have considered may fail to capture the general concept but may adequately define 
one of these types.  
Typologies have been put forward that may be able to show that the kinds of 
definitions explored above usually do quite well at defining one of these types. These 
types are not always mutually exclusive as some can be applied conjunctively, so the 
typologies are not always competing explanations but merely explanations focussing 
on different features (this will become clearer with examples in the following 
discussion). One typology is the separation of the religious phenomenon into broad 
categories of intellectual, affective, and behavioural components. Victoria Harrison 
has a typology of this kind, and she calls the categories ‘intellectual’, ‘affective’, and 
‘functional’. 60  William Alston also proceeds in a similar way, although his 
terminology is somewhat different. He calls his categories, ‘prophetic’, ‘mystical’ and 
‘sacramental’. The prophetic type locates the divine in human manifestations, for 
example Mohammad or Jesus, plus in scripture that reveals the word of God.61 The 
mystical type locates the divine in individual experiences. The emphasis is placed on 
                                                 
60 Harrison, ‘The Pragmatics of Defining Religion in a Multi-Cultural World’, p. 133. Harrison takes 
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asceticism and ‘contemplative discipline that will be conducive to the attainment and 
maintenance’62 of union with the divine. This seems to map roughly onto Harrison’s 
affective type. The sacramental type locates the divine in objects, for example totems, 
crucifixes, relics, and baptismal water. Here ‘the centre of religious activity will be 
found in ritual acts centring on these embodiments’.63 This roughly corresponds to 
Harrison’s functional type. 
It is not likely that any particular religion will fall squarely into one of these 
types. Rather, these types will appear to some extent in most religions, but in different 
ways and to different degrees, and some religions will be a combination of only two 
of these types, or even only one. Alston claims that ‘Buddhism and philosophical 
Hinduism are predominantly mystical; Judaism, Islam, and Confucianism are 
primarily prophetic; and popular Hinduism, in company with all polytheistic and 
primitive religions, is primarily sacramental.’64 Thus definitions of a particular type of 
religion are unlikely to perfectly map onto our experience of religiosity either. 
This result is in line with our practical experience of using the concept of 
religiosity, for when we try to decide whether an institution or person is religious, we 
don’t in fact go through a process of filtering it through a definition and seeing if it 
meets the definition or not; moreover, we may often use the term ‘religious’ in a 
variety of ways corresponding to an implicit understanding that there are different 
types of religion. Even when we are faced with what strikes us as a paradigm case of a 
religion, it may be clearer to us that it obviously counts as a religion, than that it meets 
any particular definition. While philosophy attempts to provide rigour, we should not 
apply rigour where doing so takes us further from, rather than closer to, the reality of 
the phenomenon we are interested in. The concluding thought of this section is that 
‘there is no unmistakable class-mark distinctive of all true converts.’65 Definitions are 
merely commentaries on meaning. In the remainder of this chapter I will fill the hole 
left by the failed definitionalist project with some positive comments about the 
concept of religiosity, and will argue that what ‘religiosity’ means is both flexible and 
dynamic, vague, and context-sensitive.  
 
                                                 
62 Ibid. 
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64 Ibid, pp. 144-5. 
65 James, p. 234. 
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1.2.2. Religion as a family resemblance concept. 
 
In reaction to an essentialist picture of language, Wittgenstein raised the thought that 
many concepts can be seen as ‘family resemblance’ concepts. 66  The essentialist 
picture seems right in the case of concepts like ‘triangle’ where if there are three sides 
whose angles add up to 180º the concept applies, and not otherwise. It is not so 
straightforward with other concepts, for example ‘game’. On reflection it seems that 
there is no single feature that all games have in common. There are games with or 
without winners (chess, peek-a-boo), with or without teammates  (hockey, solitaire), 
without or without boards/balls/rules (snakes and ladders, football, make-believe), and 
so on. Yet it is appropriate to call all these things games. While there is not a single 
feature they all have in common, there are nevertheless strands of similarity that run 
through all things that we call ‘games’. No feature is necessary, but some 
combinations of features will be jointly sufficient. Wittgenstein famously said this is 
like the resemblance between family members: while there is no single feature they 
need all have in common (although they may all share certain features, for example 
eye colour) there will be things that the father has in common with his son but not his 
daughter, and in common with his grandson but not his son, and so on, so that there 
are threads of similarity on the basis of which we can see that they look like a family.  
‘Religiosity’ can be understood as a family resemblance concept. As we have 
seen from various inadequate attempts at definition, it could well be that there is no 
feature that all religions or all religious people have in common. Nevertheless, there 
could still be features, some combinations of which are sufficient for religiosity. 
Seeing the matter in this way immediately undercuts many of the problems associated 
with definitional approaches. We no longer need to artificially constrain the concept 
to rule out things that do not seem religious, nor do we need to artificially broaden it 
in order to include things that do seem religious. Instead we can refer directly to those 
seemings and ask what features it has that seem specifically religious, that it might or 
might not share with other instances.  
Stone makes an objection to this approach, saying that ‘the Wittgensteinian, 
faced with a borderline case of religion (for example secular humanism or 
Confucianism), can simply stipulate whether or not it is a religion. Where there can be 
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no standard, there is no possibility of getting things wrong.’67 He follows this by 
stating: ‘On my account there is always a fact of the matter’. There is no argument 
given for his view except that it is able to provide this certainty, which is taken to be a 
benefit. However, he overlooks the sense in which a Wittgensteinian could allow the 
possibility of someone getting things wrong. For it would not be acceptable for 
someone to stipulate that something is a religion when it is clearly not one, nor is it 
necessarily enough to apply a concept on the basis of one single feature from a list of 
family resemblances.68 So there is a very real sense in which one is able to ‘get it 
wrong’ on the Wittgensteinian account, and in borderline cases the contested point is 
whether we are any more likely to get it wrong with a good guess based on our 
linguistic intuition and experience of religions, or by applying a stipulative 
definition.69  
The contentious area is over those examples for which it is not obvious 
whether the term ‘religious’ applies or not and these will naturally be the ones that 
most people find more challenging to classify: these are borderline cases. This 
difficulty is what Stone’s definition is supposed to alleviate, as this is exactly the 
situation in which a handy definition could help, because one could simply apply the 
definition to arbitrate between those with the definitional feature and those without. 
But what confidence can we have that applying this definition will give us the right 
result? Perhaps, contrary to Stone’s view of the matter, having this definition will lead 
one to apply it uncritically and blindly rule things in or out depending on its fit, and to 
gloss over important considerations not captured by the definition. Due consideration 
of each borderline case individually may well serve us better, and allow us to make 
room for the senses in which something is both like, and unlike, paradigm cases of 
religion. I therefore reply from the family resemblance corner that we need not make 
this retreat back to essentialism. 
A second objection to the family resemblance proposal is that family 
resemblances are much harder to use than definitions to identify cases. What is to tell 
us which resemblances count, and in which combinations? There might be lots of 
things that resemble games, and share many features with other games, without 
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themselves counting as games, for example cross country running, and formula one 
racing. Likewise, many things have many resemblances with religions, but are not 
clearly religious, like political world-views, secular humanism, and scientism. The 
fact that in some cases it will be hard to tell whether something is a religion or not is 
taken by the definitionalist as a reason that we need a criterion or definition, to neaten 
up these troublesome cases.70  
The solution to this problem can be inspired by the following quotation from 
Wittgenstein: ‘Anyone with an eye for family resemblances can recognize that two 
people are related to each other, even without being able to say wherein the 
resemblance lies.’71  The above objection underestimates our ability as competent 
language users to know and understand when a term applies and when it does not, so 
the frequency with which this problem will arise is smaller than the objector might 
lead us to think (certainly not frequently enough to warrant abandoning the concept 
altogether). This is only part of the reply. The other part of the reply is to alleviate the 
concern in those genuine cases of uncertainty. One alternative may be to ‘accept that 
in some cases there will be no clear answer to the question of whether something is 
part of the family of religions or not.’ 72  While the motivation driving the 
definitionalist to impose criteria may be understandable, it by no means shows that 
there are criteria to be had. On the contrary, we can see the situation of uncertainty in 
borderline cases as appropriate. Yet this uncertainty can be minimised, and in some 
cases resolved, by appealing to the vagueness of language, and to the mechanisms by 
which we determine meaning in cases of vagueness in many other cases. I will also 
argue that religious language is context-sensitive, and that having more contextual 
information will help when using the term, in that (among other things) contexts can 
sometimes make certain family resemblances obvious and can help to resolve whether 
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some borderline cases for the concept of religiosity should count in that particular 
context or not. 
 
1.2.3. The occurrence of linguistic shifts. 
 
In the previous section the problems with definition were brought to the fore. It was 
noted that we might find pragmatic value in using definitions for a specific purpose, 
as long as these definitions don’t become dogmatically applied when the purpose 
changes. For example, there are times when we want to highlight a difference 
between two related phenomena that might harmlessly be grouped together on some 
occasions. However, the very fact that our purposes change in this manner gives us a 
more general argument for the conclusion that the definitional project will fail. 
Namely, that some language (including the terms ‘religion’ and ‘religious’) is context-
sensitive, and definitions cannot be flexible enough to cover all contexts.  
An issue that was raised in the previous section was that it will sometimes be 
difficult to know when to apply the term ‘religious’ and, indeed, when it is correct to 
say that someone has become religious (that is, when someone has converted). Given 
that we are concerned with providing an account of religious conversion, this presents 
a potential problem. If you and I both say ‘I believe that God exists’: do we hold the 
same belief? If I say ‘God exists’ and you say ‘God does not exist’ do we disagree 
with each other? Importantly, it does seem as though we can use the term ‘religious’ 
(and other religious terms) in various ways without misusing the term. I can call 
someone a religious person and mean various things.  
However, while this may seem problematic, this is a pervasive aspect of 
language use that is shared by many other predicates. As such the difficulties involved 
in understanding and applying specifically religious concepts will be no worse than 
for a large class of predicates. The class I’m thinking of is that of vague predicates. I 
will argue that many terms are in fact to be counted among the list of vague 
predicates, and by giving an account of vagueness on which these terms are still 
usable, I will conclude that we should neither abandon, nor artificially define, nor be 
especially troubled by the concept of religiosity.  
I shall argue for the vagueness of religiosity by showing that it counts as vague 
according to three different commonly accepted criteria for vagueness. While these 
three options are not exhaustive, one of these three is adopted by almost all of those 
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involved in the debate over vagueness, so if religiosity counts as vague according to 
all three, this is strong grounds for the conclusion that it is to be counted as a vague 
predicate. The first criterion for vagueness is the possibility of faultless disagreement, 
the second is the existence of borderline cases, and the third is susceptibility to sorites 
reasoning. I’ll show that ‘religiosity’ counts as vague on any of these understandings, 
and I will then outline the consequences of this fact.  
The first criterion claims that a vague term ‘can be understood in several ways 
without being misunderstood.’73  We might understand the term ‘bald’ when it is 
applied to a man who has no hair, several hairs, or some thin patches of hair, without 
misunderstanding ‘bald’, so on Mehlberg’s definition of ‘vagueness’, according to 
which vague terms can be understood in various ways without being misunderstood, 
‘bald’ is vague. On this very general account ‘religious’ will be vague because we can 
understand it when applied to different religions, people who count as religious for 
different reasons and to different degrees. Yet understanding the concept slightly 
differently in these cases does not involve misunderstanding. We can imagine a 
situation in which Fred could competently claim ‘Michael is religious’ is true, and 
Bob could claim that ‘Michael is not religious’ is true, and they could both be entitled 
to these judgments.  
Wright takes it as datum that competent speakers do make judgments on 
borderline cases, and are entitled to do so.74  These judgments might typically be 
subject to qualification, but they are ‘never thereby automatically treated as revealing 
a mistake, or incompetence’. 75  Fred and Bob make claims that seem to be 
contradictory, and if they fail to argue about whether their interlocutor’s contradictory 
statement is also true, it shows a lack of commitment to their own assertion.76 Fine 
notes that there are logical connections within the penumbra (the set of borderline 
cases), so that while one might coherently think that two contradictories are true in 
different circumstances (for example when the comparison class changes) two 
contradictories cannot be true at the same time, so Fred and Bob ought to check they 
have the same comparison class in mind. It might be that Fred says, ‘What do you 
mean he isn’t religious – he’s a priest!’ and Bob might reply ‘Sure, if that’s what you 
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mean, but he never prays and he has lost faith in God, and that’s what I meant’. 
Otherwise, there is a sense in which Fred and/or Bob are at fault.77 I conclude that 
religiosity counts as vague according to the first criterion, since two people may 
disagree about whether to call someone or something religious in just the kind of way 
suggested, but without either one of them necessarily being at fault.  
The second criterion for vagueness is the existence of borderline cases for that 
predicate. Although there are competing theories about what a ‘borderline case’ is,78 
there are certain points that almost all theorists agree upon, for instance that there is 
some uncertainty involved in the application of predicates in borderline cases. 79 
However we understand the nature of this uncertainty, we have seen enough examples 
of uncertainty to agree that the terms ‘religion’ and ‘religious’ have cases where their 
application is uncertain, so on this definition too religiosity gives rise to borderline 
cases.  
The third criterion for vagueness is susceptibility to sorites paradoxes. The 
conditional form of this paradox contains a minor premise of the form ‘Fa1’ where 
this claims that the soritical predicate F applies to a, and ‘1’ is a quantity which gives a 
clearly non-borderline case of it doing so. 80 For example, ‘a man with 0 hairs on his 
head is bald’. The major premise rests on the assumption that one small incremental 
increase (for example a single hair) cannot make a significant (if even noticeable) 
difference in the application of the vague term. The premise is that if a man with n 
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hairs is bald (where n is a natural number), then a man with n+1 hairs will also be 
bald, and this is generalisable to all vague terms. From repeated application of the 
conditional premise, the conclusion can be reached that a man with n number of hairs 
is bald where n is arbitrarily large. When this number is large enough that ‘bald’ very 
clearly does not apply we will have derived a paradoxical conclusion from a 
seemingly valid argument. The sorites series is generated as follows:  
 
Fa1    
If Fa1 then Fa2    
If Fa2 then Fa3   …  
If Fai-1 then Fai  
  -------------------    
Fai                 (where i can be arbitrarily large) 
 
If this argument is sound, then no one escapes being bald: we are all bald, which is 
clearly false.81 
If we apply this to the concept of religiosity, we can see that religiosity is 
going to be susceptible to sorites reasoning. If a man who prays two-thousand times a 
year is religious, what about man who prays one thousand and ninety-nine times? If a 
man who attends church three hundred and sixty-five times a year is religious, what 
about a man who attends three hundred and sixty-four times? If a man believes that 
God exists with a credence level of 100%, what about the man who believes it with a 
credence level of 99.99%? This can be generalized to any religious-making feature. 
Therefore, on all three ways of understanding vagueness, the terms we were interested 
in defining are vague.  
Given that the term ‘religious’ is vague I shall now address the question of 
how we can successfully use it. Unless one can solve the sorites paradox the term will 
be unusable for it will mean that everyone is both religious and not-religious 
                                                 
81 Not all series of this form are soritical, as they do not all generate paradoxical results. A series only 
generates paradoxical results if it meets the following conditions: ‘Initially, the series <a1,…,ai> must 
be ordered; the predicate ‘F’ must satisfy the following three constraints: (i) it must appear true of a1, 
the first item in the series; (ii) it must appear false of ai, the last item in the series; and (iii) each 
adjacent pair in the series, an and an+1, must be sufficiently similar as to appear indiscriminable in 
respect of ‘F’—that is, both an and an+1 appear to satisfy ‘F’ or neither do.’ (Barnes, J., ‘Medicine, 
experience and logic’, in J. Barnes, J. Brunschwig, M.F. Burnyeat and M. Schofield (eds.), Science and 
Speculation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (1982), paraphrase quoted from Hyde, ‘Sorites 
Paradox’.) 
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(depending which end of the series we begin our reasoning from). The route taken by 
the most dominant theories in the literature on vagueness for solving the sorites 
paradox is that soritical argument is unsound. For instance, epistemicists deny the 
truth of the major premise. They claim that there is some n for which ‘Fan → Fan+1’ is 
not true, and despite not knowing the value of n this represents the cut-off point for 
the application of the term in question.82 If there were some fixed cut off point, then 
for every height, that height would either be classed as ‘tall’ or ‘short’, which does not 
reflect our classifications in natural language. People we describe as ‘of 
average/medium height’ exemplify this gap between ‘tall’ and ‘short’, and it seems as 
though these are not affirmations of our ignorance about whether the person is tall or 
short, but rather a statement that the person is neither. In the religious case this would 
require saying that there is some feature that makes something religious, and it is just 
that we don’t always know (for some reason) what that is, whether it is present, or 
whether it is present in a large enough degree for the predicate to apply. We could 
adopt a similar approach to religiosity by using modifiers like ‘devoutly religious’, 
‘somewhat religious’, or ‘religious when it suits him’. This theory of vagueness is 
implausible because there is nothing in our language or the world that justifies any 
fixed cut-off point. So the assertion that there is an unknowable fixed point seems 
arbitrary.  
Another route to overcoming the sorites paradox is to claim (rather than that 
the argument is not sound) that the argument is not valid. According to contextualists, 
the meanings of key vague terms are context-sensitive. A linguistic context is a 
situation of utterance, and contextual details include but are not restricted to the 
person making the utterance, the place and time of utterance, the (salient) shared 
beliefs, assumptions and presuppositions of the conversers, their interests, intentions, 
and conversational goals and the (salient) earlier linguistic exchanges. It was noted 
earlier in this chapter that something that changes in religious conversion is that one 
moves from one paradigm to another, changes one’s understanding of the world, and 
has a shift in salience patterns and which things will come easily to mind. Therefore 
the changes just mentioned will count as a change to one’s linguistic context. If the 
meaning of language is sensitive to changes in context, then undergoing a paradigm 
shift would result in changes to the very meaning of one’s language. Thus, if religious 
                                                 
82 Williamson, Timothy, Vagueness – The Problems of Philosophy, Routledge, (1994). 
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language is context-sensitive the consequence here is that the soritical argument 
equivocates over the meaning of the vague term, since the key term is indexed to 
different contexts, and is therefore invalid. 
If we want to know whether a word or phrase is context-sensitive, one way is 
to point to various utterances of a homophonic sentence containing it, and determine 
whether ‘what is said’ by these tokens is different, and whether this difference could 
be accounted for by something other than the difference in context.83 For example: 
 
(1) Most people believe in Jesus.  
Context-1: Uttered in 15AD in Nazareth. 
Context-2: Uttered in 2014AD in Britain. 
  
Contextualists take data like the results of context-shifting arguments, and conclude 
that there ought to be some way of accounting for it within a semantic theory.84 As the 
extension of (1) is different in context-1 and context-2, this is taken to be good 
evidence that (1) is context-sensitive.  
A consequence of the context-sensitivity of religious language is that we need 
to make certain pieces of contextual information clear in order to be understood. 
Some of these contextual features will be apparent merely from the fact of our 
utterance in a certain time and place – when I address peers at a certain time in a 
certain location, the contextual details of the utterer, time and place of utterance don’t 
need additional explication. However, things like my background beliefs, 
assumptions, comparison class, and my interests, intentions, or goals, might need to 
be explicated. This has wide reaching implications for inter-faith dialogue, and for the 
way inferences can be drawn when using religious language. Consider the simple fact 
that many people would endorse the claim that ‘God exists’ despite having very 
different conceptions of ‘God’. Take this seemingly valid inference: 
                                                 
83 Cappelen and Lepore, Insensitive Semantics: A Defense of Semantic Minimalism and Speech Act 
Pluralism, Blackwell, (2005), p. 17. This is not easy to determine, for example vague terms like ‘hot’ 
or ‘tall’ are also terms which some contextualists claim are context-sensitive, but it is not clear which 
of these phenomena are of primary explanatory importance. Also, if what is said by an expression 
varies between contexts, it is not clear when this is a result of polysemy rather than context-sensitivity.  
84 These ways might be any of, but not restricted to surprise indexicals (Lewis, ‘Elusive Knowledge’, 
Autralasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 74, Iss. 4., (Dec., 1996)), hidden indexicals (Stanley, Jason, 
and Szabo, Zoltan Gendler, ‘On Quantifier Domain restriction’, Mind and Language, Vol. 15, Iss. 2-3, 
(2000), pp. 219-261), and unarticulated constituents (Bach, Kent, ‘Conversational Implicature’, Mind 
and Language, Vol. 9, Iss. 2. (Jun., 1994), pp. 124-162). 
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(P1) ‘Lottie believes in God.’ 
(P2) ‘Will believes in God.’ 
∴ (C3): ‘Lottie and Will both believe in God.’ 
 
Assuming that Lottie believes in Krishna, and Will believes in Allah, there is some 
tension here in thinking of (C3) as true, even when (P1) and (P2) are true. The 
explanation for this is that an utterance of (P3) conversationally implicates the claim 
that whatever Lottie and Will believe, it is the same thing. Upholding the Gricean co-
operative principle (specifically by not disobeying the maxim of quantity that says 
‘make your contribution as informative as is required’ 85 ) would require a more 
explicit statement of the difference, if there were one. So the abbreviation to (3) is 
only justified if Lottie and Will do believe in the same thing. If not, the speaker is not 
upholding the co-operative principle. The statement made in (3) is not true, even if 
that made in (1) and in (2) is true. This can be accounted for by understanding the 
language involved as context-sensitive, as in this case, the reason that (3) doesn’t 
follow is that what is claimed in (1) is not the same as what is claimed in (2), due to 
contextual differences (such as the religious tradition that is a backdrop for these 
claims).86 Thus two people who prima facie hold the same belief, may in fact have 
little in common. Where this is not made explicit, it can result in conversers simply 
talking past each other, and can result in it being unclear when parties agree or 
disagree about substantive points. A contemporary example is that Richard Dawkins 
                                                 
85 Grice, H.P., Studies in the Way of Words, Harvard University Press, (1991), p. 26. This only applies 
under normal conversational conditions. Normal conversational conditions are those when there is no 
reason to suppose the maxims are being deliberately flouted to generate an implicature, or to speak 
non-literally, or other special cases.  
86 It can also happen that the context of an utterance can shift mid-sentence. Consider the sentence 
‘Mary is religious but she isn’t religious’ (Cf. Lewis, p. 562-3). On the face of it, this seems 
contradictory. (Cf. Cappelen and Lepore, p. 105, pp. 123-7.) Consider, though, how the utterance might 
be made. As it appears in print it seems more contradictory than if we add the expressive powers of 
speech. The common method of highlighting exactly the change we have here, is through placing a 
strong emphasis on the second, stronger, ‘religious’. So although Mary can in a certain context be 
described as religious, there is another context in which we wouldn’t want to call her religious. That is, 
she might have some features of religiousness while not exhibiting other features associated with a 
more rigorous or full understanding of the term. Put this way, it is less obvious that the sentence is just 
false, and I think it can be true, but it ‘must be judged by the standards appropriate to the circumstances 
of her speaking them.’ (Travis, ‘Meaning’s role in truth’, Mind, Vol. 105, No. 419, (Jul., 1996), p. 
466.) Compare this to the way that ‘he is ready but he isn’t’ can seem contradictory in print. This is 
remedied in ordinary uses of this utterance by (for example) pointing at Rhea on the first occurrence of 
‘he’ and then at Bob on the second. It might be that the contexts in which ‘Mary is religious’ is true in 
is just different from the context in which it is false, where different standards or interests are in play. 
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makes many interesting claims that he regards as undermining ‘religion’, but what he 
means by ‘religion’ (and therefore what he targets) is not what everyone means. 87 It is 
therefore arguable that many aspects of ‘religion’ construed differently are untouched 
by his claims. If both sides defined their terms relative to a context, or could find a 
way to occupy the same context, there would be less disagreement.  
 This bears strongly on understanding religious conversion for the following 
reason. If someone undergoes a conversion, their linguistic context will change. The 
subject enters a whole new context of discourse. This will often result in a situation 
where the very meaning of their language will change – we might think of this as a 
change in language-game, potentially one that is not fully accessible from within 
other language-games. It is going to be difficult for non-religious people to appreciate 
what is distinctive about religiosity without an ‘insider perspective’ and explaining 
the phenomenon in purely humanistic and scientific terms is almost inevitably going 
to miss what, for the religious person, is indispensible. On the other hand, the 
religious adherent might also find it difficult to appreciate the non-religious 
contributors to religiosity in all their diverse forms (the assumption is that at least 
some aspects of religiosity can be explained without reference to the subject of 
religious worship, but solely humanistically or scientifically). As one cannot help but 
occupy a perspective, it will be very difficult to overcome this challenge. The old 
worldview and the new may be incommensurable.88 Another consequence of this is 
that: 
 
 In religion every level of devoutness must have its own appropriate form of 
 expression which has no sense at a lower level. This doctrine, which means 
 something at a higher level, is null and void for someone who is still at the lower 
 level; he can only understand it wrongly and so these words are not valid for such a 
 person.89 
 
                                                 
87 For example Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion, Black Swan, (2007). 
88 There are ‘three types of incommensurability in Kuhn's remarks: (1) methodological—there is no 
common measure because the methods of comparison and evaluation change; (2) 
perceptual/observational—observational evidence cannot provide a common basis for theory 
comparison, since perceptual experience is theory-dependent; (3) semantic—the fact that the languages 
of theories from different periods of normal science may not be inter-translatable presents an obstacle 
to the comparison of those theories.’ Bird, ‘Kuhn’. 
89 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Culture and Value, Eds. Georg Henrik von Wright and Heikki Nyman, Trans. 
Peter Winch, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, (1998), 32e. 
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This is analogous to not being able to see Lincoln in Dali’s painting until you are far 
enough away.  
So far I have shown that the reason that the concept of religiosity cannot be 
defined can be explained in terms of its vagueness and context-sensitivity, and that 
religious conversion will involve linguistic shifts because context-shifts affect 
meaning. We can use the concept despite this because we can explicate the relevant 
contextual details. This doesn’t, admittedly, take us all the way. Sometimes in a 
borderline case we may not know whether to apply the term even once accessible 
contextual details have been spelt out. However, sometimes the subject matter does 
not allow for the degree of precision that an ‘ideal language’ theorist might seek from 
their application of concepts, and the assumption that this is a problem can be 
challenged. In reply to similar concerns, Wittgenstein asks the pertinent question:  
 
Is it even always an advantage to replace an indistinct picture by a sharp one? Isn't the 
indistinct one often exactly what we need? 
 
Frege compares a concept to an area and says that an area with vague boundaries 
cannot be called an area at all. This presumably means that we cannot do anything 
with it.—But is it senseless to say: “Stand roughly there”? Suppose that I were 
standing with someone in a city square and said that. As I say it I do not draw any 
kind of boundary, but perhaps point with my hand [...]90 
 
How would one convey what they saw looking at the night sky if ‘lots of stars’ were 
not enough, and one had to specify the precise number of stars? How could one 
exactly state what they meant by claiming their child was intelligent without using 
any vague terms? It is unclear what such a specification would even consist in, as this 
example of multidimensional vagueness requires the fixing of more than one aspect of 
‘intelligence’. Religiosity is equally hard to precisify. Indeed, ‘Our discussion will be 
adequate if it has as much clearness as the subject-matter admits of, for precision is 
not to be sought for alike in all discussions, any more than in all the products of the 
crafts.’91 Due to the pervasiveness of vagueness, even if it were possible to eradicate 
                                                 
90 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §71. 
91 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, [350BC], Penguin Classics, Trans. J.A.K. Thomson, (2004), 1094b 
12-14, p. 5. 
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it, doing so would require a large-scale upheaval of our ordinary language. There has 
been insufficient motivation to undertake this.  
 The view I have argued for here is sometimes implicitly adopted, though often 
with little detail provided to support it.92 We can, for example, see a considerable 
similarity between the account of family resemblance and vagueness provided above 
and the following passage in Alston’s ‘Religion’: 
 
These are the cases to which the term “religious” applies most certainly and 
unmistakably. However there can be a variety of cases that differ from the paradigm 
in different ways and to different degrees […] As more of the religion-making 
characteristics drop out, either partially or completely, we feel less secure about 
applying the term “religion,” and there will be less unanimity in the language 
community with respect to the application of the term. However, there do not seem to 
be points along these various dimensions of deviation that serve as sharp a 
demarcation of religion from nonreligion. It is simply that we encounter less and less 
obvious cases of religion […] Thus the best way to explain the concept of religion is 
to elaborate in detail the relevant features of an ideally clear case of religion and then 
indicate the respects in which less clear cases differ from this, without hoping to find 
any sharp line dividing religion from nonreligion. (Cf. Ludwig Wittgenstein’s notion 
of “family-resemblances” among the things to which a term applies.)93 
 
What appears to be missing from the train of thought just quoted is an account of the 
vagueness of the terms involved, and of how exactly this vagueness is to be 
understood; and it is this task that has been attempted in our discussion so far. What is 
now required is some thought about the kinds of features involved in religiosity that, 
when present, give us reason to more readily apply the term, when not present, give us 
reason to withhold it, and when present to some degree, give us reason to think of it as 
a borderline case. Thus in the next section I explore some suggestions made in the 
literature and offer my own proposal of some dimensions of religiosity, which will be 
the focus of subsequent chapters.   
 
                                                 
92 For exmaple in Harrison, ‘The Pragmatics of Defining Religion in a Multi-Cultural World’. 
93 Alston, ‘Religion’, p. 142. Here my point of divergence is that I see no need to start with an ‘ideally 
clear case’ as there could easily be seen to be more than one perfectly clear case that nevertheless have 
little in common. By starting with an ‘ideal’ we might end up concluding that something is not a 
religion based on its not sharing enough common features with this ‘ideal’ despite it having many other 
religious-making features.  
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1.3. The dimensions of religiosity.  
 
According to Richie, ‘Religion is the intimate and vital apprehension, by the 
individual, of what is conceived to be reality, in its fullest sense, la vraie vérité of 
things […] regarded as in some way related to the individual himself; any such 
apprehension must embrace belief, emotional response, and the determination of 
conduct, in so far as conduct is supposed to have a bearing on the connection of the 
individual with such reality.’94 This involves three dimensions – an apprehension of 
reality, an emotional response to this belief, and conduct which accords with it. This 
maps on to the belief, affect, and function accounts sketched in the discussion of 
typologies in section 1.2.1.  
 This also maps on to another, more detailed taxonomy provided by Cornwall, 
Albrecht, Cunningham and Pitcher. According to Cornwall, Albrecht, Cunningham 
and Pitcher there are three components to religiosity and two modes of each, meaning 
that there are six dimensions to religiosity. 95  The components correspond to the 
distinction between knowing (cognition), feeling (affect), and doing (behaviour). The 
cognitive component is the religious belief, creed, ideology, or orthodoxy component. 
The affective component is the ‘feelings toward religious beings, objects, or 
institutions’96 and includes feelings of commitment too. The behavioural component 
includes the actual practices and behaviours, for example attending church, praying, 
tithing, and behaving ethically. The two modes that these components can be in are 
the personal and the institutional. The personal mode ‘is comprised of religious 
beliefs, feelings, and behaviors that find their source in personal and individual 
religion. This includes the acceptance of doctrinal orthodoxy … feelings and 
commitment toward God, and religious behavior’.97 The institutional mode has the 
same components but directed towards formalised and institutionalised religion, 
which ‘includes acceptance of religious beliefs which are unique to a sect or 
denomination, personal feelings and attachments to a particular church or 
                                                 
94 Ritchie, E., ‘The Essential in Religion’, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 10, No. 1, (Jan., 1901), pp. 
4-5. 
95 Cornwall, M., Albrecht, S.L., Cunningham, P.H., and Pitcher, B.L. ‘The dimensions of religiosity: A 
conceptual model with an empirical test.’ Review of Religious Research, Vol. 27, (1986), p. 227. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Ibid, p. 228. 
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congregations, and participation in religious ritual and worship services.’ 98  The 
dimensions are:  
 
 (1)  Traditional orthodoxy: Belief in traditional doctrines.  
(2)  Particularist orthodoxy: ‘Acceptance or rejections of beliefs peculiar to 
 a particular religious organization.’99 
(3)  Spiritual commitment: This encompasses the relationship between the 
 religious person and the transcendental, as they put it ‘It is the affective 
 orientation of the individual towards deity and is a personal, subjective 
 mode of religion.’100 
(4)  Church commitment: ‘Church commitment encompasses the 
 attachment, identification, and loyalty of the individual toward the 
 church organization or the religious community.’101 
(5)  Religious behavior: ‘Defined as those behaviors which are by nature 
 religious, but do not require membership or participation in a religious 
 group or community. For example, personal prayer, scripture study, 
 giving to the poor, and encouraging others to believe in Christ’102 
(6)  Religious participation: ‘Religious participation has generally been 
 operationalized as frequency of church attendance or attendance at 
 worship services, although it has also been operationalized as 
 participation in church organizations and amount of financial support 
 given to the church… [but] might include any number of behaviors’.103 
 
These dimensions were tested for by asking questions designed to detect their 
presence in a large sample group of active and inactive church members from the 
Mormon faith. The final sample was 1874 people strong, having had an average 
response rate of 64%. Using various data analysis techniques, the data they collected 
appeared to confirm that all the dimensions of religiosity listed above were in fact 
exhibited in this religious community. There are of course many open questions. 
Given that this data was all collected from the same religious community, it is 
                                                 
98 Ibid. 
99 Ibid, p. 229. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid, p. 231. 
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possible that different dimensions would emerge if members of a distinct community 
were questioned. Nevertheless, the above schema seems to provide a useful 
framework for our investigation. In the remainder of this thesis I will examine the 
various dimensions involved and the conceptual connections between them.  
Specifically, I will examine what I shall call the doxastic dimension, the 
affective dimension, and the dimension of praxis. It will become clear how my view 
has advantages over the alternative of providing a rigid definition. For instance, Stone 
distinguishes between religion and what he considers to be three non-religious but 
related phenomena, namely, spiritual paths, philosophies of life, and cults. Spiritual 
paths include engagement in practices such as ‘a programme of austerity, breath 
control, mental exercises, and physical postures’ and while such activities may be 
instrumental in attaining liberation, Stone does not think they are sufficient for 
religiosity.104 A philosophy of life ‘tells us what matters in human life and how to get 
it… [it] is essentially practical’. 105  He says that ‘A philosophy of life is a non-
religious theory of the good conjoined with practical instructions for attaining the 
good.’ A cult is defined as ‘ritual practices intended to please a supernatural or quasi-
supernatural being (or collection of such beings)’.106  
It seems as if, on Stone’s view, we need to discount the ‘non-religious’ 
elements he distinguishes from genuine ‘religion’ and so may miss the ways that these 
elements can actually be dimensions of religiosity. On my view we can see a spiritual 
path as instantiating the dimension of praxis. We can equate the philosophy of life 
with the doxastic dimension. My discussion of ritual practices in Chapter Four will 
show that rituals partake in all three dimensions. The sense in which these things are 
not ‘religion’, is the sense in which they are insufficient on their own to constitute a 
religion since they only partake in a limited number of dimensions. The extent to 
which they are religious, is the extent to which they do partake in these dimensions. 
The fact that there can be these different emphases in different cases, and that one 
dimension can predominate, is not problematic on my view. Instead, it is a feature 
anticipated by the vagueness and context-sensitivity of the language used to describe 
the phenomenon of religious conversion, and as we saw in §1.2.3, we can alleviate the 
                                                 
104 Stone, p. 340. 
105 Ibid, p. 341. 
106 Ibid, p. 342. 
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potential concerns that may arise here by spelling out features of the context that are 
relevant. 
 
1.4. Concluding remarks. 
 
This chapter has explored several ways of thinking about conversion. I explored an 
analogy with a scientific revolution, and the analogous role of paradigm shifts and 
gestalt switches in the process. I also sketched a view on which a logical definition of 
religious conversion will not be forthcoming, because there is no single set of 
necessary and sufficient features that all instances of ‘religion’ have in common. 
Rather, these terms are both vague and context-sensitive. This is compatible with the 
view that the terms in question work like family resemblance concepts, with certain 
features that count towards something’s religiosity without these features needing to 
be exhibited by every case, and with some counting for more than others, and so on. 
This raised the pertinent question: which are the ‘family resemblances’ which cases of 
religious conversion tend to have in common? What are the things that combine in 
various ways on different occasions to make something appropriately classed as a 
religious conversion? Having some idea of what are ‘religious-making features’ can 
build a picture that can be applied with some degree of common sense to each 
instance we wonder about, without the need for these features to form part of a logical 
definition.  
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CHAPTER 2 
THE DOXASTIC DIMENSION 
 
Ordinary people have the power of not thinking of that about which they do 
not wish to think. “Do not meditate on the passages about the Messiah”, said 
the Jew to his son. Thus our people often act. Thus are false religions 
preserved, and even the true one, in regard to many persons.1 
 
The preceding chapter argued that religious conversion involves three dimensions, 
and the current chapter will focus on the doxastic dimension – that is, the role that 
religious beliefs play in religious conversion. I shall adopt the following terminology. 
The set of all beliefs a person holds will be called their ‘belief-set’, a belief that is in 
some relevant way ‘religious’ will be called a ‘religious belief’, and the set of a 
person’s religious beliefs will be called their ‘religious belief-set’.2 Negative beliefs 
concerning religion (including those that are the contrary or contradictory of any 
belief in the religious belief-set) I shall label ‘irreligious’, while beliefs not 
concerning religion at all I shall call ‘non-religious’.  
The precise content of the religious belief-set of converts will not be 
predictable as it will be different on a case-by-case basis. Exactly which beliefs are 
adopted will differ even among those who convert to the same religion at the same 
time and in roughly the same way (for example if two people were to witness the 
same miracle). According to William James, the specific content of the doctrines that 
are adopted is not that important. James says that: 
 
The particular form which [beliefs] affect is the result of suggestion and imitation. If 
they went through their growth-crisis in other faiths and other countries, although the 
essence of the change would be the same (since it is one in the main so inevitable), its 
accidents would be different.3  
                                                 
1 Pascal, Blaise, Pensées, [1670], Trans. W.F. Potter, Letcetera, (2015), §IV, 259. 
2 It is not entirely straightforward to determine exactly what should count as a religious belief. It might 
be that what distinguishes a religious belief from a non-religious belief is the manner in which it is held 
or the way in which it is formed, as well as the content itself. Some of this uncertainty can be resolved 
by the usual methods of dealing with vagueness and context-sensitivity as discussed in §1.2.2, but I 
shall focus on clear-cut cases here. For any that do not appear clear-cut, as long as it could be replaced 
by one that is more clear-cut, this shouldn’t interfere with the spirit of the points I make in this chapter. 
3 James, pp. 198-9.  
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Thus the content of the religious beliefs that someone forms during a conversion may 
depend more on the setting, expectations, prior beliefs, and external interpretations of 
the subject. There will of course be some beliefs that are required by religious 
institutions for a conversion to count as a conversion to their specific institution. For 
example, one might claim that unless one believes certain things about Jesus Christ 
then one doesn’t count as a Christian – these creedal components are what distinguish 
Christianity from, say, Judaism.4 To avoid an unduly narrow focus, I will focus on the 
role of belief in general, rather than the role of any specific belief.  
The believer may object that the religion they have converted to is somehow 
‘meant to be’, or is ‘proper’, or even that one would not be happy in any other 
religions and this is the only religion for them. An analogy: at a certain point in a 
happy marriage you may believe that your spouse is the only person in the world for 
you; you cannot imagine being so intimate or happy with another, you have a great 
deal of care for and loyalty to that person, and a great number of affirmative beliefs 
about both the relationship and the person. However, often, if even a small 
contingency were otherwise, (you missed the bus you met on, you sat at a different 
table that day in the restaurant, your first date went terribly for some unfortunate 
reason) you may have ended up feeling the very same thing about another person 
altogether, or no-one at all.5 Thus I maintain that there is no need to prematurely 
narrow the focus.  
 I will argue that a religious conversion may involve a change in the religious 
belief-set of a subject (for example acquiring the belief that ‘God exists’), or a change 
in the way that certain religious beliefs relate to other beliefs (for instance coming to 
see the belief that miracles are possible as relevant to the belief that a person was 
healed of an incurable disease) or in the way that religious beliefs relate to other 
cognitive states. I will discuss several ways in which beliefs are formed, focussing on 
three: beliefs that are formed after consideration of deductive or probabilistic 
                                                 
4 However, as there are other distinguishing features, this might not be necessary. There are, for 
example, certain significant practices, rituals, and symbols that may set apart a particular religion (for 
example confession, communion, and the cross). 
5 Note that the emphasis on the notion of one true love, or indeed, the unique individuality of each 
person, is a relatively modern western one, not shared by many other cultures and times. In these the 
idea that one could be as happily married to any number or people is far more convincing. The same 
may be true of religions, where the emphasis on the differences and the exclusivity of religious faiths 
may be cultural too. 
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arguments; beliefs that are formed as a result of the testimony of others; and beliefs 
that are formed as the result of religious experience. I will then assess the justification 
that beliefs formed in these ways would be capable of having, and will conclude that 
such justification is likely to be problematic in many cases. 
Later chapters will explore the ways in which the doxastic dimension of 
religiosity interacts with other dimensions. It will become apparent that a change in 
belief state is not on its own sufficient for a conversion; or to put the matter more 
precisely, a change in belief state which does not generate changes in the other 
dimensions, and which is not in turn responsive to those changes, will not in fact 
count as a genuine change in belief state.6 The upshot is that religious conversion will 
involve changes not just in beliefs but in several dimensions of religiosity.  
 
2.1. The nature of religious belief. 
 
There are several distinct conventional uses of ‘believe’ and ‘belief’. One typical 
distinction is that between ‘belief-in’ and ‘belief-that’. Belief-that P can sometimes be 
taken as an assertion of a particular positive attitude towards the proposition that P, as 
in ‘I believe that God exists’, but in many contexts might also imply that one doesn’t 
know that P, as in ‘I believe that John is in France’.7 Belief-in is often claimed to 
involve belief-that.8 For example, ‘I believe in equality’ might involve the belief that 
equality is a good thing, and ‘I believe in my daughter’ might involve the belief that 
my daughter is a capable or good person in some respect.9 Throughout I shall mean to 
                                                 
6 Cf., ‘faith by itself, if it is not accompanied by action, is dead’, Bible, James 2: 17. 
7 There are various theories about beliefs (which can be understood as applied instances of theories 
about mental states in general). One such theory is that beliefs are representational; they are ‘structures 
in the mind that represent the propositions they affirm—usually in something like a mental language’ 
(Chignell, Andrew, ‘The Ethics of Belief’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (Fall 2010 
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/ethics-
belief/>.) Another idea is that beliefs are merely dispositions to act in a certain way. On this 
behaviourist approach, to say that you have the belief that there is a table in your path is to say, for 
example, that you are disposed to act in such a way as to avoid the table as you walk, and to affirm that 
there is a table if asked, and other such behaviours. Eliminativists claim that the notion of belief does 
not refer to any real entity or state, but is merely a convenient way of expressing certain aspects of 
folk-psychology. Some epistemologists assume that belief is a primitive concept. Adjudication between 
these options will not be necessary to say what is interesting about belief as it pertains to religious 
conversion. 
8 But not always: ‘it is tempting to suppose that “belief in X” presupposes a belief that X exists. […] I 
can believe in God (trust in his providence) while accepting that He exists, rather than firmly believing 
this.’ Alston, ‘Belief Acceptance and Religious Faith’, p. 14. 
9 Complications of interpretation may well occur, in particular when reading biblical and other ancient 
texts, and this is especially true in light of the etymology of the word ‘believe’. As Alston remarks 
‘“believe” originally meant “to hold dear” or “to love,” as its German relative belieben still does. […] 
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use ‘belief’ in the propositional sense. Rather than give a complete philosophical 
account of beliefs-that, which would be unmanageable in the current context, I will 
instead take the following five features of belief as a starting point. I take it that these 
aspects of belief are appropriate and plausible in many ordinary cases, which will be 
sufficient to explore how beliefs operate in religious conversion. I don’t assume 
anything about how these aspects of belief are to be explained theoretically, nor that 
they hold in all cases.  
The first is that beliefs track evidence. That is, beliefs typically ‘aim at 
truth’.10 Williams claims that factual beliefs can be based on evidence, in the strong 
sense that if someone stopped believing the evidence, they would stop believing the 
proposition based on it. If this is right, then religious beliefs would also form in 
response to ‘evidence’, which in the analogous religious case might be a religious 
experience. 11  Of course, sometimes beliefs fail to track evidence (as in cases of 
cognitive limitations like absent-mindedness and irrationality, or self-deception, 
which will be further explored below).  
The second is that propositions can be assented to with various levels of 
credence. Credence levels can be expressed as a decimal on the scale between 0 and 
1, where 0 is no credence in the claim at all, and 1 is complete certainty. There is a 
naïve conception of belief on which belief states are binary – one either has a belief or 
one does not. Yet, this overlooks the fact that some beliefs are held tentatively and 
others are held with conviction. This model allows one to say that some propositions 
are believed with a low level of credence, others with a high level of credence, and 
some propositions inspire such a low credence level that they are not believed at all. 
In the current context, it might be that some beliefs held prior to a conversion will 
come to be held with a higher degree of credence after a conversion, and other 
propositions may be assented to with a higher level of credence such that they come 
to count as beliefs. It might not be the case that there are clear cut-off points on this 
scale at which we would claim that the subject definitely believes, definitely does not 
                                                                                                                                            
In Shakespeare's All's Well That Ends Well, when the king says to Bertram, “Believe not thy disdain,” 
this is not to be understood as exhorting the hearer not to believe (in our sense) that he has disdain, but 
rather not to cherish, foster, or hold dear the disdain that he obviously has. When the King James 
translation of the Bible or the early Anglican prayer books use “believe,” we cannot suppose without 
more ado that the word is being used in its familiar contemporary propositional sense.’ (Alston, ‘Belief 
Acceptance and Religious Faith’, p. 23-4.) 
10 Williams, Bernard, ‘Deciding to Believe’, Problems of the Self, Cambridge University Press, (1973), 
p. 136. 
11 I consider the relationship between religious experience and belief formation in §2.4.2. 
  56 
believe, or somewhat believes the relevant proposition, and there is no consensus on 
this in the literature.  
Several proposals have been offered which parallel the options offered in the 
discussion of vagueness concerning where on a scale something needs to lie for the 
object to count as a borderline case for a predicate, or as an instance of that predicate 
applying and not applying. One proposal is that an agent should believe a proposition 
‘if and only if her degree of belief that the proposition is true is higher than her degree 
of belief that the proposition is false’.12 This seems prima facie counter to our own 
experiences of holding beliefs: it seems more plausible when there is only a marginal 
difference between degrees of belief for a proposition and for its contradictory to say 
that we simply don’t believe either way. In the religious case, I propose that in a case 
like this we would be more likely to claim that the subject is agnostic. Another 
proposal is that ‘an agent should believe a proposition if and only if her degree of 
belief for that proposition is higher than a certain threshold.’13 This gives rise to 
higher-order vagueness, but can be alleviated once again by specifying certain 
relevant contextual factors. For example, in a context where a religious official is 
considering whether to formally accept someone into their faith the standard might be 
higher than if someone is having a casual conversation about that same person. It 
might be that there are certain beliefs for which we would always demand a higher 
credence level in order to count them, and religious beliefs may be one such case.  
The third feature of belief is that beliefs can be attributed to subjects even 
when they are not currently entertaining, thinking of, or paying attention to that belief, 
for instance when that subject is asleep. According to Alston, having a belief ‘is not to 
be in a certain episodic conscious state or to perform any action or undergo any 
process’.14 However, beliefs are sometimes actively thought about, and this allows us 
to draw a distinction between latent and active beliefs. Latent beliefs (sometimes 
                                                 
12  Huber, Franz, ‘Formal Representations of Belief’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
(Summer 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =  
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2009/entries/formal-belief/>. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Alston, ‘Belief Acceptance and Religious Faith’, p. 4. Cf. ‘But what does this knowledge consist in? 
Let me ask: When do you know that application? Always? day and night? or only when you are 
actually thinking of the rule? do you know it, that is, in the same way as you know the alphabet and the 
multiplication table? Or is what you call “knowledge” a state of consciousness or a process—say a 
thought of something, or the like?’ (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §148.) and ‘Suppose it 
were asked: “When do you know how to play chess? All the time? or just while you are making a 
move? And the whole of chess during each move?”—How queer that knowing how to play chess 
should take such a short time, and a game so much longer!’ (Ibid, §150.) 
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called tacit beliefs) are those that we would claim that a subject has even though the 
subject may not be thinking of it, and perhaps may not have thought of it. Latent 
beliefs can perhaps usefully be thought of as dispositional attitudes. Having a 
dispositional attitude towards a proposition need not involve exercising the attitude, or 
even being aware of it. For example, I might have had the dispositional affirmative 
attitude towards the proposition that ‘894+6=900’ without ever having had occasion 
to do this sum, because I would be disposed to affirm it if I were to think of it.15 I 
would exercise my belief if a situation arose where I had occasion to think it and 
affirm it.  
An implication of the possibility of latent beliefs is that a person might not be 
aware of the content of their entire belief set, therefore a subject might acquire 
religious beliefs without acquiring the higher-order belief that they have religious 
beliefs.16 This is the fourth aspect of beliefs; subjects may not have transparent self-
knowledge regarding their belief-set. In fact, often one may actively deny that they 
have a certain belief, and yet on reflection, retrospectively acknowledge that they did 
in fact have the belief they denied having at the time. This is more common than one 
might think – for instance, we may often feel or act in ways that we don’t understand, 
and only later come to realise that we harboured a belief that explains that action or 
feeling. If this is right then it would be possible for someone to believe that God 
exists, without the second order belief that they believe that they believe that God 
exists. Thus it might be possible for someone to form religious beliefs without 
realising it, and therefore this aspect of any resultant or concurrent conversion would 
likewise be without their knowledge. The significance of this is that one may not be 
fully aware of one’s conversion at an early stage in the process, and it may come as a 
surprise. However, once one gains a certain perspective on the process, they may 
                                                 
15 There is a question about whether latent beliefs should count as genuine beliefs. The question is, do 
we say that I believe that 894+6=900 only after I have thought it, or would you attribute this belief to 
me at any time you feel sure that I would affirm it if I did think it? Wittgenstein discusses this issue 
using the example of a teacher ordering a student to continue a series where they add two to the 
preceding number each time. The teacher can say that they knew (and so believed) when they gave the 
order, that when the student got to 1000 they should write 1002 afterwards, but ‘you don't want to say 
that you thought of the step from 1000 to 1002 at that time—and even if you did think of this step, still 
you did not think of other ones. When you said “I already knew at the time.....” that meant something 
like: “If I had then been asked what number should be written after 1000, I should have replied 
‘1002’.”’(Ibid, §187). This reminds us that ‘“to mean it” did not mean: to think of it.’ (Ibid, §692.) And 
likewise, ‘to believe it’ does not mean ‘to think it’. If belief does not mean thinking, then these two 
things can come apart – people can certainly think things that they don’t believe, and, as our intuition 
about the mathematics teacher makes compelling, we can also believe things that we don’t think about. 
16 This is further support for the claim that self-ascription cannot be a criterion for religious conversion 
where religious conversion involves the acquisition of religious beliefs. 
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retrospectively reframe the significance of earlier parts of the process. One religious 
tradition that speaks to this is that of giving testimony. This is a procedure where new 
converts (as well as others) publicly talk about their life prior to conversion and their 
conversion, weaving the narrative in a way that makes sense of their new-found 
religion, and is often delivered in terms that they would not have accepted prior to the 
conversion.17 
An implication of the possibility of not having second-order religious beliefs 
is that we cannot rely on first-person authority to ascertain what someone believes. It 
wouldn’t be sufficient to conclude that ‘X doesn’t believe that P’ or ‘X believes that 
P’ merely because X sincerely says so. Not being able to rely on sincere first-person 
testimony means we need another way of knowing whether or not someone has a 
belief in order to avoid the epistemological problem of not being able to attribute 
beliefs to people, and, insofar as religious conversions involve beliefs, not being able 
to attribute religious conversions to people.  
  One way to do this might be to appeal to the fifth aspect of beliefs, namely, 
that beliefs can be action-guiding. If someone believes that P, P should in some way 
affect his or her behaviour when that behaviour is relevant to the truth or falsity of P. 
If we want to explain why someone takes an indirect route across a room, we can 
appeal to their belief that there is a table in the way and that they cannot walk through 
the table. We think of beliefs as motivating and explaining behaviour. Amesbury 
claims that ‘nothing is worthy of being called a belief “which has not some influence 
upon the actions of him who holds it”’.18 They are not, however, conceptually linked. 
The belief and the behaviour come apart, in that the behaviour can occur as the result 
of another belief, or some irrational or non-rational motivation instead, and the 
presence of a particular belief could result in different behaviour depending on a 
variety of non-doxastic factors. However, for P to motivate x is not for P to entail or 
be entailed by x, it is merely for it to count as a factor that affects x, even if it is 
outweighed by other motivations. Belief is relevant to an explanation of behaviour. 
So to resolve the problem that there might be with belief attribution because of 
issues with self-knowledge, we might attribute beliefs based on the behaviour patterns 
                                                 
17 This will be revisited in §5.2. 
18 Amesbury, Richard, ‘The Virtues of Belief: Toward a Non-Evidentialist Ethics of Belief-Formation’, 
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 63, No. 1, (Feb., 2008), p. 27. Quotation 
referenced to Clifford, In L. Stephen & F. Pollock (Eds.), Lectures and essays (2nd ed.). London: 
Macmillan, (1886), p. 342. 
  59 
that would be made sense of by attributing that belief, but would be strange or 
inexplicable without that belief.19 In the religious case, we can attribute religious 
beliefs based on religious behavior, like praying to God, praising God at church, 
talking to your friends about your relationship with God. These and similar activities 
would be strange without an accompanying belief that God exists, and attributing this 
belief would make sense of that behaviour. If we think of speech and thought as types 
of behaviour, this also has the advantage of not making self-affirmation irrelevant. 
While sincere first-person testimony wouldn’t be sufficient, it would still count in 
favour of it, and while not overrideable in cases of a lack of self-knowledge, it would 
still be part of the calculus one might make in deciding whether to attribute that 
person with a belief or not. 
This section has aimed to render the following claims plausible:  
 
(1)  Beliefs aim to track evidence but do not always do so successfully. 
(2)  There can be degrees of beliefs. 
(3)  Subjects don’t need to think of or currently be entertaining beliefs in 
 order to be said to have them. 
(4)  Subjects can have the belief that P without having the second-order 
 belief that they believe that P. 
(5)  Beliefs motivate behaviour.  
  
These conclusions have implications for the role of belief in religious conversion, and 
allow us to make various claims about religious conversion given these features of 
belief. (1) has implications for the formation of religious belief (which will be 
discussed in the next section). (2) means that religious beliefs can be held with 
varying degrees of credence. Once a religious belief has formed, it could continue to 
respond to external and internal factors and could be held with more or less credence 
at different points in that subject’s life. For instance, a belief may form and be 
sufficient for counting as a genuine religious belief, and for instigating interactions 
with other dimensions of religious conversion (to be discussed in subsequent 
chapters) but this could be held with greater degrees of credence at later points, which 
                                                 
19 Alston offers a partial and yet more complete list of things that we would expect to find when X 
believes that P, which can also help to identify and attribute beliefs. Alston, ‘Belief Acceptance and 
Religious Faith’, p. 4. 
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may then count as a deepening within the believer’s faith. The beliefs could also come 
to be held with less credence, which could mean a de-emphasising of the role of belief 
in that person’s religious life compared with other aspects of their religious life, and if 
the credence level falls below a certain point it could also instigate or form part of a 
deconversion. An implication of (3) is that we can attribute religious beliefs to people 
who are not currently thinking of the content of that belief, and so once such a belief 
is acquired, the person can be said to have it on an on-going basis, despite the fact that 
it is not always active. An implication of (4) is that someone can have a belief without 
actually being aware that they have it. This in turn means that we cannot rely on self-
attribution to determine whether or not someone has a particular belief (although that 
still counts in favour of it). Something that can help with belief attribution is the 
behaviour that the subject exhibits that is relevant to the possession of that belief, and 
this fact is (5). The implication of (5) most relevant to religious conversion is that in 
order to understand the doxastic dimension we will also need to consider the 
dimension that includes religious behaviour, which I call the dimension of praxis.  
 
2.3. The formation of religious beliefs.  
 
Beliefs tend to respond to stimulus, rather than to spontaneously appear with no 
stimulus at all. This section will raise some suggestions about what stimulus might 
lead to the formation of religious beliefs, so that we might better be in a position to 
understand how religious conversion, insofar as forming religious beliefs is part of 
this phenomenon, comes about. We are exposed to various kinds of stimulus through 
engagement with the world. We can engage with the world in many ways that will 
count as stimulus relevant to religious belief formation (although these ways could 
count in favour of or against religious beliefs), for instance: studying theological 
arguments and employing reasoning to reach a conclusion that becomes an object of 
belief; being influenced by the testimony of others who hold religious beliefs, and 
coming to share those beliefs as the result of that testimony; by awareness of the 
world via perceptual and introspective faculties leading to a belief about the data 
received by those faculties, for example by witnessing miracles or having religious 
experiences and coming to believe the content of those experiences. I will discuss 
these in turn. 
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I take the following to be a reasonable assumption: if one self-awarely 
believes all of the premises of a valid argument that one takes to be valid (that is, if 
one thinks it is sound), is paying suitable attention, and has functioning cognitive 
powers, one will thereby come to believe the conclusion of that argument. If I believe 
that Socrates is a man, and that all men are mortal, I would be irrational or negligent if 
I didn’t also believe the conclusion that Socrates is mortal. So, if one comes across a 
valid argument whose conclusion is of a religious nature, and one believes all of the 
premises of that argument, the expectation in ordinary circumstances would be that if 
I didn’t already believe the conclusion I would thereby come to believe it. This may 
be one way in which religious beliefs are formed.  
 There are certainly valid arguments with religious conclusions.20 However, not 
everyone who comes into contact with these valid arguments will believe the 
conclusion as a result. There are several reasons why this might be the case, any one 
of which could be a sufficient explanation, but more than one may apply to a given 
case. One explanation for this failure might be that the subject does not appreciate the 
validity of the argument. Even though an argument might be valid, sometimes people 
make mistakes and so are not convinced due to this failure of cognitive processing. In 
an experiment where students were asked: Is the following argument valid? 
 
(P1) If it is raining, Fred gets wet. 
(P2)  It is not raining. 
∴  (C1)  Fred does not get wet. 
 
Over 30% of students erroneously claimed that the argument is valid.21 This sample 
represents a relatively well-educated section of the population, so the study may 
underrepresent the number of errors one might expect from a more representative 
sample of the overall population. Given that such a high percentage of students make 
errors and given that religious arguments are almost always more complexly 
structured than this relatively simple denial of the antecedent, it is a reasonable claim 
that some people may be convinced by invalid arguments, and conversely will not be 
                                                 
20 It is uncontentious that there can be valid arguments concluding that God exists, or similar, as these 
can be constructed based on valid forms from premises like ‘If all bachelors are unmarried then God 
exists.’ 
21 Evans, J. St B. T., Bias in Human Reasoning, Hove: Erlbaum Ltd., (1989). 
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convinced by valid arguments, owing to mistaken assessments of the validity or 
invalidity of the arguments in question.  
If one thinks that an argument is valid, one might nevertheless fail to believe 
the conclusion if one disbelieves one or more premises, that is, thinks that the 
argument is unsound. Because belief formation depends on whether a subject believes 
the premises, not whether they are actually true, not everyone will form the same 
beliefs in response to the same arguments. Some people will not believe the 
conclusions of even sound arguments. This need not imply that one party is being 
irrational, although certainly some failures to believe will count as irrational. For one 
thing, one may simply be ignorant of the subject matter of one or more premises and 
so not hold a belief either way. In practice, someone might even think that there is 
sufficient reason to believe based on the evidence and yet fail to believe it anyway.22  
Many arguments for God’s existence argue from premises that will not be 
accepted by anyone who does not already have a prior religious commitment. Such 
arguments are therefore useful only as a solidifying bolster for those who already 
believe the conclusion and so will be dialectically ineffective. We could claim that the 
subject in these cases is negligent, and wilfully turns his natural lights away from the 
propositions which would lead him to believe: ‘Men prefer the darkness to the light, 
as the Gospel says, but they can do so not because the light is not irresistible, but 
because they wilfully turn away from it.’ 23  In such cases, the prerequisite for 
believing the conclusion of such arguments would be relevant engagement with the 
premises. It might be that there are further arguments that could be made for the truth 
of such premises, and the subject could seek out such arguments, and engage in the 
intellectual search for truth in order to form a belief one way or the other with regard 
to such premises.24  
                                                 
22 One might imagine a sincere utterance of the following kind, offered here by Speak’s imagined 
interlocutor: ‘I think there is enough evidence to believe – I mean, if I encountered someone in 
precisely my same evidential circumstances with respect to the truth of the salvation-relevant 
propositions, I would think her perfectly reasonable in believing. It’s just that I don’t ﬁnd myself 
believing the propositions – and I can’t simply make myself believe them by force of will.’ Speak, 
Daniel James, ‘Salvation Without Belief’, Religious Studies: An International Journal for the 
Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 43, Iss. 2, (Jun., 2007), p. 232. This may benefit from application of 
research into the phenomenon of epistemic disagreement, to determine whether two parties can both be 
rational despite not forming the same beliefs based on the same body of evidence.  
23 Cottingham, John, ‘Descartes and the Voluntariness of Belief’, Monist - An International Quarterly 
Journal of General Philosophical Inquiry, Vol. 85, Iss. 3, (2002), p. 12. 
24 Contrary to the attitude described in this chapter’s epithet. 
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 I started with the default assumption that in the face of a valid argument that is 
judged to be sound, subjects who are functioning well will come to believe the 
conclusion. I have explained some failures of this by claiming that the validity may 
not be accurately judged, and that the premises may not all be believed to be true 
(irrespective of whether they are in fact true or not). However, there may also be cases 
where the subject does believe that the argument is valid, and does believe the 
premises, and yet still does not believe the conclusion. It might be that in some cases 
deductive arguments are not sufficient for religious belief formation even when 
judged to be sound, or at least they will not be sufficient for the formation of a belief 
that will be strong enough (held with a high enough level of credence) to motivate the 
huge range of behavioural, doxastic, and affective changes one would expect in a 
religious conversion. This could be because they are ‘cold’, and the passions are not 
suitably excited. Pascal says in his Pensées, ‘“God is, or He is not.” But to which side 
shall we incline? Reason can decide nothing here.’25 Additionally, Augustine remarks 
that once certainty in religious truth was gained: ‘Well, it is certain now, yet the 
burden still weighs you down, while other people are given wings on freer shoulders, 
people who have not worn themselves out with research, nor spent a decade and more 
reflecting on these questions.’26 If we accept the implication of such remarks, namely 
that there are cases where reason is not appropriate or sufficient, we will need to look 
at other methods of belief formation to understand this aspect of religious conversion.   
 Another way in which religious beliefs can be formed is in response to the 
testimony of religious people. In the same way that we form beliefs about academic 
subjects by listening to teachers and professors, about world events by listening to 
newsreaders, one might come to have religious beliefs by listening to religious people 
or authorities. This is a common way that young people come to have religious beliefs 
when they grow up in religious families or communities. In the case at hand, we are 
considering those who form religious beliefs once their most formative years have 
already passed, and so also, once their ability to discriminate between good and bad 
testimony has been developed and their susceptibility to the influence of others has 
(often) diminished. When adults form religious beliefs in this way, one might expect 
it to be more likely under conditions where their community or central relationships 
change – that is, conversions are more likely to occur when exposed to a new religion 
                                                 
25 Pascal, Pensées, 233. 
26 Augustine, Confessions, p. 199. 
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or a familiar religion in a new way, which may be because they move to live in a new 
culture, enter a marriage, or form a relationship with a charismatic individual. New 
interactions with religious individuals can have the effect of challenging 
preconceptions that blocked the formation of religious belief (for example that 
religious people are boring, or that religious people are irrational), can expose them to 
new information (for example they might be told new facts about the religion they had 
previously been unaware of) or can inspire them to find that information for 
themselves (for example to gain acceptance by a new person or group of people 
whose acceptance they desire).  
 A key way in which ordinary beliefs are formed is through experience of the 
world and of ourselves – that is, via our internal and external senses. In the reports of 
religious conversion considered by William James, an occurrence he finds particularly 
interesting is of what he calls ‘automatisms’, which include hearing voices, seeing 
lights, seeing visions, convulsions, physical incapacities, spontaneous verbal 
behaviour or spontaneous motor behaviour.27 One particularly common experience is 
of hallucinatory lumination (seeing lights, called a ‘photism’ in James’s psychological 
terminology), which can be exemplified by Saint Paul’s vision on the road to 
Damascus (Acts 9:3) and Constantine’s vision of a cross in the sky.28 I will refer to all 
such experiences, when they feature as part of an explanation of a religious 
conversion or when they have some religious content, as religious experiences. An 
example is the following, taken from a first-person report of religious conversion:  
 
All at once the glory of God shone upon and round about me in a manner almost 
marvelous… . A light perfectly ineffable shone in my soul, that almost prostrated me 
on the ground… . This light seemed like the brightness of the sun in every direction. 
It was too intense for the eyes… . I think I knew something then, by actual 
experience, of that light that prostrated Paul on the way to Damascus. It was surely a 
light such as I could not have endured long.29 
 
The frequency of genuine experiences of this kind can easily be over-
estimated because sometimes when such reports are made the report should be taken 
                                                 
27 ‘[H]allucinations, pains, convulsions, paralyses of feeling and of motion, and the whole procession of 
symptoms of hysteric disease of body and of mind.’ James, p. 231. 
28 Ibid, p. 246.  
29 President Finney, Memoirs, p. 34, quoted in ibid. 
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non-literally. For instance, this account uses a simile to describe the quality of the 
experience quite self-awarely: 
 
As I was walking in a thick grove, unspeakable glory seemed to open to the 
apprehension of my soul. I do not mean any external brightness, for I saw no such 
thing, nor any imagination of a body of light in the third heavens, or anything of that 
nature, but it was a new inward apprehension or view that I had of God.30 
 
Other examples include these comments extracted from Starbuck’s collection: 
‘suddenly the darkness of the night seemed lit up’; ‘Immediately, like a flash of light, 
there came to me a great peace’; ‘There was no fire and no light in the room; 
nevertheless it appeared to me as if it were perfectly light.’31 It is trickier to identify 
reports that should be understood metaphorically, as usually in metaphor there is not a 
linguistic marker (such as the words ‘like’ or ‘as’ in similes) to suggest that the 
reading should be metaphorical rather than literal. The reader needs to rely on either 
contextual features, or sometimes a feeling of incongruence if taken literally. For 
instance, it makes little sense to take the claim ‘Juliet is the sun’ literally,32 and this 
incongruence leads the reader to search for a non-literal interpretation. This is not 
always going to be sufficient in the case of reported religious experiences, as these 
events are often bizarre and unusual, so a literal reading will be harder to rule out. 
Thus it will sometimes be unclear whether, and to what extent, reports of religious 
experiences should be taken literally. Even once such cases are weeded out, as long as 
there are some genuine reports of a genuine phenomenon, then religious experiences 
can be a way religious beliefs form, and which form part of a religious conversion.  
Not all conversions involve religious experiences of this kind. However, 
religious experiences are sometimes claimed to be ‘conversion experiences’, meaning 
that sometimes a religious experience is cited as the explanation, cause, or trigger for 
a religious conversion. Religious experiences can be intense and life changing, and 
sometimes seem to lead to a conversion occurring suddenly and over a very short 
period of time, and so are very interesting in terms of religious conversion. The model 
of religious conversion I present in this thesis will be able to account for the 
difference between sudden and gradual conversions, and shed light on the role of 
                                                 
30 Ibid, p. 247, attributed to Brainerd. Emphasis added. 
31 Quoted in ibid, pp. 248-9. Emphasis added.  
32 Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, Act 2, Scene 2. 
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conversion experiences too.   
 Once a religious belief has formed, in one of the ways described, more beliefs 
are likely to follow. That is, once a single religious belief is part of the belief set, new 
input is more likely to be interpreted in such a way as to add to the religious belief set. 
According to Kuhn, the nature of perception is something that is susceptible to change 
as the result of a scientific revolution, due to the ‘theory dependence of perception’.33 
Kuhn claimed that ‘the nature of observation may be influenced by prior beliefs and 
experiences. Consequently it cannot be expected that two scientists when observing 
the same scene will make the same theory-neutral observations. Kuhn asserts that 
Galileo and an Aristotelian when both looking at a pendulum will see different 
things’.34 In §1.1.2 I argued that religious conversions involve paradigm shifts -  ‘A 
shift in paradigm can lead, via the theory-dependence of observation, to a difference 
in one's experiences of things and thus to a change in one’s phenomenal world.’35 
Thus if the analogy between scientific revolutions and religious conversions outlined 
in §1.1.2 holds, then by extension, the nature of perception may change as the result 
of a religious conversion. Once a certain theory is adopted – once a religious belief is 
formed – this can change the subsequent experiences that one has, which in turn will 
influence which further beliefs are adopted. In this way, the adoption of one religious 
belief may initiate a cascade of others. From the initial formation of one religious 
belief, all subsequent experiences are more likely to be experienced in such a way as 
to confirm that belief, and additionally, to be interpreted in such a way as to lead to 
the formation of other beliefs that are consistent with it. In psychology the 
phenomenon of confirmation bias supports this claim. Confirmation bias is the 
tendency for individuals to seek out confirmation of their existing beliefs, and to 
interpret their experiences in ways that are compatible with those pre-existing 
beliefs.36 
 The flip side of this, is that without occupying a certain paradigm, one may be 
unable, or at least unlikely, to form a certain belief when exposed to evidence for that 
belief. There may be certain prerequisites for the formation of some religious beliefs. 
Obvious examples are those where a pre-existing belief is a prerequisite for forming a 
belief that depends on that pre-existing belief, such as that one must already believe 
                                                 
33 Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.  
34 Bird, ‘Kuhn’. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Kahneman, Daniel, Thinking Fast and Slow, Penguin Books, (2011), pp. 80-81. 
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that God exists before they can (sensibly) believe that God acts in the world. 
Sometimes a pre-requisite could be a non-doxastic state, for example a state of 
acceptance, a certain emotional state, attention, or openness (what Cottingham calls a 
‘mode of receptivity’37). That is, if someone is not paying attention to the relevant 
details, they cannot be affected by them in the right way, and if someone is simply not 
open to a particular view, then they will not engage with it in the right way either. 
This is captured by Pascal’s warning that ‘ordinary people have the power of not 
thinking of that about which they do not wish to think.’38 If we refuse to engage in a 
reasonable way, we may form and retain false beliefs, and fail to acquire true beliefs. 
These prerequisites will need to be in place before certain religious beliefs can 
form, and so it is arguable that, given these occur prior to, and are necessary for the 
formation of religious belief, these changes are also interesting in relation to 
understanding religious conversion. These changes do not entail that a conversion will 
take place because without being exposed to the relevant stimulus, experience, or 
evidence, the religious beliefs may not actually form. Additionally, these changes are 
not in themselves sufficient for a religious conversion, as by themselves they may 
have little or no effect on the life of the individual. Thus, a person may be in this state 
without being aware of it as such (they may be aware of certain features, but not of 
the significance of these features in terms of their receptivity to religion). The content 
of these prerequisites may be different for different individuals, and this may explain 
why different individuals form beliefs with different content even in response to the 
same stimulus.  
The following extracts are taken from a first person account of a religious 
conversion, by an individual born in Ukraine in 1976. The first is an account of a 
memory of an event from his early childhood in Ukraine:  
 
The first time I heard the call of our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ was on a warm 
spring night. On an evening walk through my native Zhytomyr with my mom I 
actually wandered into a Church. The door was wide open and deep inside the 
surprisingly well lit area I saw icons, candles and other fascinating items that seemed 
strange but at the same time warm and comforting. The big room was empty, save for 
a stocky middle aged man wearing a cassock! I was mesmerized by the beauty of the 
                                                 
37 Cottingham, The Spiritual Dimension, Cambridge University Press, (2005), p. 83. 
38 Pascal, Pensées, §IV, 259. 
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iconography on the walls and didn’t notice the man approach me. When I finally 
turned my head he was right in front of me. His face seemed to be radiating kindness. 
The man smiled warmly and reached out his hand. In it he held a slice of watermelon. 
I took it, and my mother who by that time had caught up with me and was standing to 
my right told me to thank the kind Priest. The Priest smiled again, told us that it was 
nothing and than said something that completely puzzled and bewildered me. 
“Hrystos Voskrese!” which translates from Ukrainian as “Christ is Risen”.39  
 
He later emigrated with his family to America, and he later made the following 
observation: 
 
Another amazing thing that I began to notice was the fact that every time I happened 
to walk by an Orthodox Church, every time I saw the Cross, every time I looked upon 
golden cupola I felt an unexplainable urge, a pulling of some kind. My whole being 
was drawn to Christ, yet I still didn’t completely understand.40 
 
The effect of this early experience clearly affected his later interactions with the 
Church. It would not be unreasonable to suppose that had he happened to wander into 
the holy building of another faith, the details of his conversion may have changed 
accordingly, and that had no such event occurred, he might never have had a religious 
conversion at all. The accidents of which religion your community, spouse, or parents 
adhere to (and whether these factors create attraction or aversion), which places of 
worship are accessible, which philosophies or atmospheres suit your personality, 
values, and prior commitments, are all relevant to (but do not determine) which 
religious beliefs one may come to hold, and which religious faith one may convert to.  
 Aside from its relevance to the topic of religious conversion, this result would 
have significant implications for the discourse between those occupying different 
paradigms – it would make arbitration by reference to some external observation less 
successful, and the ability to occupy another’s paradigm would be limited by our 
ability to see the world in the same way. Revisiting my earlier analogy with scientific 
revolution:  
 
                                                 
39 Post by Borislav in Eastern Orthodox Christian Forum, 
 http://www.orthodoxforum.com/topic.asp?TOPIC_ID=882 posted on 08/04/2007. 
40 Ibid. 
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 the proponents of competing paradigms practice their trades in different worlds. One 
 contains constrained bodies that fall slowly, the other pendulums that repeat their 
 motions again and again. In one, solutions are compounds, in the other mixtures. One 
 is embedded in a flat, the other in a curved, matrix of space. Practicing in different 
 worlds, the two groups of scientists see different things when they look from the same 
 point in the same direction.41 
 
Likewise, one may see the very same picture as a duck or rabbit, as a portrait of Gala 
or Lincoln, depending on the paradigm and the focus of attention. 
 
2.4. The justification of religious beliefs. 
 
In the epistemological context ‘justification’ normally means something quite 
specific, namely, the proper reasons one has for holding a belief. These proper reasons 
need to be rational and connected appropriately with the content of the belief, often 
via evidence for that belief. However, we also talk about emotions being justified, and 
behaviour being justified, and here we might mean something slightly different. I will 
distinguish three senses in which something can count as ‘justified’ and argue that 
beliefs can be justified in all three of these ways. I will call these ways epistemic, 
moral, and pragmatic. If all three ways of a belief being justified are genuine forms of 
justification, then one might be able to have a justified belief even when one or even 
two of these forms of justification are (so far) absent.  
These types of justification are not contraries but are actually 
complementaries. We can use all of these yardsticks. When we cannot determine 
whether something is standardly rational, it is standardly rational to defer to pragmatic 
rationality. Sometimes it is more appropriate to use one rather than another. In the 
present context, epistemic justification is often deemed to be more pertinent. In the 
coming chapters, we’ll see that emotions can be justified or unjustified, and here the 
most pertinent aspect is moral justification, and that behaviour can also be justified or 
unjustified and here the most pertinent type is pragmatic justification. However, all of 
these types can be relevant in any of these domains. 
An important implication of this concerns the way that religious beliefs are 
sometimes evaluated. Some critiques of religious belief conclude that religious beliefs 
                                                 
41 Kuhn, p. 150. 
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are not epistemically justified and therefore one is not justified in holding that belief. 
The conclusions have rested on a premise that evidence is the only, or at least, the 
primary source of justification. If this is wrong, we are looking in the wrong place 
when we come to assess religious beliefs solely on rational grounds, or at least, if we 
understand ‘rational grounds’ to be only those grounds based on evidence of the type 
we would expect in our scientific beliefs. Justification links with the broader notion of 
rationality in the following way: if a belief is justified, then it is rational to hold it. If a 
belief is rational, then one is justified in holding it. This is not to say that justification 
and rationality are synonymous, but for the current purpose, they will occur together. I 
now discuss each kind of justification in relation to religious beliefs in turn. 
 
2.4.1. Moral justification. 
 
Here I will claim that beliefs are ethically evaluable, so could be classed as either 
morally justified, or morally unjustified. Amesbury points out that the ‘moral 
dimension [of belief] is a result of the fact that belief is not a purely private matter, or 
one that can be partitioned off from other aspects of life: one's beliefs have 
consequences for others, as well as for oneself.’42 Clifford wrote that ‘it is wrong 
always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient 
evidence’.43 If Clifford is right, then the way to determine, for any particular instance 
of religious belief, whether it should be evaluated in a positive or a negative light 
would be to determine whether that belief was formed on sufficient evidence. That it 
is wrong for someone to believe something on insufficient evidence may be taken to 
imply both that it is possible to form beliefs on insufficient evidence and that we can 
be held morally responsible for our beliefs.  
In this case, it seems as though moral justification would be strongly linked to 
epistemic justification, in that beliefs will be morally justified only if they are 
epistemically justified. However, James argues that in cases where certain criteria are 
met the evidentialist requirement that one has sufficient evidence should be loosened. 
The criteria according to James are that a hypothesis must be ‘live’ (rather than 
‘dead’), the decision between two hypotheses must be ‘forced’ (rather than 
                                                 
42 Amesbury, ‘The Virtues of Belief – Towards a Non-Evidentialist Ethics of Belief-Formation’, p. 27. 
43  Clifford, William K., ‘The Ethics of Belief’, [1879], The Ethics of Belief and Other Essays, 
Prometheus Books, (1999), p. ix.  
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‘avoidable’) and the decision about the hypothesis must be ‘momentous’ (rather than 
‘trivial’).44  
A live hypothesis is one that is a real possibility relative to a particular person 
or group of people – so for people today, belief in the Greek gods is not a live 
hypothesis, but for the ancient Greeks it was. The liveness of a hypothesis can be 
measured in degrees, so for someone who grows up with Christian parents, 
hypotheses relating to a Christian God are more live than for someone who grows up 
in an atheist household in a Christian country, which in turn is more live than for 
someone who grows up in a non-Christian country but who is somewhat aware of the 
existence of the Christian religion, but it would not be a live possibility for someone 
alive before the advent of Christianity.45 An option is forced when there are only two 
options, and withholding belief will bring you down on one side so that one cannot 
stay neutral. An hypothesis will be momentous in case it will have multifarious 
consequences and effect many other beliefs, feelings, actions, and so on, in a persons 
life. Some beliefs are unmomentous – for example my belief that it is raining in China 
has almost no consequence, arouses very little feeling, and will not affect my 
behaviour one jot. Whether a hypothesis is momentous will vary from person to 
person; to a Chinese farmer during a drought, this proposition may be momentous. 
When an option is live, forced, and momentous, it is called a ‘genuine option’.  
If James is right, then people can believe religious hypotheses even without 
sufficient evidence with impunity, whenever a hypothesis is a genuine option for 
them. Religious beliefs will be a genuine option for many people. Take a religious 
belief like ‘God exists’. While this is vague and context sensitive, for any precisified 
value of ‘x’ in ‘Ǝx’, this is a forced option for everyone, because there are only two 
options, and withholding belief is as unreligious as believing that the religious 
hypotheses are false: 
 
Our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must, decide an option between 
propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on 
intellectual grounds; for to say, under such circumstances, “Do not decide, but leave 
                                                 
44 James, William, ‘The Will to Believe’, The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy, 
New York and Bombay: Longman Green and Co., (1897), p. 3. 
45 The fact that ‘liveness’ comes in degrees may be seen by some as a problem. As my comments on 
vagueness in §1.2.3 made clear, vague concepts are still usable, and while it may therefore be tricky to 
know in some borderline cases whether a belief counts as live for a person, this doesn’t undermine my 
argument. 
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the question open,” is itself a passional decision – just like deciding yes or no – and 
is attended with the same risk of losing the truth…46  
 
It will be momentous for very many people, because it has the magnitude to affect 
almost every aspect of a person’s life if it is fully integrated as a belief (as we have 
seen, it will lead to the formation of other beliefs, and can motivate behaviour, and we 
will come to see that it will also have consequences for the emotions). The option is 
live for many people. An option that was not live may become so under some of the 
conditions mentioned previously under which conversions often occur, for instance 
when one becomes more intimately acquainted with a religion they were previously 
not exposed to or when they have a personal crisis that forces them to challenge their 
existing paradigm. It may not always be obvious whether it is live for an individual, 
but there will be clear cases in which the option is live, clear cases in which it is dead, 
and a penumbra of borderline cases where the question of whether it is live will be 
unclear. 
James mentions another case where it is morally acceptable to believe 
something on insufficient evidence, which is that belief in the truth of the proposition 
constitutes, or can help to bring about, that proposition being true. For example, if a 
person believes they will survive a cancer, they are more likely to do so due to the 
positive psychosomatic effect that such a belief may have. Obviously someone’s 
belief that God exists cannot in anyway affect the truth of that proposition, but this 
condition might apply to other religious beliefs.47 For example, take the belief that 
prayer is efficacious. If one strongly believes this, and prays to be cured of an illness, 
this belief would be just as effective on a psychosomatic level as the belief that one 
would survive a cancer, and the prayer would play the role of a placebo. 
A ‘placebo’ is an effect whereby what has the efficacy in bringing about the 
change in question is some aspect of the subject’s subjective psychological response 
to the event or substance in question, not the event or substance itself.48 Where a 
subject is more credulous and suggestible, the placebo effect can be stronger and 
occur in a wider range of circumstances (which is especially relevant given that this is 
                                                 
46 James, ‘The Will to Believe’, p. 11. Original emphasis.  
47 This assumes a realist interpretation – this wouldn’t hold if we were radical idealists.  
48 The stigma attached to the notion of the ‘placebo’ is not intended here, as despite some tendencies 
for people to dismiss these effects as not really ‘real’ or ‘all in the head’, the effects can be just as real 
and physiologically grounded as the effects where the cause is purely physical. 
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a feature of the personality of sudden religious converts, according to James).49 
Placebos can be intended or inadvertent. A placebo is intended wherever it is 
administered with the aim of bringing about a placebo effect, for example when a 
doctor prescribes vitamin pills for a medically incurable disease with the intention of 
bringing about beneficial placebo effects. A placebo is inadvertent when there is no 
such intention, for example where a doctor prescribes an ineffective medicine that he 
nevertheless believes is effective.50 Here the placebo effect is still achieved because 
the patient still expects a positive effect. In the case of religious conversion, the 
placebo effect would normally be inadvertent because the convert has not been 
manipulated, but nevertheless might end up having beneficial results due to the 
conversion experience that are brought about not as a result of the experience itself 
but his beliefs or expectations about it.51 
A consequence of the efficacy of the placebo effect would be that it may be 
more difficult to establish the cause of the positive results experienced by converts 
after a religious conversion, or more specifically in this example, if a prayer has 
positive effects because of their positive beliefs about that experience, or due to the 
presence of a divine reality. Thus it may be harder to ascertain whether the beliefs 
formed have epistemic justification. It is difficult to determine the presence of and 
effect of placebos, partly because the placebo effect is often not the only factor and 
doesn’t happen in isolation from other variables. It can therefore be difficult to 
quantify. For example, take the following cases: 
 
(1)  A patient takes a pain killer, and expects that it will work. 
(2)  A patient takes a pain killer, and expects that it will not work. 
(3)  A patient takes a placebo, and expects that it will work. 
(4)  A patient takes a placebo, and expects that it will not work. 
 
In all four cases, assume that there are no other causes that have an effect on the 
amount of pain over the period over which the results are being measured and imagine 
to that there is a reliable way of measuring the pain. In (1) we would expect that the 
                                                 
49 James, pp. 229-30 and pp. 232-3. 
50 Grunbaum, Adolf, ‘Is Psychoanalysis a Pseudo-Science’, Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, 
Vol. 32, Iss., 1, (1978), p. 52. 
51 It is possible that an intended placebo effect is brought about when converts are manipulated, for 
instance by a cult leader or sham missionary. 
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pain will reduce, but the distribution of this reduction that should be attributed to the 
effects of the painkiller and the effects of the placebo involved with the expectation of 
pain relief will be difficult to calculate. It would seem that the answer is to compare 
this amount of reduction to a control case where a painkiller is taken with no positive 
expectation, as in (2). In (2) any pain reduction will be attributable to the effect of the 
pain killer but there might in this case be a ‘negative placebo’ effect, that is, it might 
be less effective in this case than in one where there is a neutral expectation or no 
expectation at all. The latter would be achievable if the patient was unaware they had 
taken a pain killer at all, so this would be the control needed to attribute the effects in 
(1). In (3) we might predict a reduction in pain and any reduction in pain can be 
attributed to the placebo effect. In (4) we would expect no change to the pain state.  
In the case of conversion, it will be very difficult to control for the placebo 
effect because we have no way of knowing in advance whether there is any real 
divine influence, and because subjects will have so many differences that controlling 
for all variables will be next to impossible. To answer the question of whether belief 
in the efficacy of prayer brings about a sense in which prayer can be efficacious is 
thus not straightforward, and therefore it is not straightforward to determine whether 
the belief has moral justification. Whether or not the prayer acts as a placebo, if it has 
a beneficial result then one may form the belief that the prayer is efficacious. It is not 
that God has answered the prayer that is made true by having the belief. And so in 
this sense, belief in the efficacy of prayer does not bring about the truth that God 
answers prayers. It was rather the belief that the prayer would work, that may have 
contributed to a state of mind that may have been more relaxed, meditative, and 
positive that may have allowed the healing to take place, so in effect, the prayer is 
effective, in that the belief that ‘praying will make me more likely to be cured of my 
illness’ would be true, even if the person’s reasons for thinking this might be way off 
the mark. For instance, someone may believe it was divine intervention when in fact 
the calm and meditative state of praying allowed the adrenal system to rest and the 
immune system to work more effectively, resulting in healing. However, it may not be 
possible to hold the belief that the prayer would increase the chances of recovery 
without a suitable meta-belief about why, and the calmer state may not be 
successfully achieved by prayer without a belief that allows this state to be reached 
(that is, without believing in something like divine intervention). So the meta-belief 
about divine intervention may still be instrumental in this example in that the belief in 
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the efficacy is what allowed the calm state to be attained. Thus the relation between 
the prayer and God are important aspects of the belief state if it is to work effectively 
as a placebo. In which case, in a less direct way, the belief that God answers prayers 
may be morally justified, because this belief brings about the truth of the result we 
would expect to see were that belief true. However, it would not be morally justified 
whenever the prayer did not contribute to the realisation of the intention of that 
prayer. 
To summarise the discussion of whether religious beliefs are morally justified, 
I have concluded that such beliefs are morally justified if they are either: (a) formed 
upon sufficient evidence; (b) genuine options; or, (c) such that believing the religious 
claim will itself contribute to bringing about the truth of the claim. I’ve claimed that 
(b) and (c) may sometimes apply. Given that saying that a belief is formed upon 
sufficient evidence is another way of saying that it has epistemic justification, I will 
turn to this in the next section.  
 
2.4.2. Epistemic justification. 
 
A belief will be epistemically justified just in case the belief is suitably connected to 
the object of belief. This connection is often deemed to be via evidence, or reasons. 
This could come from any of the three routes to belief formation I’ve outlined: 
through the consideration of sound arguments; through reliable testimony, and; 
through sensory evidence. Typically, the soundness of religious arguments and the 
reliability of religious testimony will be assessed in the same way as any other 
argument or testimony. However, there are some interesting differences when it 
comes to sensory evidence, since experience of the world via our senses is not, 
perhaps, exactly the same as what goes on in religious experiences. I will therefore 
focus this discussion on the justification of beliefs formed on the basis of religious 
experience.  
A second reason for focusing on experience is that both the other methods of 
belief formation ultimately have their justification grounded in experience too. 
Justification for believing the conclusions of religious arguments will depend on the 
justification for the truth of the premises. Where these are justified by further 
arguments these too will need to be examined, but ultimately there will (unless 
circular or merely demonstrating analytic truths) be justification (or lack thereof) 
  76 
grounded in one of the other two methods (or others not considered here). 
Justification gained by testimony will rest on claims about the reliability of that 
testimony and also the justification that the person giving testimony has themselves, 
otherwise the only support the testimony could offer would be a fallacious appeal to 
authority if the person is considered a religious ‘expert’ (as in the case of a religious 
official or missionary) or a fallacious ad populum claim, if it is the views of a 
community or culture. If the source of the person giving testimony is in turn from 
another person’s testimony, this can be checked for reliability too and will ultimately 
need to rest on one of the other two methods. This leaves religious experience as the 
most fundamental source of justification.   
If a belief is formed on the basis of religious experience then the experience 
must be indicative of the truth of that belief in order for it to count as justified. 
Without this justification one will not have good reason to convert to a religion 
merely on the basis of these beliefs.52 I will outline a general argument that attempts 
to show that religious experiences (conversion experiences being among these) are 
indicative of a transcendent reality, which I’ll call the ‘argument from credulity’. I 
shall focus on experiences of God in particular, which I take to be a subset of 
religious experiences.53  
Richard Swinburne outlines what he calls the ‘Principle of Credulity’.54 The 
principle states that if x appears perceptually to be present, then probably x is present. 
This probability would justify believing that x was present. This principle applied to 
sense experience seems plausible – if I seem to see a barn, then there probably is a 
barn (that is, it is more plausible, prima facie, that there is a barn than that there is 
not). This applies unless there is some sufficient reason to think that there is not a 
barn, for example because I know I have taken a hallucinogen, or because I am in 
fake-barn country. 55  Swinburne thinks this principle is indispensible short of 
succumbing to scepticism, since if we could not reasonably believe things to be the 
                                                 
52 There are of course other reasons that one might have for converting, for example, if the religious 
conversion would improve my moral life this would count as a reason. If it were the religious 
experience that inspired such a moral shift, then we could say that it is pragmatically justified if the 
consequences of converting are better than the consequences of not converting. 
53 I have no reason to suppose that the criteria would be any different for experiences of other realities, 
so I take it that this applies mutatis mutandis to religious experiences of other things too: if you prefer, 
you can substitute for the term ‘God’ another object of religious experience such as ‘Allah’ or ‘the 
Virgin Mary’. 
54 Swinburne, Richard, The Existence of God, Oxford University Press, (1979), p. 303. 
55 Goldman, A.I., ‘Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge’, Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 73, (1976), 
pp. 771-91. 
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way they appear (when there are no strong reasons to think otherwise)56 we would 
never be able to know anything on the basis of our experiences. The controversial step 
Swinburne takes is to apply this to religious experiences too. The principle of 
credulity applied to religious experiences then, purportedly allows one to reasonably 
conclude on the basis of the occurrence of religious experiences of God that there is 
such a God – unless there are reasons to think that the experiences are not veridical.57  
Thus, on the assumption that there are at least some religious experiences of 
the suitable kind, the enthymematic version of the argument claims that: 
 
(P1):  If we have apparent perceptions of God then probably God exists, 
 unless there are sufficient defeaters.  
(P2):  In conversion experiences sometimes there are apparent perceptions of 
 God. 
(P3):  There are no sufficient defeaters. 
∴ (C4):  Probably God exists.  
∴ (C5):  Conversion experiences sometimes justify the belief that God exists.  
 
I think there is a successful objection to this argument. Draper claims that the 
principle of credulity is not universally reasonable; therefore there will be false 
instances of it.58 If the principle of credulity should not apply to religious experiences 
then P1 would be false. He claims that, although the principle is a fundamental and 
important one, as we become epistemologically mature it gets modified to accord with 
different sorts of perceptual claims and things we learn about their reliability. Many 
experiences are still treated with a high degree of credulity once this maturity has 
been reached, but other experiences we learn to treat with initial scepticism rather 
than credulity. For instance, it would be irrational to be credulous that space aliens 
abduct people based on people’s claims to have experienced abduction, just because 
we have not got a sufficient defeater for their claims. In order for such claims to be 
credible, for Draper, it is not just necessary that they have not got a defeater, but also 
                                                 
56 Plantinga calls a reason one might give to challenge a perception a ‘defeater’. Plantinga, Alvin, 
Warrant and Proper Function, New York: Oxford University Press, (1993), pp. 231-7.  
57 I will not address the issue of whether such experiences need to be first person, or whether the 
experience of another can be grounds for me to believe, as this raises epistemological issues which 
cannot be settled here. 
58 Draper, Paul, ‘God and Perceptual Evidence’, International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion, 
Springer: Vol. 32, No. 3, (Dec., 1992), pp. 149-165. 
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that the evidence is suitably enhanced.   
To distinguish between experiences that can be treated with initial credulity 
and those which require enhancers Draper makes the following guiding remarks: (1) 
the more specific the claim, the weaker the evidence for that claim provided by the 
perceptual experience; (2) the more significant a claim, the more initial scepticism it 
should be treated with; (3) claims about extraordinary objects are prima facie less 
probable than claims about mundane objects; and (4) claims made on the basis of an 
extraordinary mode of perception should initially be treated with more scepticism 
than claims made on the basis of sense perceptions. I’ll briefly discuss these in order.  
There is some debate about the specificity of the claims made on the basis of 
religious experiences. Lots of claims are highly specific, but this might be the result 
of a degree of interpretation applied by an individual. If there could be a less specific 
core experience that is nonspecific enough to allow the principle of credulity to apply, 
then the fact that some people deliver a highly specific version of their experience 
would mean that the specific version may not be justified, while leaving room for the 
claim that experiences can justify some more general (less specific) beliefs.59 The 
descriptions given of religious experiences are often unspecific. When they are more 
specific, it might not be due to the fact that the experience itself gave rise to the 
specific propositional content of the doctrinal beliefs that arise, but rather, that the 
experience was processed through the lens of what the subject already expected, 
knew, or believed about the experience, and what they are later told about it by others, 
particularly religious authorities. Thus only the less specific claims could lay claim to 
epistemic justification on the basis of the experience.  
Upholding the second condition, that the more significant a claim is the more 
stringent the demands on its justification should be, seems epistemically responsible. 
Mundane and trivial claims lead to mundane and trivial consequences if they are 
wrong, but the more that rests on the claim the harder we should work to 
epistemically support it. Religious claims are certainly very significant given the wide 
reaching changes that occur in those who form these beliefs in conversion, and the 
impact religious beliefs have on society at large.  
                                                 
59 This is a view held by perennialists, who think that there is a single universal truth that finds 
expression differently in different religions and at different times. (Gellman, Jerome, ‘Mysticism’, The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/mysticism/ §4.) The differences between religions is 
thus a difference in interpretation of the universal truth are therefore social, cultural, and psychological.  
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The third condition that we should be more sceptical of extraordinary objects 
is also plausible. However, it is not obvious whether one should see God as an 
extraordinary object. For the Pantheist, God is not extraordinary, but the summation 
of everything that is ordinary. For others, God cannot be seen as any kind of object, 
extraordinary or otherwise. However, many religious claims involve a God that is less 
ordinary than the objects of sense perception. However, he is also significantly unlike 
some other extraordinary objects, such as aliens or Big Foot. We can conclude that for 
those claims that do concern an extraordinary object they are going to require more 
stringent epistemic justification than those that don’t.  
The fourth claim that we should be more sceptical about extraordinary modes 
of perception is also reasonable, in particular because religious experiences are 
unpredictable, and it is unclear what conditions are to count as ‘normal’ for the kind 
of ‘perception’ involved in religious experiences. If religious experiences are 
perceived by a sensus divinitatis, this should be treated with more initial scepticism. 
Thus at least in some cases, religious claims will be specific, significant, about 
extraordinary objects, and/or perceived via an extraordinary mode of perception. In 
such cases, initial scepticism is more appropriate than credulity, and thus the 
application of the principle of credulity to religious experiences is not appropriate in 
all cases. Draper argues on the contrary that the principle of credulity should not 
apply to them for epistemically mature individuals. 
Another argument for the epistemic justification of religious beliefs based on 
religious experience is the argument from analogy. This argument claims that as 
perceptual experiences can be veridical, and there is a sufficiently close analogy 
between perceptual experience and religious experience, we are justified in thinking 
that religious experiences can also be veridical. A mode of experience is veridical if it 
provides the truth. When it comes to sense perception, there is a cluster of tests that 
aim to show that those experiences passing the tests are veridical.60 Defenders of the 
                                                 
60 Although there are more tests discussed in the literature than I discuss here, I don’t include tests that 
are eliminative – that is, tests that cannot tell us that an experience has any more probability of being 
veridical, so even if the experience passes these test it would still not be sufficient to conclude that God 
exists. For instance, tests that focus on the need for experiences to be either logically or empirically 
consistent with other ‘facts’ or experiences. These cannot stipulate what counts as a ‘fact’ without 
being arbitrary – for instance, an atheist will gladly take ‘God does not exist’ to be a known fact, while 
the theist will not. Restriction to claims which are ‘known’ by everyone probably excludes all claims, 
while restriction to facts known by everyone in a particular culture, society, or religious group 
arbitrarily discriminates against the known facts held true by excluded groups. Wainwright attempts to 
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claim that there is a sufficient analogy between religious experience and ordinary 
experience argue that these tests can apply in an analogous way mutatis mutandis, to 
ascertain the veridicality of religious experiences. If religious conversion experiences 
pass a sufficient number of these tests then it will show that they are veridical, and if 
they are veridical then the subjects of religious conversion experiences can take these 
experiences as an epistemically justifying reason to hold the beliefs that arise from 
them. 61  If religious experiences are not veridical then they would not give 
epistemically justifying reasons to form beliefs about the objects of those religious 
experiences.62 If it turns out that the tests are not fair tests for the veridicality of 
religious experience, then this will destroy the analogy, so in this case the argument 
from analogy would fail to show that we are justified in believing religious 
propositions on the basis of religious experiences. 
 One test for the veridicality of sense-experience is that we would expect 
continuity between contents in some law-like manner. In the case of sense perception, 
if an object is present, all those suitably exposed to it ought to perceive it, and this 
experience would be repeatable under the same conditions. Draper makes a 
convincing case for failure of this test. Whilst there are law-like regularities in the 
case of sense perceptions, there are not in the case of religious experiences, and this 
disanalogy is epistemically significant.63  Sometimes different people, or the same 
person on different occasions, can be in the same position in all the relevant ways 
(physical location, hours of meditation, time since last meal… whatever one might 
consider relevant) and yet have a religious experience in one case and not in the other. 
                                                                                                                                            
solve this issue by including the following two conditions as tests for veridicality which require 
consistency with known facts:  
 
1. The experiential claim should ‘agree or disagree with orthodox talk’ (Wainwright, William 
J., ‘Mysticism and Sense Perception’, Religious Studies, Cambridge University Press: Vol. 9, 
No. 3, (Sep., 1973), p. 261.) 
2. We must ‘take the pronouncements of authority into account. In some communities the 
word of the spiritual director, or guru or master is final.’ (Ibid, p. 262.) 
 
However, these conditions are fallacious appeals to tradition and to authority, and discriminate against 
the unconventional or minority beliefs. Thus these ‘conditions’ are no guide to truth at all, unless the 
orthodoxy can be independently justified or shown to sufficiently correlate with truth. 
61 Gale, Richard M., On the Nature and Existence of God, Cambridge University Press, (1991), p. 306. 
62 A defeating condition can be understood as a flunked test, so if religious experiences flunk these tests 
it will also render P3 of the argument from credulity (that there are no sufficient defeaters) false. 
63 Wainwright disagrees with this, as he claims that the mystic can prescribe ‘a regimen, a mode of 
procedure, which is likely to lead to introvertive experiences’, p. 263. I would simply point out that 
here, the operative word is ‘likely’. One does not usually consider ‘likelihood’ sufficient for ‘law-like’ 
governance. 
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Unlike in the case of objects of sense perception where if there is a table under 
suitable conditions we do have an experience of it, one may not have a religious 
experience even if God is present (in some loose sense) and the conditions are fitting. 
So not having a religious experience is then not grounds for concluding that God is 
not present.  
This creates a situation where, according to supporters of the argument from 
analogy, having an experience of God counts in favour of God’s existence, but not 
having an experience of God does not diminish the possibility of God’s existence. 
This ‘heads I win, tails you lose’ situation doesn’t seem like the best basis for a 
plausible account of the justificatory force of religious experiences. This state of 
affairs counts as a defeater by both lowering the antecedent probability of the 
experience given that the claim is true and by raising the antecedent probability of the 
experience given that the claim is false. The actual distribution of religious 
experiences is also what we would expect on the hypothesis that God does not exist. 
Wainwright and Alston claim that this disanalogy is not significant because of 
the nature of the object we ‘perceive’ in religious experiences – as God chooses to 
reveal himself based on considerations we are not (and perhaps cannot be) aware of, 
the lack of regularity is exactly what we should expect assuming God exists and is the 
cause of our experience.64 The point they seem to be making is that because of the 
difference in the nature of the object of religious experiences from the objects of 
ordinary sense perception, we cannot expect there to be the same tests, and so genuine 
experiences of God would not be supported, confirmed or disconfirmed in the same 
way. This, however, seems to be simply conceding the vital point – there is a 
significant and relevant disanalogy between the two kinds of experience and so this 
counts against the argument that the veridicality of one kind is reason to believe that 
the other kind is also veridical.  
 Another test for veridicality is that there is likely to be agreement between 
different subjects, when both subjects had the experience under normal or standard 
conditions.65 What the ‘normal’ or ‘standard’ conditions for a religious experience are 
                                                 
64 This is similar to the ‘sceptical theism’ tact taken in response to problems from evil, and faces the 
same problems. Dougherty, Trent, ‘Skeptical Theism’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Spring 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =  
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/skeptical-theism/>. 
65 What ‘standard conditions’ are is difficult enough to ascertain with sense experience, but might 
include things like healthy organs, no significant deprivations, no significant physiological influences – 
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is not clear, although typically things like meditation, prayer, breathing exercises, and 
asceticism might be included as conditions that would increase the likelihood of 
religious experience and so be considered normal. However, not all religious 
experiences are preceded by these (or any other) special activities, and not all 
activities of these kinds lead to religious experiences. If under normal conditions we 
sometimes saw tigers when there were none, and sometimes failed to see them when 
there were, we would consider this to be evidence against the veridicality of tiger 
perceptions. Likewise, in every case where two subjects disagreed about the presence 
of a tiger we would conclude either that one person is not in standard conditions, or 
that the disagreement is significant. However, for defenders of the analogy between 
sense experience and religious experience, the analogue of this feature of sense 
experiences does not apply to religious experiences.  
Wainwright thinks that we should not worry about agreement between those 
who do not lead the prescribed mystical lifestyle (for example, a religious life of 
mystical experience educing practices like meditation and asceticism). Those people 
without the necessary ‘discipline’ do not count. We might be able to rectify the 
appearance of a disanalogy here between the agreement between subjects of 
perceptual experience and the lack of agreement between subjects of religious 
experiences, and in particular the fact that perceptual experiences, but not religious 
experiences, tend to occur for all subjects under normal conditions. In perceptual 
experience, where one subject is blind, they will not experience the colour change that 
a sighted subject would experience. And if a colour blind person sees a red and green 
picture they will not have the experience that a well-sighted person would. We can 
explain the lack of regularity and agreement in religious experiences by analogy with 
these perceptual examples. In the case where someone doesn’t have a religious 
experience, it could be that they have a similar lack, or inability or insensitivity that 
prevents them from seeing what is there. A more fitting analogy might be that certain 
aspects of poetry or music are able to be enjoyed only after years of study and a well 
trained sensibility for the subtleties of the art. A less experienced person may simply 
miss what for the connoisseur is pertinent. 
However, in this case it would be unusual for people to become religious due 
to religious experiences, as it would be unlikely that someone who is not already 
                                                                                                                                            
like drugs or alcohol – white light, suitable situation relative to the object, no holographic equipment 
etcetera.  
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religious would be leading such a lifestyle. If we agree with Wainwright, we must 
also agree that religious conversion experiences will not be epistemically justified. 
Additionally, unless there is some prior reason for giving more weight to the 
experience had by ‘religious connoisseurs’ (so to speak) we may have just as much 
reason to claim that the disagreement between subjects can be reduced, if not 
dissolved, by claiming that in all cases of disagreement at least one of the parties 
counts as an unreliable subject.  
The reliability of the subject also counts as a test for veridicality in its own 
right. Subjects are not considered reliable when they are in abnormal physiological or 
psychological states, and in such cases subjects tend to have more non-veridical 
experiences. Such subjects do have veridical and non-veridical experiences, so failing 
this test doesn’t show that the experiences are not veridical, just that they cannot be 
relied on to be veridical – which is enough to claim that believing the content of the 
experience without sufficient enhancers would be epistemically unjustified. Such 
‘abnormal’ conditions include (but aren’t limited to): 
 
(1)  Hyper suggestibility.  
(2)  Severe deprivation (for example of sleep, food, or water). 
(3)  Severe sexual frustration. 
(4)  Intense fear of death. 
(5)  Infantile regression. 
(6)  Maladjustment. 
(7)  Mental illness or psychosis. 
(8)  Unusual neurological happenings or physiological states (including       
………………medical conditions, and drug use, dependency and withdrawal). 
 
Under all of these conditions the subject cannot be relied upon to have veridical 
experiences. Some of the conditions that are most often reported to precede religious 
experiences count as abnormal according to the above list. Spiritual practices such as 
long periods of meditation or fasting lead to (2), severe deprivation; chastity may lead 
to (3), sexual frustration; near death experiences or the death of a loved one may 
involve (4), intense fear of death; and alcohol and drug addiction may involve (8), 
unusual physiology (as well as be a symptom of (6), maladjustment or a self-
medication for (7) mental illness of psychosis).  These correspond to the conditions 
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under which many ‘sudden’ conversions occur. Therefore, for many subjects, their 
religious experience will be unreliable and therefore the beliefs they form on the basis 
of such experiences will not have epistemic justification. 
The conclusion reached is that there are serious doubts about whether religious 
experience can satisfy the kinds of test for veridicality that are normally accepted in 
standard non-religious cases where the veridicality of an experience is being assessed. 
It is possible that some cases may avoid all of the exceptions mentioned in this section 
and therefore acquire the elusive status of epistemic justification, but this will be 
difficult to ascertain.  
 
2.4.3. Pragmatic justification.  
 
The final kind of justification I consider is pragmatic justification. By this, I mean 
that according to various principles about what makes things go better or makes our 
lives function better, we have (all things considered) more reason to do something 
rather than not to do it. James claims that some things ‘cannot by [their] nature be 
decided on intellectual grounds’, but instead the ‘evidence might be forever withheld 
from us unless we met the hypothesis half-way’.66 James thinks that (certain) religious 
beliefs are of this kind, because they ‘cannot be verified scientifically at all’.67 In any 
case, I have noted throughout this chapter that our belief formation is somewhat 
haphazard, that it is subject to cognitive errors, inattention, and any number of other 
‘flaws’. Given such a system, is it still reasonable to evaluate them in the way implicit 
in much philosophical discussion – is it not unreasonable to demand perfection where 
there can be none? Rott says: 
 
logicians have come to realize that most of our reasoning proceeds on the basis of 
incomplete knowledge and insufficient evidence. Implicit assumptions about the 
normal state and development of the world, also known as expectations, 
presumptions, prejudices or defaults, step in to fill the gaps in the reasoner's body of 
knowledge. These default assumptions form the context for ordinary reasoning 
processes. They help us to generate conclusions that are necessary for reaching 
decisions about how to act, but they are retractable if further evidence arises. Thus 
                                                 
66 James, ‘The Will to Believe’, p. 28. It might be through faith/acceptance that one gets to be half way. 
Acceptance will be discussed in §4.3. 
67 James, ‘The Will to Believe’, p. 25. 
  85 
our inferences will in many contexts be defeasible or non-monotonic in the sense that 
an extension of the set of premises does not generally result in an increase of the set 
of legitimate conclusions.68  
 
If religious beliefs are not the sort of belief that require evidence for epistemic 
justification, one might ‘feel that what is unreasonable is not their belief, but the 
demand that it be supported by evidence.69 
 In On Certainty, Wittgenstein points to beliefs that can be held without 
evidence, as ‘the grounds that [one] can give are no surer than [the] assertion’ that one 
seeks to justify.70 An example could be ‘The earth has existed for more than five 
minutes’. This proposition (and others like it) is not certain ‘because it is intrinsically 
obvious or convincing; it is rather held fast by what lies around it’.71 Here there is a 
departure from the Cartesian strategy of appealing to ‘clear and distinct’ or 
‘intrinsically obvious’ ideas.72 Such beliefs are certain because they function ‘like a 
hinge on which other things turn, an axis around which they revolve’, and if the hinge 
or axis were removed, the entire structure that depends on it would collapse. Where 
such a collapse cannot be tolerated, the hinge proposition is not doubted. In the case 
of central religious beliefs, it seems clear that many of a person’s other beliefs, their 
way of being, of interacting with the world and other people, and their emotional 
lives, are radically affected by them to the extent that their removal would result in an 
upheaval of extreme proportions. More relevantly, adopting a belief like this (perhaps 
not immediately) can radically alter almost every other aspect of a person’s 
engagement with the world.  
 Such beliefs will not be responsive to evidence in the same way. Of course, they 
can (and under certain conditions will) be doubted and challenged. Yet the default 
position with them should not be the evidentialist ‘guilty until proven innocent’, but 
rather a more judicious ‘innocent until proven guilty’.73 That is, rather than demand 
that they should be evidenced sufficiently before they can justifiably be held, one 
                                                 
68 Rott, Hans, ‘A Counterexample to Six Fundamental Principles of Belief Formation’, Synthese, Vol. 
139, No. 2, (Mar., 2004), p. 226. 
69 Amesbury, ‘The Virtues of Belief – Towards a Non-Evidentialist Ethics of Belief-Formation’, p. 33. 
70 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, On Certainty, [1969], Blackwell, (2003), §243. 
71 Ibid, §144. 
72  Descartes, Rene, Meditations on First Philosophy, [1641], Ed. John Cottingham, Cambridge 
University Press, (1996), Meditation III, §35, p. 24. 
73 Here we have something like a principle of credulity again, but here held for a more profound and 
defensible reason. 
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should claim that they are justifiably held until sufficient reason presents itself not to 
– and where the stakes are high, we can reasonably demand that the bar for 
sufficiency on this count be placed high. True, we cannot be certain of a proposition 
in the same way if it is not founded on evidence in the same way. However, 
Wittgenstein would claim that we do not need that certainty, and that ‘without 
appropriate grounds doubt can itself be irrational, and until doubts arise, we are within 
our rights to believe.’74 From what we know so far about the way that certain religious 
beliefs are like new scientific discoveries that dramatically alter one’s paradigm, it is 
reasonable to suppose that some of these beliefs will underpin so much else, and be so 
integral to one’s being and functionality, that it would be more rational to allow a 
little confirmation bias to ease our journey than to attempt a revision of these beliefs 
every time something rose as an ostensible challenge to them. Therefore, where 
religious beliefs function as hinge beliefs they can be pragmatically justified. This 
will further depend on whether the role that the belief plays improves the life of the 
believer and those they affect. Where the belief leads to things like moral 
improvement, increased well-being and health, and improved functioning in society, it 
is pragmatically justified. Where the belief leads to maladjustment, ill-health, or moral 
corruption, it will not be. 
 
2.5. Concluding remarks. 
 
This chapter has aimed to investigate the doxastic dimension of religious conversion. 
I came to the following thoughts about religious beliefs: religious beliefs aim at truth; 
they can be held with degrees of credence; they can be latent; they can be held 
without first-person knowledge; they are not always subject to first-person authority; 
and beliefs can motivate or explain behaviour.  
I also considered three ways in which religious beliefs tend to be formed, 
namely, through rational argument, through third-person testimony, and through 
religious experience. I argued that as well as these things (which might be seen as 
‘triggers’) there must be an appropriate mode of receptivity too. Given that the soil in 
which the seeds land will be different for each individual, and that there are many 
kinds of seed that can bear religious fruit, the trees will not look the same in all cases. 
The particular beliefs one adopts may be different according to various accidents. 
                                                 
74 Amesbury, ‘The Virtues of Belief – Towards a Non-Evidentialist Ethics of Belief-Formation’, p. 29. 
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Despite these differences, the process is similar, and the conditions that make for a 
suitable receptivity are also similar.  
I then turned to the justification of religious beliefs, and distinguished between 
three types of justification: moral, epistemic, and pragmatic. I claimed that beliefs will 
be morally justified when (a) formed upon sufficient evidence; (b) genuine options, 
or; (c) such that believing the religious claim will itself contribute to bringing about 
the truth of the claim. I focussed further on (a) as beliefs formed upon sufficient 
evidence are those that are epistemically justified. I claimed that epistemic 
justification should include a suitable relationship between the content of the belief 
and the object of belief, and so considered an argument that attempted to show that 
religious conversion experiences are indicative of God, and therefore suitable as 
reasons for subjects to convert on that basis. To establish whether or not religious 
experiences were veridical I looked at some tests for veridicality. The disanalogies 
piled up in subsequent discussion, and it was established that unlike sense experience, 
we do not know how to judge the reliability of the subject or their extraordinary 
faculty of religious ‘perception’, there is no law-like governance of such experiences 
nor determinable standard conditions, and one can only remove disagreement between 
subjects by extinguishing the religious import of their claims. Finally, I claimed that 
pragmatic justification may be a more appropriate measure of religious beliefs under 
some circumstances, as religious beliefs may have pragmatic justification even when 
they don’t meet the criteria for epistemic justification. It might be that rather than 
taking religious experience as a kind of scientific evidence for the truth of religious 
beliefs, ‘[r]eligious experience can best be viewed like other general life experiences 
as events which shape an individual's world view. Thus, individuals who have ‘had a 
witness of the Spirit’ or ‘felt the presence of God’ may be more likely to exhibit 
higher levels of religious feeling, beliefs, and behaviors.’ 75  Through the 
interconnectivity with these other dimensions, the network can provide pragmatic 
justification by making the beliefs fundamental to the individual and a large sphere of 
their inner and outer lives.  
Some accounts of religious conversion focus purely on the cognitive, and so 
might leave the topic here, having discussed only the doxastic dimension. However 
conversion is not about mere cognitive change and so accounts focusing solely on the 
                                                 
75 Cornwall, Albrecht, Cunningham and Pitcher, p. 232. 
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sphere of belief are not very promising. I now move on to discuss how religious 
experiences, and also beliefs, contribute to a powerful non-cognitive affect on the 
subject, to the emotional lives and behaviour of converts, and how these aspects are 
mutually interrelated.  
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CHAPTER 3 
THE AFFECTIVE DIMENSION 
 
‘both judgement and action lack the emotionality that is a requirement of virtue.’1 
 
I now turn to the second of the three interconnected dimensions I’ve claimed that 
religious conversion involves: the affective dimension. I will argue that religious 
conversion will likely lead to both an increase in certain emotional episodes and 
moods, and to a dispositional change in the affective life of the convert. An important 
aspect of what changes for a person in a religious conversion might be the cultivation 
of emotions that were previously uncultivated (for example humility, compassion, 
awe), as well as overcoming or managing emotions that were previously rife (for 
example hatred, pride, malice) both in terms of the episodes of these emotions 
experiences, the dispositions to experience these episodes, and in the background 
emotional ‘weather’ of one’s general mood. Strong emotional experiences typically 
form at least part of (often a significant part of) religious experiences, and empirical 
data on conversion suggests that times of extreme emotional turmoil precede sudden 
religious conversions. Here are three extracts from first-personal accounts of religious 
conversion that clearly include a strong affective element:  
 
The next day I rejoiced with trembling; soon after, my happiness was so great that I 
said that I wanted to die; this world had no place in my affections, as I knew of, and 
every day appeared as solemn to me as the Sabbath. I had an ardent desire that all 
mankind might feel as I did; I wanted to have them all love God supremely.2 
 
Although up to that moment my soul had been filled with indescribable gloom, I felt 
the glorious brightness of the noonday sun shine into my heart. I felt I was a free man. 
Oh, the precious feeling of safety, of freedom, of resting on Jesus! I felt that Christ 
with all his brightness and power had come into my life; that, indeed, old things had 
passed away and all things had become new.3 
 
                                                 
1 Goldie, Peter, ‘Intellectual Emotions and Religious Emotions’, Faith and Philosophy, Vol. 28, No. 1, 
(Jan., 2011), p. 101. 
2 James, p. 188. 
3 James, p. 201. 
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At that instant of time when I gave all up to him to do with me as he pleased, and was 
willing that God should rule over me at his pleasure, redeeming love broke into my 
soul with repeated scriptures, with such power that my whole soul seemed to be 
melted down with love, the burden of guilt and condemnation was gone, darkness 
was expelled, my heart humbled and filled with gratitude, and my whole soul, that 
was a few minutes ago groaning under mountains of death, and crying to an unknown 
God for help, was now filled with immortal love, soaring on the wings of faith, freed 
from the chains of death and darkness4 
 
I will explore the role that these and similar emotional components play in religious 
conversion.  
I will consider the nature of emotion in §3.1 and will discuss how the 
emotional responses during religious experiences lead to shifts in emotional 
dispositions, religious belief formation, and motivations to engage in new kinds of 
activity in §3.2.5 In §3.3 I will argue that sometimes the influence of emotions on 
belief formation results in self-deceptive beliefs. I will further this thread by 
considering the view that self-deceptive beliefs are those formed under the influence 
of strong emotions rather than being formed under the influence of the usual cognitive 
constraints, and which serve a more emotional purpose than mere epistemic inquiry. I 
will examine the dynamic of this ‘influence’. In §3.4 I evaluate the rationality of 
emotions and argue that they can contribute to cognitive processes that can be 
considered rational. The assumption that beliefs formed under the influence of 
emotion are thereby irrational is a symptom of the pervasive mind-set that emotions 
are inferior states to be overcome or ignored in favour of cold hard cognition. I will 
consider the objection that emotions are irrational and therefore cannot be a rational 
basis for religious conversion, and show that it does not defeat my position. 
In the present chapter I conclude that emotions are not only welcome, but are 
essential for a rich life, and more surprisingly, that emotions are integral to our ability 
to behave as rational agents and therefore should be integrated into our intellectual 
pursuits rather than ostracised. Moreover, their role in religious conversion is 
indispensable, and there is a legitimate sense in which emotions can actually endow 
some beliefs with justification. The prospects for the justifiability of forming religious 
                                                 
4 Quoted from James, p. 215. 
5 The latter will be elaborated more fully in Chapter 4 – The Dimension of Praxis. 
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beliefs on the basis of religious experience will be better given this. Whilst emotion 
can also lead us astray, so too can the most exalted forms of argumentation. Whereas 
Pascal says that ‘It is the heart which experiences God, and not the reason’6 I shall 
claim to the contrary that it is the heart which experiences God, and also the reason. 
 
3.1. The nature of the emotions. 
 
Before exploring the concept of emotion in more detail I will outline two distinctions. 
The first is between an emotion and a mood, and the distinction centres on the clarity 
of the intentional object. An emotion will have a fixed intentional object that it will be 
possible for the subject to identify (although the subject may not always actually 
identify it, or do so correctly). Thus if I experience the emotion of sadness, I am 
usually sad about something, and on reflection I am often able to identify what it is 
that I am sad about. A sad mood on the other hand is more vague than this and does 
not necessarily attach to a specifiable object. If I have a persistently depressed mood, I 
may not be able to specify something I am depressed about. The object might be more 
like ‘everything’ or ‘life in general’. Often it may be difficult to distinguish a mood 
from an emotion in a first-personal way, or to distinguish them by reference to a 
single moment, especially as it is possible that even if one is experiencing a mood, it 
is sometimes the case that we engage in a kind of post-hoc rationalisation when we 
experience feelings. This may result in us positing an intentional object for a feeling 
in order to make sense of the feeling to ourselves, even when there is none. For 
instance, anyone who has experienced (either personally or second-hand) the effects 
of pre-menstrual-stress may find that they posit the nearest object as the source of 
their irritation when in fact that ‘source’ post-dates the feeling.   
There is also a distinction between an emotional episode, and an emotional 
disposition. If I am undergoing an emotional episode of anger this will imply that I am 
currently experiencing the phenomenal characteristics of anger, while if I merely have 
an angry disposition this doesn’t imply anything about my present state, but says of 
me that I perhaps easily or frequently experience angry episodes. A disposition 
towards a certain emotion is more like a tendency to experience emotional episodes of 
a particular type. We can also say that someone feels a certain emotion in a 
dispositional sense, when we would attribute that feeling to them but they are not 
                                                 
6 Pascal, Pensées, 278. 
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currently experiencing an episode of that emotion. It can be truthfully said of me that I 
am angry with my boss in the dispositional sense even if I am unconscious. One can 
also say that someone has a disposition towards a particular mood that they frequently 
experience. For instance, if someone has a sad mood regularly, it would increase the 
aptitude of saying that they have a disposition towards sadness.  
In the philosophy of emotion literature there is disagreement about what 
emotions are and how to understand them, and different theoretical accounts of 
emotion explain and account for various aspects of emotion differently. I will not 
attempt to decide between competing theories of emotion because my account of the 
role of emotion in religious conversion does not turn on how some of the subtler 
questions about emotion are answered.7 Instead, I will give a rough account based on 
those things that most theories agree on, focussing on the aspects of emotion that are 
taken as a starting point for much of the theorising.8  
Points of agreement are that emotions have a characteristic phenomenology – 
there is something that it is like to experience each emotion, and that different 
emotions will vary with regard to: type; intensity; valence; duration; complexity; 
physical manifestation; degree of consciousness; motivational capacity; and 
intentional object. Which emotion is present may not always be easy to identify by the 
individual or by others, but there are criteria for an experience counting as an 
experience of a particular emotion made up of a combination of those factors. Further 
points of agreement are that: emotions indicate subjective importance and can define 
our ends and priorities (by guiding our attention, and bestowing salience); emotions 
heighten the efficacy of memory formation and retention; emotions can guide action 
and provoke behavioural response; and emotions ‘play a crucial role in the regulation 
of social life’9 and ‘have a central place in moral education and the moral life.’10  
                                                 
7 At any rate, attempting this would be complicated by the fact that emotions are adaptive. They have 
played an evolutionary role in our functioning and success as a species, and so we can expect that they 
will continue to evolve, and not remaining static would make abstract theorising about a diachronic 
relation between them and the phenomenon of religious conversion challenging at best, impossible at 
worst. 
8  de Sousa, Ronald, ‘Emotion’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (Spring 2012 Edition), 
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2012/entries/emotion/>, and Goldie, ‘Emotion’, Philosophy 
Compass, Vol. 2, Iss. 6, (2007). 
9 de Sousa, ‘Emotions’. 
10 Ibid. 
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One debate that does bear on my project is whether emotions should be 
understood as cognitive or non-cognitive.11 The difference concerns whether emotions 
are reducible to either non-cognitive aspects (for instance physiological changes, like 
a rise in blood pressure, a dry mouth, sweaty palms, or muscle tension) or to cognitive 
aspects (for instance beliefs, judgements, appraisals, or intentionality – which is the of 
or aboutness of emotions). 
A simple non-cognitive theory has been attributed to both James and Lange, in 
which emotions are reducible to feelings brought about by physiological changes in 
the body, like ‘trembling, blushing, perspiring, pangs, throbs, tingles, burning and 
other sensations, adrenalin secretions, increase in heart and respiratory rates, 
alterations of blood flow, changes in blood pressure, and digestive processes and other 
neurological symptoms.’12 On this model, if I see a tiger this leads to an increase in 
adrenaline, a tightening of certain muscles, a quickening of the breath, and an increase 
in sweat production. This group of feelings can be called ‘fear’ and the 
phenomenology of the emotion of fear is reducible to the bodily responses we can 
feel. Fear is therefore understood on this model as these bodily sensations. On this 
model the role emotions play in conversion would be no more than a symptom of 
something that plays a real role.  
However, this model does not allow one to differentiate between all emotions. 
For instance, the physical symptoms just described in relation to fear might just as 
well be describing the effects of anger, so it is not obvious which physiological 
features are really different in cases of similar emotions. If the distinction cannot be 
found in bodily sensations then bodily sensations cannot be the whole story. This 
objection is made extremely plausible in light of the results of the following 
psychological experiment.13 Subjects were given a shot of epinephrine and placed in a 
room with an actor. Half of the subjects were subject to an actor instructed to behave 
angrily and the other half to an actor instructed to behave euphorically. The reports of 
these subjects tended to match their situation, with some interpreting the arousal they 
felt from the shot as anger and some as euphoria. If there were nothing to emotion but 
the bare sensation the expected result would have been a convergence in report 
                                                 
11  Harris, Daniel, ‘Of Somethings and Nothings – Wittgenstein on Emotion’, International 
Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 51, No. 1, Iss. 201, (Mar., 2011), p. 73.  
12 Bilimoria, ‘On Grief and Mourning – Thinking a Feeling, Back to Bob Solomon’, Sophia, Vol. 50, 
(2011), p. 291. 
13  Schacter, Stanley, and Jerome Singer, ‘Cognitive, Social and Physiological Determinants of 
Emotional States’, Psychological Review, Iss. 69, (1962), pp. 379–99. 
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between all (or at the very least, most) subjects. Differentiating emotions merely by 
sensation becomes all the more difficult when we consider complex emotions like 
guilt, embarrassment, and shame. With these emotions, the object of the emotion 
seems crucial to understanding the emotion as an instance of that kind of emotion at 
all – for instance, embarrassment is not possible without reference to a person before 
whom one is embarrassed. 
A contending group of theories leaves feelings completely behind, thus 
avoiding the problems faced by the James-Lange theory, instead modelling emotions 
on cognition. The literature displays various alternative theories of this type, that 
equate emotions with beliefs, judgements, appraisals, or intentionality. An objection 
to this kind of theory is that sometimes a person may have a contradictory belief to the 
proposition(s) that would need to feature in an explanation of the emotion. For 
example a person might believe that flying is the safest mode of transport, and yet still 
feel fear when flying. This is difficult to reconcile if this fear is to be understood as a 
belief in the truth of the proposition that flying is a threat to my safety (or similar). 
Another objection can be formulated in response to recent neuroscientific experiments 
that show that emotions arise before cognition has had the time to take place.14 If this 
were right, then emotion could not be equated with cognition.  
Neither the cognitivist nor the non-cognitivist can account successfully for the 
breadth of emotional experience to be explained – the cognitivist has hold of an 
elephant’s trunk and the non-cognitivist has hold of its tail, and both assume that they 
are holding an entire animal. Moreover, both assume that the cognitive and non-
cognitive aspects of emotion are separable from each other. 15  I think a more 
promising approach will integrate both cognitive and non-cognitive aspects that are 
prioritised by the cognitive reductionists and non-cognitivists respectively. Indeed, 
‘the logic of our concepts already keeps them in a tight logical and conceptual knit.’16 
                                                 
14  See Zajonc, Robert B., ‘Feeling and Thinking: Preferences Need no Inferences’, American 
Psycologist, Vol. 35, (1980), pp. 151-175. See also Storbuck, Justin, and Clore, Gerald L., ‘On the 
Interdependence of Cognition and Emotion’, Cognition and Emotion, Vol. 21, Iss. 6, (2007), pp. 1212-
1237. 
15 ‘[B]oth are following through on the program laid down by Descartes in choosing one feature among 
body and mind as central, and then construing the other as connected only contingently, the only result 
seems to be stalemate: two views unable to speak to each other from their isolated perches atop 
different starting points.’ Harris, p. 76. 
16 Ibid, p. 77. 
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Strawson notes that ‘an objective account of reactive attitudes does not capture their 
importance for our lives’.17 I’ll focus on the example of one emotion to illustrate.  
In order to understand the complex emotion of love, and the role it may play in 
religious conversion, we need to understand the concept of love and how this is 
manifested in the individual experiencing it. The criteria for claiming that an 
individual feels love will include phenomena of both the cognitive and non-cognitive 
kinds, and in many cases these will be inextricably linked. 
 
The question of whether or not it is love is decided by the normal course of love, and 
a putative lover either meets the criteria or does not. If she says or does certain things, 
we say that she did not love him. These behavioral criteria define the emotion. They 
form part of the concept, and it is only by appeal to them that we can sensibly speak 
of inner events. Of course, love consists in part of a racing heart and quickening 
pulse, but we would have no way to talk about such inner events without their 
expression in behavior.18  
 
Love, as an emotion, involves a cognitive, a non-cognitive and a behavioural 
component. The cognitive component may involve beliefs about the worth and 
worthiness of the beloved. The non-cognitive component may include certain physical 
changes such as an increase in oxytocin and dopamine in the presence of the beloved. 
The behavioural component may involve a disposition to seek out and spend time 
with the beloved, look at, be affectionate with, and otherwise do things for the good of 
the beloved.19 These aspects combine to form a state that can be called love. Any of 
these by themselves in the absence of the others, we would not call love: pure bodily 
feelings, like throbbing or dizziness, are not emotions, and given that we can induce 
the chemical changes artificially even when no object is present, we would not call 
the affective dimension ‘love’ if it stood alone. Likewise, I can believe things about 
the lovableness and worthiness of an individual without actually loving them – the 
cognitive, or intentional aspect is essential, but not sufficient by itself. Thus both 
affect (feelings) and cognition are compounded in emotional experience.  
                                                 
17 Kimbrough, Scott, ‘Philosophy of Emotion and Ordinary Language’, Florida Philosophical Review, 
Vol. VII, Iss. 1, (Summer 2007), p. 94.  
18 Harris, ‘Of Somethings and Nothings – Wittgenstein on Emotion’, p. 80. 
19 The details of how emotions are expressed through behaviour will be elucidated in §4.1, where I will 
argue that behaviour is also to be understood as involving both cognitive and non-cognitive aspects. 
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 The cognitive aspect of emotion may be propositional in nature, although it 
may include non-propositional content too, as ‘there are modes of nonverbal cognitive 
processing and nonverbal memory’.20 Whatever propositional content there is need 
not be present in the conscious mind of the individual for the emotion to have its 
affect as ‘[c]onscious awareness and critical reflection are not necessary for changes 
in attitude, perspective, or meaning structures to take place.’21 The presence of non-
propositional cognitive content in the emotional experience of religious experiences 
would explain why religious experiences are so difficult to describe, and why people 
describe them in terms readily at hand from the religious tradition with which they are 
most familiar. Trying to explain a feeling using words is akin to trying to describe a 
picture using words. It may not include anything inaccurate, and it may indicate the 
main layout of the scene, elaborating on relevant details, but no description will be an 
adequate substitute for having a feeling any more than for surveying a picture with 
your own eyes.  
 
3.2. The interplay between emotions and beliefs. 
 
Having explored the doxastic dimension in the previous chapter, I can consider the 
interplay between this and the affective dimension currently under consideration. In 
§1.1.2 I argued that there is a useful analogy between scientific paradigms and 
religious conversion. The current focus on emotions can further this analogy, as the 
way that emotions direct our attention to provide a source of reasons is similar to the 
way that scientific paradigms stimulate research. 22  James notes that ‘[e]motional 
occasions, especially violent ones, are extremely potent in precipitating mental 
rearrangements’.23 They can do this, in part, by influencing belief formation, so that 
the emotional landscape of an individual will affect the beliefs that they form.  
 An important way in which emotions affect belief formation is that they direct 
our attention and alter the salience of the objects of emotion. When we consider some 
                                                 
20 Norris, ‘Examining the Structure and Role of Emotion: Contributions of Neurobiology to the Study 
of Embodied Religious Experience’, Zygon, Vol. 40, Iss. 1, (Mar., 2005), pp. 188. 
21 Ibid. 
22 ‘paying attention to certain things [as we do when our emotions are engaged] is a source of reasons, 
but comes before them. Similarly, scientific paradigms, in Kuhn’s sense, are better at stimulating 
research that at finding compelling and fair reasons for their own adoption’ Ronald de Sousa, ‘The 
Rationality of Emotions’, in Rorty, Amelie, (eds.), Explaining Emotions, (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, (1980), p. 139. 
23 James, p. 196. 
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religious symbol, text, or artefact, ‘when our attention is roused, then the more 
steadily we dwell upon it, the more probable does it seem that a revelation has been or 
will be given to us.’24 If one has a sufficiently strong emotional response, (for instance 
the overwhelming and extreme kind that often features in religious experiences) this is 
very likely to lead to the perception of extreme importance regarding the object of 
experience. This importance will have a residual effect that will continue to direct 
attention. Although much is yet to be understood, a broad outline of the functions of 
the brain claims that the Reticular Activating System (RAS) acts as an intermediary 
between the lower and higher brain functions and input from the former can influence 
the latter. More specifically, emotional or instinctive input can end up affecting 
reasoning and rational thinking, via the RAS, as the emotional cues direct our 
attention which influences reasoning and thinking. The RAS (among many other 
functions) filters out unimportant aspects of our surroundings and puts us into a state 
of attention with regards to others. It is why we are more drawn to people over 
objects, moving objects over still ones, and emotionally significant objects and people 
over emotionally neutral ones.  
 In a religious experience the emotional component will lead to an increase in 
attention and engagement with anything that resembles, reminds one of, or seems 
even remotely relevant to that experience. Thus, if the experience was of God, this 
may lead to the subject of the experience noticing places of worship they may 
previously have walked past, being interested in taking part in discussions about God, 
attaching more significance to anything they read about him, and generally being 
more open to, and engaged with anything that is included in the sphere of increased 
salience thereafter. The assignment of increased salience to religious propositions will 
make it more likely that new religious beliefs will form, in virtue of the fact that it 
makes it much more likely that a person will engage with religious people, 
behaviours, arguments, and other things which may all contribute to the formation of 
religious beliefs.25  
If this is right, this may explain why two people exposed to the same evidence 
may form different beliefs. This would be a particularly interesting result in the 
                                                 
24 Newman, Grammar of Assent, pp. 328-9 as quoted in Wynn, Emotional Experience and Religious 
Understanding, p. 139. 
25 To revisit an earlier concern in §2.3 about the fact that arguments perceived as sound are still 
unconvincing to subjects, perhaps the inability of pure cold argument to convince subjects to the extent 
required to lead to beliefs and action may explicable in terms of the lack of emotional engagement, and 
so in turn, the lack of motivation and salience required for this. 
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present context, for it may explain why some individuals convert while others do not, 
even when they have been exposed to the same evidence. For instance, my brother 
and sister are only a year apart in age, have the same parents, education, and 
upbringing, and are in many respects outwardly similar – yet my brother did not 
convert in response to what was largely the same set of external stimuli.  
There is also a question concerning how a transient experience could bring 
about the long lasting and extensive changes that occur in religious conversions. 
Having an emotional episode now can contribute to an explanation of how beliefs are 
formed, but beliefs are sometimes retained even once the emotional episode passes. 
Beyond the short-term influence of emotions on initial belief formation, there is also 
an effect on belief retention, and this far outlives the transient experience of an 
emotional episode. Wynn discusses this in relation to religious experiences, saying 
that:  
 
such moments of vividly experienced feeling are typically transient (we cannot, 
realistically, live enduringly in such a state of heightened sensitivity). Even allowing 
that we continue to acknowledge the authority of the original experience once the 
feeling has subsided, there is a question therefore about how we are to appropriate its 
meaning at later times, and appropriate that meaning ‘really’ and not just 
‘notionally’.’26 
 
One way we can reconcile the longevity of the effects with the transience of 
the experience is by reference to emotional dispositions. Emotional dispositions are 
changeable, and interact with experiences in that experiences can consolidate, 
attenuate, form, or completely obliterate a disposition.27 For example, I might have a 
pleasant experience of clowns, and through repeated good experience I build a 
disposition of fond feelings towards clowns in general. I will then be predisposed to 
react favourably when I encounter clowns in the future. Even if a pattern is well 
entrenched, a single event (if significant enough) can uproot a disposition, for 
example, one need only be traumatised by one clown to form a fearful disposition 
thereafter. This is an interesting result because it can partly explain (in cases involving 
emotional experiences) how and why religious conversions do often involve a change 
                                                 
26 Wynn, Emotional Experience and Religious Understanding, p. 71. 
27 Goldie, ‘Intellectual Emotions and Religious Emotions’, p. 99. 
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in disposition. The dispositional changes tend to be towards emotions that might be 
considered ‘religious’ (like humility, compassion, awe, and suchlike), and away from 
those that might be considered vicious (such as pride, hatred, greed, and suchlike). 
One may have an experience in which one feels so humbled, for example, that this 
forms a new disposition to feel more humble and attenuates the disposition towards 
pride. As these dispositions will persist until some other influence alters them, they 
can continue to have an impact long after the experience itself has ended. We should 
also note here, that some emotions can be understood, not as states that occur at 
moments, but as processes that perdure. Emotions ‘may have a part to play in giving 
or recognising structure and meaning in human life.’ 28  The process can form a 
recognisable pattern, as in the case of grief, which involves different aspects that can 
occur in stages. Wittgenstein says that ‘“Grief” describes a pattern which recurs, with 
different variations, in the weave of our life’.29 According to Goldie, ‘[t]he pattern has 
certain features. It includes characteristic thoughts, judgments, feelings, imaginings, 
actions, expressive actions, habitual actions, and much else besides, unfolding over 
time, but none of which is essential at any particular time.’30  Thus an emotional 
experience is itself extended in time and can thus continue to influence that to which 
it is connected (like beliefs and motivations to act). 
Another way we can reconcile the longevity of the effects with the transience 
of the experience is that once a new belief is formed, this will in turn influence the 
behaviour one adopts, the way that new experiences are framed, or understood, and 
the way that one feels about future experiences. Once these behaviours are adopted, 
and once new experiences start to be framed differently, it becomes progressively 
unlikely that the belief will be rejected, and increasingly likely that consistent beliefs 
will be formed in favour of inconsistent ones in future. The fallacy of confirmation 
bias may play a role here, which is a well-documented effect whereby we are more 
likely to interpret new evidence and integrate it into our current framework in such as 
way as to confirm our pre-existing beliefs than we are to challenge those beliefs.31 
Once a new belief is formed, future experiences are more likely to be fitted into the 
existing belief framework and thus interpreted as confirming the belief, than if that 
                                                 
28  Wynn, Mark, ‘Valuing the World – The Emotions as Data for the Philosophy of Religion’, 
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 52, No. 2, (Oct., 2002), p. 100.  
29 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, p. 174. 
30 Goldie, Peter, ‘Grief: A Narrative Account’, Ratio, Vol. XXIV, (Jun., 2011), p. 125. 
31 Kahneman, p. 80-81. 
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belief had never formed. According to Starkey ‘emotions can generate or play a key 
role in supporting confirmation bias by controlling the way that we apprehend 
situations, and encouraging us to focus on particular evidence.’32 For instance, once 
my sister believes that people can be taken over by the Holy Spirit, witnessing 
someone in church shaking and speaking in tongues is more likely to be taken as 
confirmation of the claim that people can be infused by the Holy Spirit by her than by 
my brother. For him, this same observation may instead confirm his belief that 
religious people act in strange ways. 
One further way that emotions have a residual affect is through that fact that 
people often have improved memory formation and retention when they are 
emotionally aroused. 33  Research indicates that when subjects are emotionally 
stimulated so that the amygdala is activated, hormones are released ‘that consolidate 
into long-term memories whatever is experienced at the time. That is, after a delay of 
several days, information that has been followed by such emotional or physiological 
arousal tends to be well recalled.’34 What is remembered in this way can also be 
recalled with more detail than what is recalled from unemotional events. This can 
explain the ability for religious experiences that are highly emotional to remain more 
prominent in the mental field than mundane experiences. The role of emotions in 
conversion acts as a way of re-orienting the mind. While it is unlikely that you 
remember what you had for dinner this day one month ago, you are exceedingly more 
likely to remember if someone dear to you surprised you with a special dinner, 
arousing many positive feelings. Religious experiences are able to reside for a long 
time in part because of the emotional component gives the experience a greater 
prominence for a longer duration in a person’s Jamsian mental field. 
 As well as influencing beliefs, emotions can also alter the significance of a 
particular belief that already existed prior to the emotional episode, and can influence 
the connections that are deemed to exist between beliefs. For instance, via the 
bestowal of emotional significance to a belief, it can come to the forefront of one's 
mental field while others will subside into the peripheral reaches of consciousness. So 
a previously insignificant belief can gain importance and may thus organise one’s 
                                                 
32 Starkey, Charles, ‘Emotion and Full Understanding’, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol. 11, 
(2008), p. 450. 
33 ‘Improved’ here does not mean ‘more accurate’. 
34 Clore, Gerald L., ‘Psychology and the Rationality of Emotion’, Modern Theology, Vol. 27, Iss. 2, 
(Apr. 2011), p. 331. 
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worldview in such a way as for that belief to be what might be called an ‘organising 
belief’. To return to the analogy with scientific revolutions, an organising belief 
would be a belief on which a paradigm rests, and which would be taken to be of 
primary importance, so that other beliefs would be organised in relation to it. Once a 
belief has gained prominence, it will also come more readily to mind, and will be 
more easily accessible in a greater variety of contexts to the mental field. This in turn 
will affect the connections it may have to a greater variety of other beliefs, and it will 
achieve a greater network of related beliefs and cognitions. The availability bias is a 
phenomenon whereby we may reach different (often faulty) conclusions, based on 
how quickly or readily information comes to mind. For instance, if we read a news 
story about someone being hit by lightning five days in a row, but no news stories 
about car traffic accidents we will be likely to overestimate the overall number of 
people who die in lightning storms relative to car traffic accidents, but the estimate 
bears less relation to the actual occurrence of these incidents than to the ease with 
which they come to mind.35  
The interaction between beliefs and emotions is reflexive. Aside from the 
aforementioned ways that beliefs are influenced by emotion, emotions are also 
influenced by beliefs. That emotions arise in response to beliefs is a foundational 
premise of cognitive behavioural therapy, where the approach taken to managing 
difficult emotions is to identify and correct the beliefs from which they arise. There is 
a first-order connection in that one’s beliefs about a situation will affect the emotional 
response in that situation. For instance, if one believes a snake is poisonous, one may 
feel fear, whereas if one believes a snake is harmless yet rare it may provoke 
curiosity. There is also a second-order connection in that one may have feelings about 
one’s beliefs. For instance, I may believe that my friend has stolen from me and feel 
disappointed that I believe it.  
I have shown in this section how emotions contribute to religious beliefs and 
play a role in religious conversion. The interaction between emotions and belief might 
be seen metaphorically as a spiralling interaction, whereby taking either emotion or 
belief as a starting point, a belief can cause an emotion which can in turn cause a 
further belief, which can give rise to a further emotion, and so on.36 The affectively 
coloured account of religious conversion that we now have may seem to be an 
                                                 
35 Kahnman, p 131.  
36 In §5.1 we will see how behaviour is also part of this spiral. 
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improvement on the emotionless picture of religious experience painted in Chapter 
Two. However this can only count as an improvement if the influence of the emotions 
is of the right type – if the emotions merely distort or cloud, then their involvement 
cannot count as an advantage. In the next section I will consider cases in which the 
influence of emotions is detrimental to the belief formation process, namely, where 
emotional influence leads to the formation of self-deceptive beliefs.  
 
3.3. The nature of self-deception. 
 
In this section I argue that the emotions play a role in the explanation of self-
deceptive beliefs. Given that emotions play a role in conversion, if the emotions also 
affect the formation of religious beliefs in such a way as to lead to self-deceptive 
beliefs, this would diminish the value of those beliefs. Wynn acknowledges that  
 
 if I come to realise that my exalted, religiously informed affective state is the product 
 of my desire for it, whether for narcissistic or dramaturgical reasons, then that state 
 can hardly confer any religious consolation. On the contrary, in that case, I might well 
 think that my spiritual life is pretty worthless, since it turns out to involve a kind of 
 wish fulfilment rather than any genuine encounter with God. […] how can we be sure 
 that a particular candidate for this title is free from the influence of dramaturgical or 
 narcissistic motives? And if we can’t be sure, doesn’t that suggest that we can’t after 
 all rely very much upon affectively constituted kinds of insight.37  
 
Self-deceptive beliefs are a sub-class of beliefs that are formed on insufficient 
evidence. Due to the gap between belief and evidence, self-deceptive beliefs are not 
justifiable on the discussed grounds for epistemic justification. In the literature there 
are two kinds of account of self-deception: intentionalist accounts, and non-
intentionalist accounts. I will discuss these in turn, and will conclude that non-
intentionalist accounts, which gives emotion a central role, are preferable as an 
explanation of how self-deception should be understood. I will also argue that despite 
the potential for deviation or error, emotions can nevertheless be considered rational 
under suitable circumstances and so the role that they play is not undermined by the 
capacity to influence belief formation.  
                                                 
37 Wynn, Emotional Experience and Religious Understanding, pp. 182-3. 
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Intentionalist accounts of self-deception model it on interpersonal deception, 
whereby someone leads a person to believe that P while themselves believing that 
not-P. Carrying over the analogy, this model would have it that a person self-deceives 
when, although they realise that not-P, they intend to bring about the belief that P, and 
then do so.38 Davidson understands self-deception as a case in which A has evidence 
that P and thinks it more likely to be true than not-P, but where A forms the intention 
to act in such a way as to cause himself to believe that not-P. 39  On this view ‘The 
self-deceiver must intend the “deception”’.40 The intention to form the belief is not 
seen to be sufficient for self-deception, as the belief must actually be formed in order 
for there to be a belief that can count as self-deceptive. Williams says that armed with 
such an intention one may ‘set out to use the machinery of drugs, hypnotism, or 
whatever to bring it about’.41 Any resulting belief would count as self-deceptive on 
the intentionalist account. 
However, this way of thinking about self-deception is highly problematic. For 
one to hold the belief that P sincerely, it would seem to be a requirement that one does 
not know that P is the result of self-deception, for of course, at the moment one 
acknowledges that their belief was formed self-deceptively, they are no longer self-
deceiving. This basic inconsistency challenges the intentional view of self-deception 
in that one must simultaneously intend to believe that not-P whilst believing P, and 
then come to sincerely believe that not-P, which is at best irrational, and at worst 
paradoxical. One might be tempted to bite this bullet. For of course, we acknowledged 
in §2.1 that people can and do hold contradictory beliefs, and can be irrational. There 
is nothing intrinsically impossible about holding contradictory beliefs, and we do fall 
prey to this inconsistency on a regular basis.  
It is the nature of the contradictory beliefs posited by the intentionalist that is 
puzzling. One assumes that in ordinary cases of contradictory beliefs, the problem 
arises as a result of error, negligence, or inattention. Once we become aware that we 
hold contradictory beliefs, we normally acknowledge that one or the other has to go, 
and would then proceed to re-evaluate our beliefs. On the contrary, in cases of self-
                                                 
38 The possibility of some kind of self-deception is relevant to the discussion about the voluntariness of 
beliefs. If one could decide to believe something out of sheer desire to do so and then successfully form 
that belief on this basis, this would be a counterexample to doxastic involuntarism. 
39 Davidson, Donald, ‘Deception and Division’, Ernest LePore and Brian McLaughlin (eds.), Actions 
and Events. Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford: Blackwell, (1985), pp. 88-9. 
40 Ibid, pp. 79-92. 
41 Williams, ‘Deciding to believe’, p. 150. 
  104 
deception (according to the intentionalist) a person deliberately and knowingly forms 
a contradictory belief. When drawing on our own experience of having self-deceptive 
beliefs, we must choose an example that has passed, as by its nature self-deceptive 
beliefs can only be interpreted retrospectively. We could only recognise self-
deceptive beliefs as such after we have released ourselves from their hold. If you 
search for an example in your own history of self-deceptive beliefs, does something in 
that experience correspond to the deliberate attempt to form a belief that runs counter 
to your current evidence and belief? If not, what could account for this, if not that this 
is an incorrect account of self-deception? 
This ‘intentionalist’ view seems to work under a mistaken assumption. We 
have certain stimuli, for example perception of a chair, and we respond to it, for 
example by forming a belief that there is a chair. Alternatively, the stimulus might be 
the intention to form a belief, and the response might be to form that belief. The 
intentionalist mistakenly allows for only two options for what might occur between 
stimulus and response in the belief formation process: simply interpreting the stimulus 
and forming a belief that is most in line with the stimulus, as in most ordinary cases, 
or making a decision to have a certain response which more or less diverges from the 
most rational response that the stimulus would warrant, as in the case of self-
deception. However, this cognitive process does not involve a direct correlation 
between the stimulus and a specific response. Instead, there can be various other 
factors that determine, for a given stimulus, what the response will be. 
To illustrate, take Clifford’s ship-owner, who self-deceptively forms the belief 
that his ship is sea-worthy despite some obvious faults. If this ship owner perceives 
various faults, some wear-and-tear, and the age and condition of the ship overall, and 
his cognitive faculties were in working order without any self-deception, he would 
respond to this stimulus by forming the belief that the ship needs to be refurbished, 
and that it would be a high risk venture to send it out to sea. Not everyone would form 
the same belief in response to these stimuli, because there are other factors affecting 
the response other than the reception of the perceptual data. For example, another 
ship-owner (or the same ship-owner on a different occasion) may be tired and drunk, 
and may also fail to conclude that the ship is unsafe because he fails to follow through 
his line of reasoning correctly, which may be called negligence.42 A butcher or baker 
                                                 
42 This example is intended to illustrate a distinction been self-deception and mere error. 
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may also look upon the same ship and as shipping is not their trade, they don’t have 
the same pre-existing beliefs about the function of ships, and through their ignorance 
they have no reason to conclude that the ship is unsafe. The intentionalist account has 
it that when the ship owner self-deceives, this is neither negligence nor ignorance, as 
he in some way acknowledges that the ship is unsafe, but for reasons of self-interest 
actually decides to ignore that, and instead deliberately forms the belief that it is safe.  
A better way of thinking about self-deception takes account of the additional 
influences, and is suggested by folk-psychological ways of understanding instances of 
self-deception. This way is the non-intentionalist account, and Amesbury’s illustration 
makes the difference apparent: rather than believing that the ship is unsafe and then 
intending to form the opposite belief ‘the ship owner would respond that he has 
examined the evidence. What he doesn't know - and what we do - is that his reading 
of the evidence is skewed by his self-interest and greed. These blinders are, however, 
invisible to him, and so it is with a clear conscience and a "light heart” that he 
watches his dilapidated vessel disappear over the horizon.’43 Here the emphasis is on 
motivations that affect his cognitive process in relation to the evidence. He is driven 
to neglect certain facts and to draw his attention to the meagre evidence in support of 
his favoured conclusion (for example that the ship has sailed successfully in the past) 
by his self-interest and greed – not by a deliberate intention to do so in order to form a 
certain belief. It is the influence of emotions (in this case greed) acting on the ship-
owner that guides his attention away from the evidence that doesn’t serve his purpose, 
and places undue salience on those that do. Self-deception most often occurs in 
situations where the truth of P has emotional consequences for the subject, and where 
there are some emotional motivations for adopting the belief that P.  
So far the discussion of belief has focused on what we might call ‘bottom-up’ 
belief formation, where some outside trigger starts off a cognitive process, the end 
result of which is the formation of a belief about some aspect relevant to that trigger. 
However, the current discussion of emotion makes it clear that we should also 
consider ‘top-down’ belief formation. This is where our expectations, emotions, and 
other factors can influence beliefs to form that even conflict with the evidence 
provided by the stimulus. Here is a simple example: glance at the phrase in the 
triangle (fig. 1) in order to see what it says.  
                                                 
43 Amesbury, ‘The Virtues of Belief – Towards a Non-Evidentialist Ethics of Belief-Formation’, p. 34. 
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             BIRD IN  
        THE HAND IS  
             WORTH TWO IN THE 
          THE BUSH 
 
    Fig. 1 
 
Bottom-up processing involves noticing what the phrase actually says based 
on your perception of the letters on the page. If this is the process you just 
experienced, you will have noticed the repetition of the word ‘the’. It might be that 
you did not notice the error at first – many people do not. Perhaps you did a double 
take or stumbled over it, in which case you did employ bottom-up processing but not 
as a primary mechanism. When we read the sentence in such a way as to miss (even 
temporarily) the mistake, it is an example of top-down processing: the expectation of 
what it says that is bred from familiarity with the well-known phrase influences your 
belief about what it says. This effect is stronger when the expectation is stronger, and 
when less attention is paid. This fact accounts for why you are less apt to picking up 
on your own typing errors than the errors of others (where the expectation effect is 
weaker due to unfamiliarity with the text) and (arguably) why more religious 
experiences occur at revivals and other religious meetings where one is primed for 
having such an experience and has a higher expectation that such an experience may 
occur, than in mundane circumstances. Given that beliefs formed are subject to the 
influence of other processes which guide our attention and bestow salience, and given 
that we have argued that emotions do these very things, it becomes pertinent to 
question the role of emotions in this process.  
 
Emotions affect information processing skills of various kinds: they are associated 
with less systematic thinking, less efficient processing skills, reliance on simplistic 
response strategies, decreased reliance on direct evidence, and increased reliance on 
superficial cues. In addition, emotions affect attention and salience patterns, as well 
as working memory capacity. There is evidence that belief formation under the 
influence of an emotion is strongly affected by selective features of the environment 
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and is removed from systematic reasoning. This is so because, in addition to causing 
considerable reliance on superficial cues, emotions affect the salience level of 
environmental features: what is more easily observable and stands out in one's 
environment as well as in one's memory is highly sensitive to the subject's emotional 
state. Furthermore, emotional arousal causes superficial consideration of the 
evidence. It is all the more easy to form a distorted view of the evidence in the 
absence of careful consideration.44 
 
It bestows reasonableness on the non-intentionalist’s claims about the effect of 
emotion on belief. 
To summarise, on the non-intentionalist account, a belief is self-deceptive 
where (a) one possesses evidence that p, and (b) one holds a false belief that not-p, 
and (c) one has a desire or emotion that explains why p is believed rather than not-p.45 
For example, Alice has a fear of her house being burgled, pertinent due to a recent 
burglary and a police officer’s warning that the criminals may return. She may form 
the false belief that she forgot to dead bolt the front door. She has good evidence that 
this is not the case, for instance her friend’s insistence that she did, and the fact that 
she has never previously neglected it. Where the emotional interference is a strong 
motivation for forming the false belief, the belief would count as self-deceptive. Note 
that ‘cognitive shifts that are produced by emotions, occur in the absence of changes 
in relevant information: the subject “puts together” the evidence in a different way 
when her mood shifts.’46 Thus Alice may leave her house believing that she has taken 
the necessary precautions and only later believe that she has left the door unbolted, 
despite no new evidence coming to light. In a similar fashion, a fear of death might 
bring about a belief in an afterlife, ennui may bring about belief in a higher purpose, 
and in these cases too, if these beliefs form not in response to some new and 
compelling evidence, but in response to an emotional shift, the beliefs would count as 
self-deceptive.  
Given that some religious beliefs are formed under the influence of strong 
emotions, especially those formed during highly emotional religious experiences, 
                                                 
44 Lazar, ‘Deceiving Oneself or Self-Deceived? On the Formation of Beliefs “Under the Influence”’, 
Mind, Vol. 108, No. 430, (Apr., 1999), p. 280.  
45  Deweese-Boyd, Ian, ‘Self-Deception’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (Spring 2012 
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2012/entries/self-
deception/>. 
46 Lazar, p. 281. 
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some religious beliefs will be self-deceptive. The epistemic status of self-deceptive 
beliefs depends in such cases on the evaluation that we give to the epistemic value of 
the emotions that these beliefs are based upon. That is, if emotions have either no 
epistemic value, or a negative one (for example they are irrational) then the beliefs 
formed under the influence of these emotions will likewise have no, or negative, 
epistemic value. In the next section I will discuss the appropriateness of emotions and 
the bearing this has on the rationality of emotions. I will defend the view that, 
contrary to the claim that the emotions are an impediment to rationality, they are 
integrally important to our rationality and can therefore be (at the least) legitimately 
useful to our rational thought. 
 
3.4. The rationality of emotion. 
 
Having argued that emotions guide cognitive processes, including those that lead to 
belief formation, and that some of these occasions will count as self-deceptive, I now 
turn to the question of whether the influence that emotions have can count as rational. 
The term ‘rational’ is used to label anything that accords with the principles of reason 
(however they are construed) and anything that falls short of, or contravenes these 
principles is therefore deficient, and the term ‘irrational’ is often used as a derogatory 
term. Things that it makes no sense to evaluate in terms of rationality are 
‘nonrational’. The emotions have been claimed to be irrational by some, and to be 
nonrational by others, and I will be taking the third position, that they can be rational, 
although first I will outline a more fine-grained distinction between ways of being 
‘rational’. 
We can distinguish between types of rationality, or ways of being rational. In 
§2.4 I said that rationality was related to justification, in that if a belief is justified 
then it is rational to hold it. Here, I will claim that if an emotion is justified, then it is 
rational. I also claimed that justification is divisible into types: moral justification; 
epistemic justification; and pragmatic justification. An emotion being justified in 
these different ways may allow us to make distinctions between the ways that the 
emotion would count as rational.  
Insofar as emotions involve beliefs, they will be subject to epistemic standards 
of justification. If Fred is angry because he believes that Bob has tried to sabotage 
him, his anger would be unjustified should his belief turn out to be false, or if it were 
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true for a reason unconnected with his reason for holding it a suitable way. 47 There 
needs to be cohesion between one’s emotions and beliefs in order to maintain 
integrity. Where there is a tension between one’s feelings and one’s beliefs there will 
be dissonance, and a lack of integrity.  
When we say that Fred is morally justified in his anger, we often mean 
something like his anger is appropriate given the stimulus. This may depend on 
whether my feeling is in line with, in terms of its intensity and duration, the situation 
that it arose from. For instance, Fred’s anger might be inappropriate if the object of 
anger had actually done nothing wrong, or if the anger was extreme, or prolonged. 
This is not to say that the emotion is morally wrong, simply unjustified. There is 
every chance in cases where people exhibit disproportionate emotional reactions to 
situations that they are in part actually reacting to an entirely different event or 
situation and the current one is simply a trigger, onto which the emotion has been 
inappropriately displaced, or transferred. Fred’s anger might be justified whenever the 
object of anger gave sufficient reason for the angry response and the response was 
well-measured. Thus here there is an appropriate connection between the world and 
the emotional response. The sense in which we might consider the emotion to be 
justified in this case might be a moral sense. On a roughly Aristotelian model we 
could interpret the right emotional response to be one that embodies a mean between 
extremes, and is in line with the situation in the ways outlined.48  
An emotion may be pragmatically justified when it helps one to achieve a 
given end, or when it contributes to the best outcome in a given situation. There will 
be many cases in which heuristic, associative, or automatic processing may be more 
appropriate and beneficial than systematic, rule-based, or controlled processing, 
despite the fact that the latter is typically equated with rationality.49 For instance, 
emotions can heighten our ability to focus appropriately. Emotions can sometimes 
also help to resolve a given situation effectively in various ways. For example, a 
display of the emotion of guilt can reassure others that we have learnt from our 
mistakes, or a display of humility can de-escalate a situation involving conflict. 
Emotions also prime our bodies for appropriate action. For instance, fear can prepare 
                                                 
47 Whatever that way turns out to be, which will depend on which theory of knowledge one holds. 
48 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, Book II. 
49 Clore suggests that instead of focusing on the terms ‘rational’ and ‘irrational’ we can instead look at 
different processes which pair up to form alternative kinds of thinking which don’t retain the value 
laden implications of the catchalls. These include ‘“controlled vs. automatic processing,” “systematic 
vs. heuristic processing,” or “rule based vs. associative processing.”’ Clore, p. 325. 
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our body for a fight or flight response, which pragmatically speaking can help us to 
survive. Pragmatic considerations also come into play on occasions on which it would 
be irrational to think something through too much – we would be better off reacting 
immediately.50 Controlled processing might give us a lower margin for error in any 
decision that we make, but will take a lot more time and effort than automatic 
processing, which will be unacceptable where instant action is required.  
Supporting the thought that heuristic, associative, or automatic processing can 
be pragmatically justified is the conclusion of an experiment conducted on people 
through a long period in their lives, which showed that: 
  
those who engaged in heuristic thinking were also the most healthy, happy, and 
 successful. The group that answered correctly by second-guessing their own 
 inclinations consisted of individuals found to engage in self-doubt, harbor neurotic 
 beliefs, and fare less well in life generally. The results suggest that being strictly 
 ‘rational’ (according to our initial definition) may not always be the preferred mode 
 of thought. Engaging in heuristic thinking, although it occasionally leads to error, 
 tends to be adaptive, rather than undesirable. How could this be? The answer is 
 simply that conscious, deliberative, logical thought is metabolically expensive.51  
 
When conserving energy and resources is a priority then, engaging in what might be 
called ‘irrational’ thinking, may actually be the most pragmatically rational thing to 
do. 
In the remainder of this section I will offer some good reasons for thinking 
that emotions can be rational. Emotions are uniquely beneficial to our cognitive lives, 
and I will claim that these benefits show that emotions are valuable to our successful 
cognition. I’ll then consider some reasons that emotions are taken to be irrational, by 
way of objection. The typical implication of such views is that emotions should be 
suppressed, or avoided. I will argue that these objections are unsuccessful. The result 
of this conclusion for religious conversion is that even if religious conversions involve 
an emotional shift, or if the beliefs formed in religious conversion are emotionally 
driven, they are not necessarily irrational as a result. This leaves open the possibility 
of a healthy and well-functioning role for emotions in our cognition and for 
                                                 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid, p. 327-8. 
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integration between the various aspects of religious conversion I discuss.   
Self-deceptive beliefs have a particularly bad press. However, adaptively 
speaking, it is more useful to us to form some self-deceptive beliefs than only forming 
beliefs that are not self-deceptive. For example, ‘deceiv[ing] oneself into thinking that 
one is sure of something when one is not’52 may be a huge aide to practical reasoning 
in cases where one has to act. We are all motivated to reach a state of integrated 
consistency between our beliefs, actions, and feelings, and the role that the emotions 
play in this actually drive us towards rational beliefs and actions, and thus can 
themselves be evaluated in terms of rationality. 
One advantage of the emotions becomes clear if we remember that we also 
have emotional reactions to things we perceive to be rational and irrational, as 
‘[w]hen we hear others being illogical, we are critical of them and find their assertions 
unpersuasive. And when we hear ourselves being illogical or inconsistent, we become 
embarrassed and motivated to rethink our position. Thus, perhaps surprisingly, 
emotion actually enforces standards of reason.’53 We can be driven towards logical 
and rational conclusions and away from the contrary by the experience of pleasant 
and unpleasant emotions respectively. Whenever we experience a lack of integration 
or an inconsistency between various aspects of our selves, including our beliefs, 
behaviour, and feelings, we experience what is called ‘cognitive dissonance’. This is a 
kind of stress reaction and is distressing. This distress is unpleasant and so is usually a 
motivator to reduce the dissonance in some way: 
 
the automatic, negative affective reaction we have to incoherence and illogic 
motivates rational thought. The fact that people care deeply about the logic and 
consistency of their own beliefs and actions can be seen in the classic social 
psychological phenomenon of cognitive dissonance. Relevant research showed that 
when people act in ways that are inconsistent with their beliefs, a state of tension or 
cognitive dissonance is generated, which motivates them to adjust their beliefs to 
make them consistent with their actions—the process of dissonance reduction.54 
 
For instance, I believe in the benefits of charitable giving. Then I walk past a charity 
fundraiser without making a donation. At this moment I am aware that my actions are 
                                                 
52 Alston, ‘Belief Acceptance and Religious Faith’, p. 7. 
53 Ibid, p. 328. 
54 Ibid. 
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inconsistent with this belief, and I experience a negative emotion as a result, which 
motivates me to resolve this dissonance. Resolution may take different forms. I may 
change my behaviour, (turn around and donate to the fundraiser or go out of my way 
on the next opportunity to give to charity), re-evaluate my beliefs (for instance about 
the benefits of giving or about the worth of giving to this particular charity), or I may 
self-deceive or rationalise my behaviour (ignoring or denying the event, or making 
excuses like that I was too busy).  
 There is a sense in which emotions can be seen as rational because of the ways 
that they enable our other rational faculties to operate effectively. At any given 
moment, there are innumerable aspects of our environment that could all be the focus 
of our attention but which cannot all be processed: we are confronted with a 
cacophony of stimuli. To rationally process the field of awareness and think through 
which aspects of our environment are most pertinent, relevant, interesting, or 
otherwise deserving of attention, would be very time consuming and would be a huge 
metabolic expense. In §1.1.1 I noted how conversion involves shifts in one’s mental 
field, and changes in salience patterns. Now we can begin to see that our emotions 
partly explain why: when we experience different emotions, the pertinent aspects of 
our environments will also change, as ‘[t]he emotions […] constitute patterns of 
salience, lighting up some matters as deserving of our attention and leaving others at 
the periphery of our awareness.’55 If we needed to weigh up all of the input on the 
savannah before reacting to a tiger, we would be dead before achieving action. 
Instead, the emotions ‘play an active role in the dynamics of attention, serving to 
make us focus on a narrower range of objects and to maintain that focus.’56 In general 
we pay more attention to the objects of emotion than to other objects and in this way 
‘[e]motions play a crucial role in determining what is salient, and in keeping each 
person motivated to address what is important for him or her.’ 57 When I feel an 
emotional reaction to religious icons, I will notice and engage with them over other 
aspects of my surroundings. If I were feeling differently, I might notice other aspects 
of the same environment. Wynn explains that:  
 
                                                 
55 Wynn, Emotional Experience and Religious Understanding, p. 104. 
56 Starkey, p. 435. 
57 Halpern, Jodi, ‘When Concretized Emotion-Belief Complexes Derail Decision-Making Capacity’, 
Bioethics, Vol. 26, No. 2, (2012), pp. 111-2. 
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 To register some feature of a situation emotionally is to accord that feature weight, or 
 to judge it to have some sort of importance. So the objects of the emotions are already 
 lit up for us as deserving of attention, and in that case, we seem to have good prima 
 facie reason for allowing our emotions, especially strongly felt emotions, to set the 
 agenda for our thinking.58  
 
Thus, our reliance on emotions provide an efficient short cut which allows us to 
respond in ways that most benefit us – ignoring our emotions would therefore be 
irrational. If what Wynn says is right, then the emotions set up the possibility of 
further rational thought to occur about the salient subject or object. 
Damasio’s research provides empirical support for the view that emotions are 
vital for rationality.59 His subjects were previously ordinary people who sustained 
injuries to the prefrontal and somatosensory cortices of the brain, which meant that 
they were unable to experience emotions. He describes a therapy session with one 
such patient, during which he asked the patient when would be a good time for their 
next appointment. The answer he gave detailed extensive reasons for and against the 
various options, and twenty minutes later the patient was still enumerating relevant 
facts with no decision forthcoming. This inability to form a decision can be accounted 
for by the absence of the emotions in the following way. Without emotions adding 
salience to some reasons and not others, the patient was less able to distinguish 
quickly between the important and the trivial factors affecting the decision. Without 
the spotlight of emotion to act as a shortcut to the most pertinent information, 
everything relevant had to be trotted out and rationally compared to determine what 
should be done. Without the feeling of discomfort one may get in social situations, he 
was also unaware of the inappropriateness of his ramblings. The impetus to close it 
short even in the absence of decisive facts was thus also missing. This picture of the 
connection between emotion and rationality is that: 
 
feelings may offer a ‘quick and dirty’ (non-conceptually articulated) route to choices 
 of action. It also recalls Goldie’s suggestion that the action-guiding understanding 
 that is embedded in feeling may not be reducible to anything we have articulated (or 
 could articulate) in verbal terms. For somatic markers are not themselves 
                                                 
58 Wynn, Emotional Experience and Religious Understanding, p. 103. 
59 António Damásio, in conversation with David Brooks, (July 4 2009), Aspen Ideas Festival, Aspen, 
CO. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1wup_K2WN0I. 
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 propositionally articulated thoughts, but they move us to action anyway, in ways that 
 involve some genuine taking stock of what is at stake in a situation.60  
 
In Chapter Four – The Dimension of Praxis I will further examine the role of action in 
religious conversion.   
Another rational benefit of emotions occurs as a result of the fact that even 
simulating or imagining a possible state of affairs will engender an emotional 
reaction. We have emotional reactions to the mere thought or imagining of some 
possible future state of affairs. This can give us insight into whether the consequences 
or likely consequences of certain things will be good or bad. ‘When contemplating 
such actions in the future, twinges of anticipated affect can then alter our choices to 
maximize positive outcomes.’61 By feeling a certain way when we consider a possible 
course of action, we can navigate our decisions to effectively avoid negative 
outcomes and improve the prevalence of positive ones. 
An interesting application of this thought is that emotions can play the role of 
‘moral guide’. When we feel shame, disgust, or guilt in relation to some action, we 
are motivated to act so as to reduce these feelings. In a normally functioning 
individual we would expect that these feelings typically arise in response to acts we 
would call immoral. We are motivated to act morally by emotions such as love, 
compassion, and those we experience via empathy with another’s emotions. Religious 
conversion involves a shift in the emotional landscape, both in terms of the 
dispositions to feel certain emotions and in the emotions that are felt in response to 
certain stimuli. Therefore, religious conversion also involves moral change, insofar as 
the emotional change leads to different morally evaluable behaviour. I’ll come to a 
more general conclusion than this in §5.4, where I’ll be in a position to argue that 
religious conversion involves moral change in virtue of the fact that emotions (as well 
as beliefs and action) have their own ethics, and that emotions contribute to virtue not 
only insofar as they affect behaviour (which is a clearer bearer of normativity) but that 
as ‘both judgement and action lack the emotionality that is a requirement of virtue’62 
emotions are a necessary aspect of a moral life. 
Lastly, emotions give us information about and access to our body, our values, 
                                                 
60 Wynn, Emotional Experience and Religious Understanding, p. 116. 
61 Clore, p. 330. 
62 Goldie, Peter, ‘Intellectual Emotions and Religious Emotions’, p. 101. 
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our health, and other aspects of ourselves: 
 
The tendency to ignore our emotions is oldthink, a remnant of the still reigning 
paradigm that keeps us focused on the material level of health, the physicality of it. 
But the emotions are key elements in self-care because they allow us to enter into the 
bodymind’s conversation. By getting in touch with emotions, both by listening to 
them and by directing them through the psychosomatic network, we gain access to 
the healing wisdom that is everyone’s natural biological right.63 
 
The information we get from noticing the occurrence of emotions contributes both to 
the beliefs that we form, and the behaviour that we adopt, and the information itself 
allows for new states of knowledge to be reached that may not have been possible 
without it.64  
Having given some compelling reasons for the rationality of emotions, I now 
consider the contrary view. Emotions can be irrational by leading us to form irrational 
beliefs, or by motivating us to perform irrational actions, in any of the relevant senses. 
One reason for thinking that emotions are irrational stems directly from the previous 
discussion of self-deception. This sets the stage for a view in which the emotions are 
antagonistic to reason,65 and that they should be avoided.66  Not all self-deceptive 
beliefs serve a useful purpose. For example, Daniel may form the self-deceptive belief 
that Amy is having an affaire, motivated by his jealousy and fear, despite a lack of 
evidence for this. If this belief motivates possessive, suspicious, accusatory, insecure, 
or other unpleasant behaviour, it is more likely to bring it about the destruction of the 
relationship he is aiming to protect than if his beliefs were in line with the evidence. If 
Amy is faithful, his emotion is inappropriate. However, the fact that we can have 
inappropriate emotions, does not show that all emotions are inappropriate, and so does 
not show that emotions cannot be rational – only that they are sometimes not. It is 
correct that emotions leading to pathological or self-deceptive beliefs will (often) be 
irrational, but so far this doesn’t show that the influence of emotion is always 
irrational, or irrational per se. This is analogous to an argument that says that because 
people’s rational thinking is sometimes erroneous, rational thinking should be 
                                                 
63 Pert, C. B. Molecules of Emotion, New York: Scribner, (1997), p. 285. 
64 This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Five. 
65 ‘[Emotions are] reputed to be antagonists of rationality’. de Sousa, ‘Emotions’. 
66 ‘We regularly engage a limited strategy of this sort (consider counting to ten, and then rethinking a 
situation).’ Starkey, p. 451. 
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abandoned as a tool. Therefore the fact that some emotions are inappropriate and 
leads to negative outcomes, is not a reason to conclude that emotions in general are 
irrational. 
We could take this possibility to an extreme, and consider cases where the 
emotional affect is so extreme for an individual that rational behaviour or thought is 
no longer possible for them. When taken to an extreme, emotional distress in 
individuals can ‘actually block them from deliberating about their futures, thus 
derailing their decision making capacity.’67 This would make their beliefs inflexible 
and mean they were unable to act appropriately. Halpern claims that sometimes 
emotional influence might render beliefs unrealistic by involving subjective bias and 
distortion, however without making them unresponsive to reality. When 
unresponsiveness to reality is in effect this would be irrational. Unresponsiveness 
shows when someone rigidly adheres to their ‘subjective distortions with utter 
certainty in the face of contrary evidence. When a person does show such rigidity, we 
contrast his or her views to ordinary emotions by labeling them ‘pathological.’’68 
These ‘pathological’ beliefs ‘are selfsustaining, and resistant to any disconfirming 
evidence’ 69  as they ‘involve being subject to an unrelenting emotional state, 
unpunctuated by moments of feeling otherwise […] the person is both unable to feel 
differently in the present and unable to imagine feeling differently in the future.’70 A 
person in this kind of state will only respond to factual evidence insofar as it supports 
their conviction. Such people have a diminished or compromised capacity for 
deliberation as it is ‘a necessary (but not sufficient) condition that the beliefs held 
about the subject of deliberation are or would be responsive to evidence. To 
deliberate, one needs to be able to think through alternatives, and this thinking 
through alternatives needs to be responsive to evidence.’71 This kind of pathology 
may well be exhibited in some converts. What is required, though, is that there are 
some cases of conversion in which the responsiveness to reality is intact, and in these 
cases the possibility of rationality is likewise intact.  
                                                 
67 Halpern, ‘When Concretized Emotion-Belief Complexes Derail Decision-Making Capacity’, p. 108. 
68 Ibid, p. 112. 
69 The term ‘pathological’ is not preferred by Halpern. Ibid. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid, p. 114. 
  117 
 A further claim against the rationality of emotions is that they ‘can distract us 
from what is most important in a situation by monopolizing our attention.’72 However, 
we noted earlier that this very same feature of emotions is what allows them to play a 
vital role in our cognition by directing our attention to the most important aspects of 
our surroundings and situations. So, the objection is right that emotions guide us in 
this way. And it is empirically true that this sometimes leads to errors and bad 
behaviour. However, just because they don’t guide us right one hundred percent of the 
time, this is not good enough reason to ignore them as a guide. Given that there is still 
room for our judgment about whether to act on our emotions or not this is not a good 
reason for the conclusion that emotions are not able to give us information on which 
we can make rational decisions. 
Another reason for claiming that emotions are irrational is that they are 
sometimes seen to cause rash or inappropriate behaviour: ‘In ordinary language we 
speak of being ‘gripped’ and ‘torn’ by emotion: ‘drowned by sorrow’, ‘driven by 
anger’, ‘plagued by remorse’, or ‘struck by Cupid’s arrow’ when a person falls in 
love.’73 The accusation is that desires and strong emotions can sometimes prevent 
people from thinking things through, seeing what is good for them, or forming 
justified beliefs, and in such cases, emotions are to be deemed irrational, along with 
the things they influence (the beliefs, decisions, or actions).  
This concern can be alleviated by plausibly denying the claim that there is a 
logical connection between feeling an emotion and acting on it. Once an emotion is 
felt there is room for personal agency with respect to how one reacts to it. A 
measured, self-controlled person needn’t act out all his emotionally driven impulses 
and urges.74 The first step is to be mindful of our emotions. For of course, if one isn’t 
experiencing an emotion consciously there is no opportunity for anything but 
automatic or blind reaction. Yet, when we are mindful the picture looks more 
promising: 
  
We can become aware of our automatic appraisals, or what the cognitive therapist 
calls the “autopilot of thinking patterns”. Ekman also says that we can achieve 
‘impulse awareness’ following the awareness of automatic appraisals. One can also 
develop attentiveness by becoming aware of the causes of certain emotions and thus 
                                                 
72 Starkey, p. 450. 
73 de Silva, p. 257. 
74 I will argue for the kind of voluntarism this implies in §5.3.2.  
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identify hot emotional triggers and take steps to weaken them.75 
 
Interestingly, practices from the Buddhist religion involve such techniques, for 
example mindfulness meditation:  
 
In using the art of quiet listening to become aware of emotional inroads in our mind, 
we develop diminishing reactivity to raw sensory events, avoid making automatic 
identifications with our reactions, develop openness, impartiality and flexibility, and 
train our minds and bodies to ‘wise seeing’. Such wise seeing adds an epistemic and 
cognitive dimension to our repertoire of techniques for managing emotions — 
opening up a window to grasp the truths about the human condition. There are in fact 
‘transformative insights’ that emerge from a deep understanding of human 
emotions.76 
 
This is an example of how religious practice can actually improve the integration 
between the cognitive and non-cognitive aspects of our mental processes (and may 
confer pragmatic justification to the performance of such practices). Once we are 
aware of them, it is possible to develop and train emotional responses.  
 
 By maintaining a healthy relationship between our emotions and practical reason, 
 maintaining a critical perspective on our emotional responses and on the 
 understandings that they produce, and cultivating appropriate emotional responses, 
 we may avoid emotions that distort understanding and disable practical reason.77 
 
Additionally, ‘we can take emotional feelings to be cognitively important without 
supposing that they are important in proportion to the degree of their felt intensity, or 
that they are to be cultivated for their own sake.’78 One can avoid blindly irrational 
responses or reactions to emotions in this way, thus side-stepping the objection to the 
rationality of emotion. 
One final claim for the irrationality of emotions is that emotionally aroused 
states leads to the use of poorer cognitive processes. Our emotions can lead us to 
process information in a different way. In his influential book, Thinking, Fast and 
                                                 
75 de Silva, p. 262.  
76 Ibid. 
77 Starkey, p. 451-2. 
78 Wynn, Emotional Experience and Religious Understanding, p. 194. 
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Slow, Kahneman divides our cognitive processes into two kinds, which he calls 
system-1 (fast) and system-2 (slow). 79  System-1 is characterised by deliberate, 
conscious, rational thinking. System-2 is characterised by intuitive, gut-reaction, pre-
conscious thinking. When we consciously focus on solving a difficult problem by 
thinking through the steps involved and reaching an answer, we are using system-1. 
When, on the other hand, we look at the same problem and come up with an educated 
guess that sounds or feels right, we are using system-2. System-1 makes us less likely 
to be influenced by things like biases and irrelevant information, but it is also 
metabolically expensive and time consuming. System-2 makes more mistakes, but the 
more skilled one is in the relevant area, the more likely the answer that system-2 gives 
us will be correct. Highly trained philosophers are more likely than average to guess 
correctly whether a complicated argument is valid based on their intuitive guess. 
Kahneman claims that when we are in a good mood (experiencing positive emotions 
that lack an intentional object) this leads to more reliance on system-1, whereas bad 
moods tend to lead us to more reliance on system-2. It is widely reported that 
religious experiences involve strong feelings of happiness, and that religious 
conversions also involve a shift to a state that often includes greater feelings of 
happiness (of one description or another). Thus, it might also be the case that these 
feelings of happiness lead to an increased reliance on intuitive thinking, and this may 
explain how new beliefs can be formed that were previously not forthcoming, even in 
the absence of new information. This is because the existing information is processed 
differently. However, this intuitive thinking need not be irrational. It may lead to a 
greater number of mistakes when the shortcuts relied upon are ill-informed. However, 
once someone is trained in a certain area, their instinctive, quick, or impulsive 
reactions to a question, problem, or situation, tends to be increasingly more accurate 
with increasing skill levels. Therefore emotion has not been shown to be irrational.  
 
3.5. Concluding remarks. 
 
In this chapter I have explored the nature of emotion, and sketched an account on 
which both cognitive and non-cognitive aspects are compounded in emotions. The 
cognitive and non-cognitive work together in the way that verbal and non-verbal 
mechanisms work together, and the influence can work in both directions, ‘Just as 
                                                 
79 Kahneman, pp. 13-14.  
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emotions influence ideas, so ideas brought in through text, song lyrics, sermons, or 
discussion affect emotion at the neurobiological and experiential levels.’ 80  The 
importance of integration between these two aspects is mirrored in the importance of 
integration between the affective and doxastic dimensions of religious conversion, 
where such integration is important for the integrity of the individual.  
I argued that the emotions play an important role in religious conversion, both 
because the emotional life of the individual changes in conversion, and because this 
has the additional effects of influence on understanding, belief formation and 
retention, morality, and behaviour. What is emerging, through the repeated need to 
refer to beliefs and action in the discussion of emotions, is the interrelatedness of 
these dimensions.  
One such connection that I explored was the influence of emotion on belief 
that results in self-deception. I argued for a non-intentionalist account of self-
deception which took into account the top-down process of belief-formation where 
the emotion influences the belief despite the evidence, which has been argued to result 
in a less rational belief because of the separation of belief from evidence. However, 
this led me to consider the idea of rationality, and to sketch different ways in which 
we might consider something to be rational.  
Thought is often considered paradigmatic of rationality, but ‘[r]esearch shows 
that thinking routinely involves mental short-cuts, and that everyday inferences and 
reasoning are generally guided by judgment heuristics and rough rules of thumb, 
rather than by explicit logic. Thought is not well characterized as being guided by 
“rationality as process”’.81 Thus even the cognitive process that is most hailed is 
unlikely to meet the standard of rationality so construed. I then considered arguments 
for and against the rationality of emotions. This discussion concluded that far from 
being an impediment to rationality, emotions are essential to it. Emotions can be 
justified either epistemically, (to the extent that they involve beliefs, which has clear 
consequences for the doxastic dimension of religious conversion) morally, or 
pragmatically, which has clear consequences for the dimension of praxis. I now turn 
to this final dimension, where I will focus not only on the role that behaviour plays in 
conversion, but its many points of contact with the doxastic and affective dimensions. 
  
                                                 
80 Norris, p. 190. 
81 Clore, p. 326. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE DIMENSION OF PRAXIS 
 
‘How do I know that two people mean the same when each says he believes in 
God?... Practice gives the words their sense’1 
 
This chapter addresses the outwardly manifested changes in behaviour that occur in a 
religious conversion. Not all behaviour will be considered; I will consider only 
actions of religious significance, especially those that are sustained over a period of 
time. By ‘action’ I mean to rule out automatic and unintentional behaviour, and to rule 
in behaviours that can be attributed to a subject and are intentional. By narrowing the 
field to behaviours with ‘religious significance’ I mean to rule out circumstantial 
behavioural changes (like walk one’s dog on a Sunday afternoon rather than morning 
post-conversion) that are not telling of a deeper phenomenon. I mean to rule in 
anything that is directly relevant to one’s religiosity or expression of such. I will also 
focus on those behavioural changes that are sustained, rather than singular or 
sporadic. It will emerge that behavioural changes that are sustained in such a way as 
to (partly) constitute the pattern of one’s life will be those actions that stem directly 
from or contribute directly to religious beliefs and emotion. The kinds of behaviour 
I’ll consider include praying, kissing a cross, going to church, taking communion, 
confessing, celebrating religious holidays, and many others, which I will collectively 
refer to as religious ceremonies and rituals. 2  Examples of the role of praxis in 
religious conversion are highlighted in these first-person accounts of conversion 
where we can note attendance at religious events, prayer, confession, kneeling, going 
to the altar in a church, and repeating a mantra:   
 
I was taken to a camp-meeting, mother and religious friends seeking and praying for 
                                                 
1 Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, 85e. 
2 In a similar vein to the argument offered in 1.2.1 and 1.2.2 about the usefulness of defining ‘religion’, 
which concluded that we might most usefully see that as a family resemblance concept, I will assume 
here that for similar reasons ‘religious ritual’ or ‘religious ceremony’ are also family resemblance 
concepts.2 This means that while we have a coherent and usable concept of rituals, there is not one and 
only one set of criteria to mark them out, and nor should there be only one way of understanding them 
(Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §66-7). Rather, there are many characteristics, some 
combination of which is present in ritualistic actions, but not all of them necessary. 
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my conversion. My emotional nature was stirred to its depths; confessions of 
depravity and pleading with God for salvation from sin made me oblivious of all 
surroundings. I plead for mercy, and had a vivid realization of forgiveness and 
renewal of my nature. When rising from my knees I exclaimed, ‘Old things have 
passed away, all things have become new.’ 3  
 
I had attended a series of revival services for about two weeks off and on. Had been 
invited to the altar several times, all the time becoming more deeply impressed, when 
finally I decided I must do this, or I should be lost. Realization of conversion was 
very vivid, like a ton’s weight being lifted from my heart; a strange light which 
seemed to light up the whole room (for it was dark); a conscious supreme bliss which 
caused me to repeat ‘Glory to God’ for a long time. 4  
  
I will explore the nature of praxis, and the role it plays in the conversion process. In 
particular, I will explore the role of the affective aspect of religious rituals, and the 
doxastic aspect of religious rituals. A useful focal point for this discussion is the 
debate between those who think that ritual is purely doxastic, and those who think it is 
purely affective.  
In the former camp is Frazer, as exposited in his Golden Bough, where he 
argues that religious rituals are the instrumental actions conducted on the basis of 
certain beliefs in order to bring about a certain result. For example, when someone 
prays, they are performing an instrumental action, based on beliefs – such as that God 
is listening and can intervene with human affairs, or that God is fond of worship and 
will favour those who worship him – and this is done to bring about a certain result, 
usually that the object of the prayer is granted, or that they gain some headway to 
salvation as a result of their worship. I call this perspective ‘intellectualism’, and if 
this view were adopted the consequence for my thesis would be that the link between 
doxastic dimension and the dimension of praxis is significant. After considering 
Frazer’s exposition of this perspective I will argue that that it is not a fair and 
complete analysis of rituals. 
  In the latter camp we find certain interpretations of Wittgenstein, which claim 
that engagement in religious rituals is driven by emotion and the action is an 
expression of the emotion that drives it. I call this view ‘expressivism’ and if this view 
                                                 
3 James, p. 244. (Quoting Starbuck.) 
4 Ibid, p. 246. (Quoting Starbuck.) 
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were correct the link between the affective dimension and the dimension of praxis 
would be significant. I will argue that (aside from being an incorrect interpretation of 
Wittgenstein) there is more to ritual than emotional expression.  
 I will conclude the section with a sketch of a positive account of what is 
involved in rituals that fuses these opposing views into a more integrated and 
plausible explanation, and holds a significant place for both the doxastic and affective 
dimensions. It will emerge that all three dimensions are present with interaction 
between each pair.  
The final section focuses on one action in particular; that of acceptance. 
Acceptance can be seen as a bridge between the dimension of praxis and the doxastic 
dimension, and can illuminate the connections between dimensions well. This leads to 
a conclusion that summarises the nature of and interactions between the various 
dimensions of religious conversion, so at the close of this chapter a fuller picture of 
the conversion picture will have be painted.  
 
4.1. The nature of religious rituals.  
 
In Chapter Two – The Doxastic Dimension, I discussed the role of belief in religious 
conversion and concluded that conversion will often involve changes to the belief set 
of the individual. Intellectualism is the view that any religious rituals that a convertee 
begins to partake in, and any practices that they adopt, are instrumental and can be 
explained as the result of new religious beliefs, which inform the ends they are trying 
to achieve in their enactment. In The Golden Bough, Frazer writes that in order to 
understand a ritual, one should conduct some kind of historical or empirical enquiry to 
discover how this practice originated, what the beliefs or hypotheses are that underlie 
it, and what results one is aiming to achieve by performing the ritual. He thinks that 
participants conduct instrumental activities, which are impotent because they are 
based on faulty beliefs. Thus the engagement in ritualistic activity is an error, based 
on a mistake. Beattie elucidates instrumental activity in contrast with expressive 
activity as follows:  
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Instrumental activity is directed to bringing about some desired state of affairs; it is 
oriented towards an end. Expressive activity is a way of saying or expressing 
something; usually some idea or state of mind.5 
 
On this view, then, the connection between beliefs and religious acts is highlighted 
and the belief plays an explanatory role in understanding the religious acts. It also 
says something about the purpose of those acts.  
Wittgenstein, in his Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough, aims to repudiate the 
intellectualism found in Frazer’s approach, claiming that ‘Frazer’s account of the 
magical and religious views of mankind is unsatisfactory: it makes these views look 
like mistakes’ and they are not best understood as mistakes.6 Wittgenstein points to 
the claim that the information Frazer thinks leads to an understanding of rituals is 
neither necessary nor sufficient for such understanding. 
One objection Wittgenstein makes is that if people really believed in the 
efficacy of their rituals, then they would surely perform them when the result they are 
supposed to produce would be most beneficial. However, the rainmaking ritual of the 
Abyssinian people is performed only when the rainy season comes. In response to this 
data Wittgenstein asserts that this ‘means that they do not really believe that he can 
make it rain, otherwise they would do it in the dry periods’.7  
However, this is a non sequitur. It might be that the Abyssinians also believe 
that the Alfai (the Rain-King), is only responsive during certain times, somewhat in 
the fashion of a tax-redemption you can claim only at the end of the tax year, but only 
if you apply for it. When rain fails to come ‘the Alfai is stoned to death’,8 and this 
evidence supports the view that the Abyssinians do have an instrumental belief 
because this makes no sense if they don’t hold him responsible. However, while this 
shows the misfortune of using this particular example, even one successful example 
would show that instrumental beliefs cannot explain all cases of ritual. There are some 
cases in which it would be extremely uncharitable to assume that people really 
thought their actions had instrumental value, or that they literally believe that which is 
                                                 
5 Beattie, J.H.M., Other Cultures, London: Routledge, (1966), p. 71. 
6 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, ‘Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough’, Philosophical Occasions, Eds. James 
Klagge and Alfred Nordmann, Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Co., (1993), p. 119. 
7 Ibid, p. 137. Cf. ‘when the sun is about to rise, rites of daybreak are celebrated by the people, but not 
during the night, when they simply burn lamps’ (Ibid, p. 127). This is called the ‘due season argument.’ 
Clack, B.R., Wittgenstein, Frazer, and Religion, Hampshire and London: Macmillan Press, (1999), pp. 
32-3. 
8 Frazer, J.G., The Golden Bough, (abridged edition), London: Macmillan, (1922), p. 107. 
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only symbolic.9 Wittgenstein illustrates the point with the example of an adoption 
ceremony in which the adoptive mother pulls the child through her clothes in a 
symbolic simulation of birth. After this the community sees her as the mother of this 
child. I think Wittgenstein is correct in saying ‘it is surely insane to believe that an 
error is present and that she believes she has given birth to the child’.10 If one is 
aiming at a target, and misses, this is a mistake, but if there is no such aim or target, it 
makes no sense to call the result a mistake, which undermines Frazer’s account.11 
Whatever we think about Frazer’s examples based on the ancient or 
‘uncivilized’ people featured in his illustrations, it is implausible to suppose that 
everyone who takes part in rituals today in our society (including those with vast 
intellect, scientific knowledge, and reasoning skills) still believe in such a radically 
‘false physics’ 12  behind their ritualistic actions. If we are to account for their 
participation at all, we need to look beyond Frazer’s intellectualist account. Either 
there is an instrumental element, but it is not sufficient to account for the participation 
of certain people, or there is none, in which case it cannot be necessary for such 
understanding if understanding is to be had at all.  
Another issue with the intellectualist view is that the historical facts regarding 
the origin of rituals and corresponding beliefs about those facts are not necessary for 
rituals to have the meaning that they do today. 
 
It can indeed happen, and often does today, that a person will give up a practice after 
he has recognized an error on which it was based. But this happens only when calling 
someone’s attention to his error is enough to turn him from his way of behaving. But 
this is not the case with the religious practices of a people and therefore there is no 
question of an error.13 
 
To use Hacker’s example, even if Jews discovered that actually the children of Israel 
ate pita rather than Matzot (as is currently believed) this would not affect the 
contemporary practice of eating Matzot as part of the Passover celebration.14 If this is 
                                                 
9 Compare the ‘obviousness of error’ argument, Clack, p. 33. 
10 Wittgenstein, ‘Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough’, p. 125. 
11  Compare Wittgenstein: to ‘try’ implies the possibility of failing, (Wittgenstein, Philosophical 
Investigations, §§622-3) and ‘know’ implies the possibility of doubt, (Ibid, §679). 
12 Wittgenstein, ‘Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough’, p. 29. 
13 Ibid, p. 121. (Original emphasis.) 
14 Hacker, P. M. S., Wittgenstein: Connections and Controversies, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
(2001), p. 84-5. 
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true (and if it isn’t some similar example would be) then the link between the belief 
about the fact and the practice cannot be necessary.15 If the historical fact or the belief 
about it are not necessary for the meaning of the ritual, it cannot be necessary in order 
to explain the ritual, for that would make the ritual inexplicable whenever the 
historical fact was in fact false or unknown. Contemporary rituals wouldn’t be 
inexplicable if the facts they are (ostensibly) based upon were disproven and the 
beliefs about them ceased to be held. And even if they were, the ritual need not lose 
its depth or significance.16  
The hypothesis or belief that a ritual is based upon is also not enough to 
explain the impression that a ritual makes on us. Wittgenstein raises the following 
question:  
 
If I see a man being killed, –is what makes an impression on me simply what I see, or 
is it only the hypothesis that here a man is being killed?17  
 
If it were merely the hypothesis that ‘here a man is being killed’ which made the 
impression on me, I should have the same reaction to a loving family committing 
euthanasia, a prisoner on death row killed by a lethal injection, and the murder of an 
innocent man by poisoning. That these instances of a man being killed do not make 
the same impression on me shows that the hypothesis is not sufficient for our 
understanding of the event. I think that these three examples would require a different 
understanding, even though the method and result is similar in each case. The 
converse situation where the very same beliefs might generate different ritualistic 
actions in different people, or in the same people at different times adds force to this 
objection to Frazer:  
 
Recall that after Schubert’s death his brother cut some of Schubert’s scores into small 
pieces and gave such pieces, consisting of a few bars, to his favorite pupils. This act, 
as a sign of piety, is just as understandable to us as the different one of keeping the 
                                                 
15 This isn’t to say belief in general couldn’t be a necessary part of ritual, but that no specific belief can 
be necessary to a particular ritual.   
16 This is called the ‘immunity to criticism argument’ by Clack, p. 29-30. Cf. ‘It would make no 
difference if the hypothesis… turned out to be wrong.’ (Rhees, Rush, ‘Wittgenstein on Language and 
Ritual’, Wittgenstein and His Times, Ed. McGuiness, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, (1982), p. 99). 
17 Wittgenstein, ‘Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough’, p. 149. 
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scores untouched, accessible to no-one. And if Schubert’s brother had burned the 
scores, that too would be understandable as a sign of piety.18 
 
Knowing the facts involved cannot always lead one to understand the specific 
behaviour of the ritualist. So an intellectual explanation is not sufficient to explain 
rituals because even when we know all of the beliefs that a person holds and all the 
facts or hypotheses they take to be true, we might still be missing something 
important; what we know is not sufficient to explain why ritualists act the way that 
they do.  
We can consider what is missed by the intellectualist if we consider what we 
might experience if we witnessed a strange ritual, having been told only the Frazerean 
facts. Armed with these facts, we might understand partly why these people engage in 
the ritual, some of what (if anything) they hope to achieve by it, and perhaps if we 
knew it was a matter of life or death (for example praying for good harvest during a 
famine) we might also understand the solemnity with which it was carried out. Yet we 
would still be at a loss to understand, for example, the peculiarities of the ritual or the 
symbols they used. When witnessing the rain ritual, or Holy Communion, or the 
Beltane Fire-festival, we could still wonder at why there is a costume, a wafer, or a 
cake, and what it is that strikes us as deep, or sinister in these rituals.  
The impression made on us (that it strikes us as deep, or sinister, or whatever) 
is certain, in that it cannot be doubted or falsified. Wittgenstein says that ‘Compared 
with the impression which the thing described makes on us the explanation is too 
uncertain’.19 The explanation thus seems to be highlighted as unnecessary for the 
impression which is made on us, for the impression is certain even though there is a 
possibility that the explanation is incorrect. From Frazer’s point of view, this is no 
objection, for it is part of the concept of a scientific explanation that the explanans is 
less certain than the explanandum – an explanation is a series of statements designed 
to shed light on something that is already accepted as a matter-of-fact. However, it’s 
also part of the notion of scientific explanation that ‘an explanation is not fully 
adequate unless its explanans, if taken account of in time, could have served as a basis 
for predicting the phenomenon under consideration’.20 (This model of explanation – 
                                                 
18 Ibid, p. 127. 
19 Ibid, p. 123. 
20 Hempel, C.G. & Oppenheim, P. ‘Studies in the Logic of Explanation’, Philosophy of Science, Vol. 
15, (1948), p. 154. 
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called the Deductive-Nomological model – has it critics, but serves well enough here.) 
It is required of an explanation in this sense, that ‘the explanandum must be a logical 
consequence of the explanans’ and ‘the sentences constituting the explanans must be 
true’. 21  Thus if, as suggested by Wittgenstein, one cannot, from the uncertain 
hypotheses offered by Frazer predict the whole phenomenon of ritual (as I have 
argued), the kind of explanation offered by Frazer is not a fully adequate explanation.  
 In discussion of the Beltane Fire-festival, Rhees concludes that: ‘in one sense 
we have explained it; explained, perhaps, the performance of it in this place and at 
this time of year, and also the burning of the straw figure. But in a sense that is more 
important for Wittgenstein, it does not explain.’22 We might then see the disagreement 
as follows. There are at least two distinct senses of explanation that have legitimate 
uses. Frazer only gives what might aptly be called an ‘historico-scientific’ explanation 
of ritual, but Wittgenstein sees the need for a more holistic one due to the 
shortcomings we have identified in the purely scientific approach. Wittgenstein says 
that: 
 
An historical explanation, an explanation as an hypothesis of development, is only 
one kind of summary of the data… We can equally well see the data in their relations 
to one another and make a summary of them in a general picture without putting it in 
the form of an hypothesis regarding the temporal development.23 
 
To state the contention in these terms, an historico-scientific explanation is not 
adequate to understand a ritual, and therefore the intellectualist view is inadequate. 
And this in turn suggests that the role that rituals and practices play in explaining 
religious conversions is not reducible to that played by religious beliefs plus a story 
about the action-guiding or motivational quality of such beliefs.24 Understanding the 
beliefs relevant to practicing religious rituals is important to understanding them, but 
Wittgenstein correctly highlights the inadequacy of Frazer’s account. We can 
understand Frazer’s motivation insofar as we too have the tendency to ask ‘What is 
                                                 
21 Hempel, C., Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science, New 
York: Free Press, p. 248. 
22 Rhees, p. 99. 
23 Wittgenstein, ‘Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough’, p. 8e. 
24 ‘The practice of religious observance as a way of either placating the gods or ascertaining their 
intentions may long outlive any literal belief in the Gods themselves’. Warnock, Mary, Dishonest to 
God: On Keeping Religion Out of Politics, Continuum, (2010), p. 129. 
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this performance trying to do, what is its point?’25 However, as the plays of Samuel 
Beckett might have taught us, there is not always a point, at least, not always of the 
kind that we are seeking. 
While we have now loosened the connection between beliefs and ritualistic 
action, it doesn’t follow that we should adopt an expressivist account as an 
alternative. The expressivist claims that rituals are only expressions of emotions or 
attitudes. Some have read Wittgenstein as positing an expressivist view, and evidence 
for this is taken from passages such as the following:  
 
When I am furious about something, I sometimes beat the ground or a tree with my 
walking stick. But I certainly do not believe that the ground is to blame or that my 
beating can help anything. “I am venting my anger”. And all rites are of this kind.26 
 
Note however that he does not say ‘only of this kind’. So the passage does not 
demand the interpretation that all rites are solely (or merely) expressive, only that 
there is at least an expressive element. Evidence against the interpretation of 
Wittgenstein as an expressivist can be found in the following remark regarding a 
festival where men ride around on each other’s backs: 
 
…if we knew that among many peoples it has been the custom, say, to employ slaves 
as riding animals and, so mounted, to celebrate certain festivals, we would now see 
something deeper and less harmless in the harmless practice of our time.27 
 
Here I agree with Clack, who thinks that ‘we should do well to see this as a sign of an 
exemplary openness with regard to the diversity of rituals, which are not regarded 
here as universally expressive in character’.28 This suggests that the facts can (at least 
sometimes) be relevant to how one should interpret a festival, and likewise, the beliefs 
of those taking part will alter the significance of the festival.  
 An expressivist view (although I don’t think this is the correct reading of 
Wittgenstein) can be targeted by claiming that as a description of a social 
phenomenon, it is empirically false to claim that rituals are merely expressive. Cook 
                                                 
25 Wittgenstein, ‘Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough’, p.  149. 
26 Ibid, p. 137. 
27 Wittgenstein, ‘Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough’, p. 144.  
28 Clack, Brian R., ‘Response to Philips’, Religious Studies, Vol. 39, No. 2, (Jun., 2003), p. 206. 
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cites ethnographic data that shows that there are rituals that are definitely intended to 
be efficacious by the ritualist.29 Further reason for rejecting a purely expressivist 
account comes from the conclusion drawn in §3.1 that emotions themselves are not 
purely non-cognitive. If affect involves a cognitive element, then even if rituals were 
an expression of emotion, they would nevertheless be partially cognitive. A further 
consequence of the cognitive-non-cognitive mix that we find here, is that any account 
that focuses on only one to the exclusion of the other cannot help but miss part of the 
story. Both the expressivist and the intellectualist view are overly general because 
they take account of only part of what it is to understand a ritual and as such miss 
something of what we need for a full understanding. It is with this inspiration that I 
now turn to some positive comments about how to understand religious rituals. I take 
inspiration from Wittgenstein’s claims about how to understand rituals, so I begin by 
unpacking some of his key claims.  
Wittgenstein says that ritual can be represented ‘by means of an evolutionary 
hypothesis, … but also by means of the arrangement of its factual content alone, in a 
‘perspicuous’ representation.’30 By ‘perspicuous representation’ he means that which 
brings about understanding, which consists in the fact that we ‘see the connections’.31 
The connections that are important in understanding a ritual are those between the 
practice and ourselves. Understanding ritual is not merely comprised of knowing 
which beliefs are involved, but also in knowing how the beliefs relate to each other 
and to other things. We might say that ‘there is a way of seeing how those who are 
engaged in creating and transmitting myths, actually stand in relation to their myths 
and practices’.32  
What we have understood in addition to any relevant historico-scientific facts 
when we understand a ritual will be the ‘inner nature’ of that ritual.33 Wittgenstein 
elucidates:  
 
[By] the inner nature of the practice, I mean all circumstances under which it is 
carried out and which are not included in a report of such a festival, since they consist 
                                                 
29 Cook, pp. 11-16. 
30 Wittgenstein, ‘Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough’, p. 133. 
31 cf. Ibid. Understanding will be discussed in §5.2. 
32 Bell, p. 122. 
33 Cf. ‘it is clearly the inner nature of the modern practice itself which seems sinister to us, and the 
familiar facts of human sacrifice only indicate the lines along which we should view the practice.’ 
(Wittgenstein, ‘Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough’, p. 144). 
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not so much in the specific actions which characterize the festival as in what one 
might call the spirit of the festival; such things as would be included in one’s 
description, for example, of the kind of people who take part in it, their behaviour at 
other times, that is, their character; the kinds of games they otherwise play. And one 
would then see that the sinister quality lies in the character of these people 
themselves.34  
 
These things comprise what Wittgenstein calls the ‘spirit’ of a ritual, and it is this that 
the historico-scientific facts cannot explain. Armed only with an historico-scientific 
explanation the ritual remains enigmatic because ‘the explanation isn’t what satisfies 
us here at all’.35  
Wittgenstein’s emphasis on the kind of people involved, their behaviour 
during the ritual and in their wider culture, and their characters, points to the need to 
understand more than merely all the facts involved. We can understand better by 
picturing ourselves present in a real ritual, imagining that we know only the Frazerean 
facts. Even with all of the historico-scientific data, we would be struck very 
differently by a baptism if, in one case, the parents of the child being baptized were 
happy, proud, and handed their child over graciously to the priest to be baptized, and 
in another case the parents were nervous, tearful, and handed over the child 
reluctantly. What we have is a difference in the spirit of the ceremony in the 
respective cases. We tend to think that the first is more fitting, and more in line with 
the spirit of the ceremony as it functions in the Christian religion. In another religion, 
perhaps one where baptism is a marking of sinners so they can be sent to hell, one 
would expect the spirit of the occasion to be different in various obvious and subtle 
ways. These differences can be understood not just as differences in the affect 
generated by their participation, but in the affect experienced by those who participate 
that moves them to participate.  
For instance, if we want to understand why the Beltane Fire-festival has depth 
and seems sinister, part of this understanding is understanding the feeling from which 
the urge to participate, and to participate in that way, arises. That will involve 
understanding the inner nature, the spirit of this ritual, and the part it plays in the 
wider lives of the participants. When we understand this, we will also know that the 
                                                 
34 Ibid, p. 144-5. 
35 Ibid, p. 121. Cf. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, part ii, p. 190e. 
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sinister quality comes from the people themselves, that is, the ritual acts as a medium 
for expression of something that is already present in those that are moved to 
participate in the ritual. The spirit of a ritual comes largely from the role that it plays 
in the societies in which it is practiced. One way that we come to understand the inner 
nature is by extrapolating from one’s own experiences and feelings, and once a ritual 
‘is brought into connection with an instinct which I myself possess, this is precisely 
the explanation wished for’.36 Only when we understand something in ourselves that 
might lead us to perform this or a similar ritual in similar circumstances will we feel 
satisfied.37 What it takes to understand a ritual is a comprehension of what is involved 
in relation to our own lives and how the instincts involved in the ritual act connect 
with our own instincts. We can thus draw an important result about conversion. In 
order to fully understand conversion to a religious life one must connect the practices 
and behaviours associated with it to some religious impulse that one has in oneself, 
which can thereby explain it. 
 This conclusion suggests the following objection. Bell claims that when faced 
with Frazer’s account we aren’t satisfied because ‘we must still “find our feet”’ in 
relation to the ritual.38 Whether Wittgenstein’s positive comments can allow us to 
‘find our feet’ is still an open question. Wittgenstein himself was an outsider to many 
of the kinds of ritual discussed, as was Frazer. Wittgenstein in his later work says: 
 
one human being can be a complete enigma to another. We learn this when we come 
into a strange country with entirely strange traditions; and, what is more, even given a 
mastery of the country's language. We do not understand the people. (And not because 
of not knowing what they are saying to themselves.) We cannot find our feet with 
them.39  
 
If understanding a ritual involves seeking some similar impulse to that we find in the 
ritual, in ourselves, then we must accept the consequence that we only understand 
them ‘in so far as we have acted in similar deep, and perhaps sinister, ways within our 
own particular form of life’. 40  The objection is that this subjectifies religious 
understanding to quite a degree. In cases where a ceremonial act is performed by 
                                                 
36 Wittgenstein, ‘Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough’, p. 137. 
37 Cf. Bell, p. 122. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Part ii, p. 190e. 
40 Bell, p. 123. 
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those in a different religion, (or even a different church within the same religion) we 
might fail to ‘find our feet’ with their strange acts. If I observe an alien ritual I may be 
completely at sea and have no means to form an empathetic connection with them at 
all. Yet, even if I do infer something by analogy with myself, it is possible that I have 
missed the point completely, even while feeling satisfied and having the impression 
that I understand it, and moreover, I may have no way to tell the difference. Unless 
this can be resolved this account of understanding rituals is going to leave us 
unsatisfied because ‘what [Wittgenstein] calls the 'spirit of the festival' is 
impenetrable’. 41  It is unclear just what needs to be involved in order for us to 
understand the spirit, but if it is the case that foreign gestures are as incomprehensible 
as foreign words,42 then we will really be lost when it comes to rituals not based on 
some shared ground. If we don’t share certain features with the ritualists we will 
never understand. This account therefore has some serious consequences for the 
possibility of inter-religious dialogue, as well as a difficulty in expounding the role of 
ritual in religious conversion. 
 Wittgenstein claims that perspicuous representation ‘denotes the form of our 
representation, the way we see things. (A kind of Weltanschauung as it is apparently 
typical of our time...)’43 Thus the impasse between Frazer and Wittgenstein might be 
understood in terms of their very different world views – it accounts for why 
Wittgenstein can relate to the spiritual while believing that Frazer is spiritually 
impoverished (‘What a narrow spiritual life on Frazer’s part! As a result: how 
impossible it was for him to conceive of a life different from that of the England of 
his time!’44) This explains why Wittgenstein thought that Frazer would only have 
succeeded in convincing those who already think and feel the way he does.45 Those 
rituals that arise from a Weltanschauung different enough from our own will simply 
remain an enigma.  
 There is something very unsatisfying about this – we certainly want to feel as 
though rituals can be understood. However, one might claim this is not so much an 
objection, as a description of the way we really find things. Perhaps you have 
                                                 
41 Ibid, p. 120. 
42 Cf. Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Zettel, 2nd ed., Eds., G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, Trans., G. 
E. M. Anscombe, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, (1967), §219. 
43 Wittgenstein, ‘Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough’, p. 133. By ‘Weltanschauung’ Wittgenstein 
means something approximating ‘worldview’.  
44 Ibid, p. 125. 
45 Ibid, p. 119. 
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occasionally felt alienated by ‘the opposition’ in religious debates because 
assumptions have already been made that you cannot accept, or can at least relate to 
this or a similar situation. From the perspective of some atheists, nothing could be 
stranger or more irrational than the religious life, and from some religious points of 
view, nothing more impoverished than the atheistic one. In which case we would not 
understand religious conversion except to the extent to which we are moved towards 
conversion ourselves. 
 On the other hand, perhaps these differences are overstated. Wittgenstein says 
that ‘one could very easily invent primitive practices oneself, and it would be pure 
luck if they were not actually found somewhere’46 and ‘[i]f I wanted to make up a 
festival, it would die out very quickly or be modified in such a manner that it 
corresponds to a general inclination of the people’.47 These comments point to a view 
whereby all people share a common humanity, and the impulses that lead to and 
comprise our ritual actions are the very things that define our human-condition. While 
it might be true that we won’t understand whenever the community is alien enough, it 
is true that in many cases we don’t understand rituals. However, in many, perhaps 
most cases, the common humanity we share will be enough to give us some 
understanding even very unfamiliar practices. The religious impulse, whatsoever this 
might be exactly, is an incredibly pervasive one, both synchronically and 
diachronically. The time investment it would take from us in order to finally 
accomplish a perspicuous representation may well be a higher price than it is worth 
paying to understand an unfamiliar view, and so it may rarely be achieved. However, 
with enough time and energy put into immersing oneself into a foreign religious 
culture, given the deeper human traits that we share, we could come to understand.  
 This leaves open the possibility of inter-faith dialogue, while at the same time 
warning that success in this may often present a difficult challenge. 48  The clear 
message here is that the key to understanding the role of ritual in religious conversion, 
is to take part in the rituals, and to immerse yourself in the activities that comprise a 
religious life. Wittgenstein’s interlocutor poses the same question, and he answers: 
‘How do I know that two people mean the same when each says he believes in God?... 
                                                 
46 Ibid, p. 127. 
47 Ibid, p. 148-9. 
48  Mirroring the issues we saw in §1.2.3 with inter-faith dialogue resulting from differences in 
linguistic context.  
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Practice gives the words their sense’.49 We have raised the question of how to fix the 
meaning of religious language given that language users attach different meanings to 
the same terms, and even where the intention is to use a term in the same way, 
problems of vagueness and context-sensitivity abound. However, the answer here is 
that from inside the language game there is not a problem. The problem occurs when 
we are on the outside looking in, which is the position from which most 
philosophising in conducted, and the solution is to immerse oneself in the language 
game as it naturally occurs: ‘for someone for whom this “conceptual re-orientation” 
does not occur, no real understanding of the sentence (or words) in question is 
possible.’50 This immersion often takes place without a deliberate intention, as when 
someone is raised in a religious tradition. Sometimes the immersion coincides with a 
shift in one’s personal circumstances, like my sister’s emigration (which happened 
during her adolescence: statistically a common time that conversions occur). 51 This 
result accords with other statistical and anecdotal information about the common 
circumstances of conversion, which include marriage into a religious family, 
emigration to a religious community, grief, ill-health or near-death experiences, and 
addiction or alcoholism.52 However, (as I’ll discuss in §5.3.2) one may also decide to 
engage in religious rituals voluntarily. Doing so may lead to us recognizing the spirit 
of such rituals in relation to the aspects of ourselves that would motivate us to 
participate in these, or similar activities. This may lead to changes in one’s beliefs and 
emotions. Integrating our understanding of both the doxastic and affective aspects of 
religious practice leads us to a position where understanding is possible. I’ll now 
explore this integration in more detail.  
 
4.2.  The interplay between praxis and other dimensions. 
 
It is a plausible position that doing differently is a sign of being different. If a change 
in outward behaviour is indeed a reflection of inner change, then the dimension of 
praxis is significant not only intrinsically, but also extrinsically in that it can guide us 
to posit that other changes have occurred, and predict further changes (such as in 
                                                 
49 Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, 85e. 
50 Schönbaumsfeld, G., ‘Worlds or Words Apart? Wittgenstein on Understanding Religious Language’, 
Ratio, Vol. XX, (Dec., 2007), p. 432.  
51 Christensen, ‘Religious Conversion in Adolescence’. See also James, p. 197 and pp. 209-10. 
52 Ibid, and personal communication. 
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beliefs or emotions). I argue here that by engaging in different behaviour we are 
changing not just our present, but our future, because our experiences of ‘doings’ 
affect us and expose us to different stimulus for beliefs and feelings, and these in turn 
will influence the further actions we take.  
 In §3.1 I claimed that emotions can be intentional. Wynn aptly notes that ‘the 
kind of intentionality realised in feeling is inseparably action-guiding intentionality: 
the meanings borne by feelings are defined in part by the role of those feelings in 
guiding behaviour.’53 There is a causal and a conceptual link between emotion and 
action.  
The deeper point is conceptual. If a friend tells you that she is furious with 
you, but does so calmly, with a relaxed posture, and continues her relation to you in a 
perfectly ordinary fashion, you’d justifiably be dubious about the sincerity of that 
feeling. It just doesn’t make sense to think that she is really furious. Fury is borne out 
in the actions that follow. ‘[O]n this [Greenspan’s] view the meanings of emotional 
feeling are fixed (at least in part) by their role in behavioural response.’54 Likewise, 
being in a state of loving someone is incompatible with causing them deliberate harm. 
If I cause them deliberate harm you would be perfectly justified in claiming that, 
whatever I may think, what I feel in that moment is not really love. So it is more than 
a causal link, but a conceptual one, between feelings and action.55  
Emotions can guide action in various ways that are not conceptual, but might 
be seen as closer to a causal connection. For instance, if we came across a vicious 
animal we might naturally feel fear. The fear plays several roles in ensuring our 
survival in this situation. We’d most likely both experience some very similar 
physiological changes (like the release of adrenaline). This prepares our body for 
engagement or flight, and as Wynn says, ‘feelings owe their intentionality, at least in 
part, to an awareness of the body’s readiness to act’.56 This doesn’t cause any specific 
behaviour, but nevertheless the emotion is part of whatever causal chain unfolds – 
perhaps you are stronger than I am and bravely stay to fight the animal, while I flee. 
                                                 
53 Wynn, Emotional Experience and Religious Understanding, p. 119. 
54 Ibid. 
55 It is not a necessary link, in that a certain feeling must always be accompanied by a specific act, 
because we can choose not to act on certain feelings, or to act against them. However, we may choose 
to see this as deviant, for whenever one suppresses or acts against one’s true feelings, this (although I 
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56 Ibid, p. 133-4. 
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Our actions are different, but we have both been motivated to act and enabled 
appropriately to act by the emotion of fear. The emotional experience does guide 
action (although it does not determine it).  
Emotions also guide action in that we have a tendency to seek out certain 
feelings, and to avoid others. According to Clore, ‘[r]elevant research showed that 
when people act in ways that are inconsistent with their beliefs, a state of tension or 
cognitive dissonance is generated, which motivates them to adjust their beliefs to 
make them consistent with their actions—the process of dissonance reduction.’57 For 
instance, anxiety may be taken as a sign that something is wrong, and may lead us to 
act in ways to remove the problem or minimise discomfort. For example, by preparing 
more comprehensively for a speech, or leaving earlier to catch an important train. The 
way this may be relevant to conversion can be illustrated as follows. One may at a 
certain point feel tension between the belief that there is no God, and the feeling of 
awe experienced when considering the magnitude and beauty of the universe, or more 
dramatically, after a religious experience. This might inspire someone to read or 
engage in conversation on this topic (which in turn might lead to the formation of 
religious belief). There is no single formula: loneliness might motivate the search for 
a community in which one can feel belonging, and this might be a religious 
community; helplessness might motivate faith in a higher power; grief may motivate 
the participation in religious rituals. All of these things may in turn re-enforce any 
religious beliefs that are held, and these new beliefs might then give rise to further 
emotions, and so on. In light of this, we can see how a negative emotional reaction to 
a felt tension between one’s beliefs and practices, or between one’s practices and 
feelings, or feelings and beliefs, could motivate someone to reconcile this tension by 
acting in ways that might be conducive to doing so. 
In the other direction, those who engage in religious behaviour will experience 
various affects. These in turn will interact with the other dimension, as described. 
Clore makes the following observation (although he makes it about children, the 
process is the same for adult converts). First one adopts a gesture or posture (which 
may be for any reason at all):  
 
Gradually the physical and emotional dimensions of worship become embodied 
                                                 
57 Clore, p. 328. 
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personal experience, and, each time a gesture is repeated the kinesthetic and 
emotional memory of that gesture is evoked, layering, compounding, and shaping 
present experience. Images, ideas, and emotional and physical associations (including 
both kinesthetic and contextual sensory experience) are all active and present in the 
experience of a  ritual gesture or posture. Each repetition of a posture of worship with 
the body not only reinforces the associations but also recalls the feeling 
associations.58 
 
 As well as a two-way relationship between emotion and behaviour, there is 
also a two-way relationship between beliefs and behaviour, such that ‘it makes no 
sense to think that the “beliefs” can be specified (in anything but a purely minimalist 
– ‘external’ – sense) completely independently of the practices in which they are 
embedded (and vice versa).’ 59  Religious behaviour can lead to religious belief 
formation and retention. According to Pascal, ‘behaving in certain ways’ (called 
‘custom’)60 is a source of belief. He says:   
  
 Custom is the source of our strongest and most believed proofs. It bends the 
 automaton, which persuades the mind without its thinking about the matter. […] We 
 must get an easier belief, which is that of custom, which, without violence, without 
 art, without argument, makes us believe things and inclines all our powers to this 
 belief, so that our soul falls naturally into it.61  
  
Custom includes which things we do, which activities we participate in, and the usual 
pattern of our lives. If I never act in any way that would expose me to new evidence 
relevant to the proposition that grass is green (let’s say I retreat to the desert for the 
remainder of my days with no contact to the outside world), I will never change my 
rational grounds for forming a new belief regarding the colour of grass. On the other 
hand, whenever I act in the world so that I visit new and foreign grasslands, I thereby 
expose myself to new data that can form the basis for new belief formation. When 
someone engages in religious behaviour they expose themselves to things that place 
them in a different epistemic position with respect to certain religious propositions, 
and so in this way, religious behaviour can lead to a change in the religious belief set. 
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59 Schönbaumsfeld, p. 434. 
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61 Ibid, 252. 
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For example, by taking a course of study in religious studies, theology or philosophy 
of religion, one will expose oneself to arguments that aim to prove God’s existence 
(among other things) and one will also improve the rational faculties that enable one 
to appreciate and construct such arguments. By leading a more aesthetically and 
morally attuned lifestyle one might make the occurrence of religious experiences 
more likely, thereby rendering the likelihood of forming a belief more likely. By 
going to places of worship we make ourselves open to relationships with those who 
believe, and therefore expose ourselves to testimony that may be convincing and lead 
to the formation of religious beliefs. Other suitable activities would be reading 
scripture and engaging in religious practices or rituals.   
 The interaction between religious beliefs and behaviour occurs in the other 
direction too, in that religious beliefs can motivate and guide religious behaviour. 
Clifford goes as far as to say: ‘Nor is that truly a belief at all which has not some 
influence upon the actions of him who holds it.’62 If I believe I’m in an empty room, 
I’ll plot a straight trajectory when I want to exit through the door on the opposite side. 
However, if my belief set changes so that I now believe that there is a table in the 
centre of the room, this belief will guide my behaviour in that I am now likely to take 
a diversion around the edge of the room to exit through the same door. Likewise, if 
you come to believe that God listens to prayers, this may guide your actions and 
motivate you to pray when you would not otherwise have done so. In this way beliefs 
guide and motivate behaviour, so there is a simple sense in which changes in belief 
will lead to changes in behaviour. Likewise, changes in behaviour can be explained 
by changes in belief. When someone acts in a new or unexpected way, we may make 
sense of this by inferring that some belief has changed. If I form a new religious 
belief, this will have a direct effect on the way I behave in some respects. If I believe 
that praying is efficacious, I might pray in a situation where I would not have prayed 
without that belief. If I believe that God is judging me for my actions, I may act in a 
way that accords with what I believe his commands are when I otherwise would not 
have done.  
I’ve now claimed that religious behaviour can lead to religious beliefs, and 
religious beliefs can lead to religious behaviour. But as far as understanding 
conversion goes, so far this is a closed circuit: how does the circle begin? Without 
                                                 
62 Clifford, ‘The Ethics of Belief’, p. 99. 
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some further explanation it seems that we will first start off with an inexplicably 
formed religious belief which then leads to religious behaviour which in turn can form 
and re-enforce religious beliefs, or, we first start off with unmotivated religious 
behaviour which would then lead to the formulation of religious beliefs. There are two 
ways out of this supposed dilemma.  
 The first, drawing on the understanding of ritual discussed above, is to appeal to 
the role of the emotions in the conversion spiral. The starting point is religious 
behaviour, but this is not unmotivated merely because it is not motivated by a pre-
existing belief. It is motivated first by an affect. I have some feeling, some impulse, 
and this drives me to participate in some religious activity, which in turn leads me to 
form religious beliefs.  
 The second is to focus on other epistemic states than belief that might explain 
participation in religious practices. Alston points out that ‘the term “belief” has been 
allowed to spread over any positive propositional attitude.’ 63  We can draw out 
distinctions between belief and other relevant propositional attitudes, and then 
consider the roles that these separate propositional attitudes might have. This may 
avoid a distorted and possibly exaggerated account of the role of belief in religious 
conversion. One such epistemic state is that of acceptance, which I now briefly 
discuss.  
 
4.3. The role of acceptance. 
 
A specific action that has a special significance to conversion, and can solve the 
aforementioned problem with the connection between behaviour and belief, is that of 
acceptance. The role of acceptance in conversion is illustrated in the following 
quotation:  
 
 Gospel salvation seemed to me to be an offer of something to be accepted, and all that 
 was necessary on my part to get my own consent to give up my sins and accept 
 Christ. After this distinct revelation had stood for some little time before my mind, 
 the question seemed to be put, ‘will you accept it now, to-day?’ I replied, ‘Yes; I will 
 accept it to-day, or I will die in the attempt!’64 
 
                                                 
63 Alston, ‘Belief Acceptance and Religious Faith’, p. 20. 
64 Quoted from James, pp. 205-6. 
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Alston posits two differences between belief and acceptance. Firstly, while acceptance 
is a mental act, belief is a disposition to various reactions involving the proposition. 
The positive attitude one adopts towards a proposition when one accepts is something 
that one does. The second key difference is that while acceptance is directly 
voluntary, beliefs are not.65 He sees a distinction too between accepting a proposition 
and adopting an assumption or working hypothesis:  
 
[One] can adopt an assumption, a working hypothesis, for the sake of action guidance 
without accepting it. Accepting p involves a more positive attitude toward that 
proposition than just making the assumption that p or hypothesizing that p. The 
difference could be put this way. To accept that p is to regard it as true, though one 
need not be explicitly deploying the concept of truth in order to do so. But one can 
assume or hypothesize that p for a particular limited purpose, […] without taking any 
stand on truth-value.66 
 
In the philosophy seminar room when we are engaging in the philosophy of religion, 
we need to neither accept nor believe the proposition that ‘God exists’ to assert it as 
the premise in an argument. Merely entertaining the hypothesis or adopting as an 
assumption is not sufficient for religious conversion, but acceptance is more than this. 
Acceptance, while not as strong as belief, is strong enough to be action-guiding, and 
can therefore explain and justify changes in behaviour. Such changes in behaviour 
might eventually lead to a full belief. The standard for justification of acceptance is 
lower than for belief. What counts as a sufficient reason for accepting a doctrine 
might not also count as sufficient reason for believing it. This is precisely the kind of 
thing that pragmatic arguments like Pascal’s wager rely on – while the wager cannot 
seem to lead us directly to belief, it can lead us directly to acceptance. We might 
                                                 
65  Alston, ‘Belief Acceptance and Religious Faith’, p. 8-9. Buckareff makes a more fine grained 
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especially 1 and 5. However, as long as at least one of these differences holds there is a genuine 
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66 Alston, ‘Belief Acceptance and Religious Faith’, p. 11. 
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claim that actions can be justified in various ways, along parallel lines to the various 
ways I’ve claimed we can justify beliefs and emotions.  
 
 (1)   An action, A, is epistemically justified iff the beliefs connected to that 
  action are justified. 
 (2) An action, A, is morally justified iff that action is either morally             
………………supererogatory, or morally permissible.  
 (3)  An action, A, is pragmatically justified iff in situation S if that action 
…………..leads to overall better consequences than the non-performance of that 
…………..action.    
 
As acceptance can be seen as an action, we can see that it can be justified in any of 
these ways. 
 Once one accepts a proposition, this acceptance can interact with the other 
dimensions, allowing this to initiate religious conversion even in the absence (thus 
far) of belief. Acceptance is sufficient to play a cognitive role in the generation of an 
emotional response to this acceptance (in much the same way as mere imagination 
can generate genuine emotional responses). Once we emotionally react to an accepted 
proposition, what happens next is as described in the interactions between emotion 
and the other two dimensions. Acceptance can also motivate religious behaviour, as it 
‘typically engenders a complex dispositional state’.67  
 
if acceptance were just a momentary act that left no residue, it would have no point. 
The point lies precisely in the fact that to accept a proposition is to be prepared to 
make use of it in reasoning and in guiding one's behavior.68 
 
Acceptance is thus in a better position to motivate religious behaviour, as it will be 
easier to explain how it happens that one accepts religious propositions that would 
justify the behaviour than it would be to explain how one comes to believe them in a 
rational way. This is because one doesn’t first need sufficient evidence to accept the 
religious propositions – one only needs to think there might be good reasons for 
thinking that accepting them might be fruitful. Once a proposition has been accepted, 
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this is not enough alone, but it does allow the interaction between the dimensions of 
religious conversion to get moving and ‘it is possible for acceptance to turn into belief 
as one gets deeper and deeper into the religion one has accepted. Neither the believer 
nor the accepter is necessarily frozen forever into that stance.’69 
 Acceptance is not something that occurs only one time, and then never again, 
if it is to lead to a conversion. It will need to be reaffirmed at key points, and will 
need to be re-enforced by taking action in line with that acceptance. Alston says (but 
we needn’t restrict the application of this claims to only the Christian religion): 
 
When I come to my thesis that accepting basic Christian doctrines can undergird a 
full-blown Christian commitment, I don't want to restrict myself to the act of initial 
adoption. If one “accepted” the doctrines and then promptly forgot all about them, if 
no further use were made of them or attention paid to them, this clearly would not 
serve as a foundation for a robust Christian life.70  
  
Failing to reaffirm acceptance would not lead to a religious life, but doing so might. 
This works well so long as the distinction between belief and acceptance is 
robust. Clarke thinks, however, that acceptance entails belief, which he calls the 
‘entailment thesis’.71 If the entailment thesis were to hold, then the distinction for this 
purpose collapses. Clarke’s motivation for the entailment thesis is in part based on an 
objection to its contrary. Here is a scenario – I measure my table for a tablecloth, and 
the ruler reads 3 feet, 11 and 7/16 inches long and so this is the length I believe it to 
be. However, when I come to buy a tablecloth for this table I accept the proposition 
that my table is 4 feet long. While this example purports to describe a situation where 
I accept that my table is 4 feet long without believing it, Clarke thinks this is mistaken 
and cites the plausibility of the example to ‘the vagueness of the concepts of 
acceptance and belief used in its formulation’.72 While we can generate an instance of 
Moore’s paradox by stating ‘The table is four feet long but I believe that it is 3 feet, 
11 and 7/16 inches long’, this is not how we would report the state of affairs described 
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71 D. S. Clarke, ‘Does Acceptance Entail Belief?’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 31 (1994) pp. 
145–55, 145 (See also D. S. Clarke, ‘The Possibility of Acceptance Without Belief’, in Pascal Engel, 
(ed.) Believing and Accepting (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2000), pp. 31–53, 37). 
72 Clarke, D. S., ‘Does Acceptance Entail Belief?’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 31, (1994), p. 
39, quoted in Buckareff, Andrei, ‘Acceptance Does Not Entail Belief’, International Journal of 
Philosophical Studies, Vol. 18, Iss. 2, (2010), p. 256. 
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in the example.73 We would be unlikely to report our belief in such an exact form, but 
would happily report our belief as the belief that the table is 4 feet long, thus 
rendering compatible the second clause of the paradoxical sentence with the first. 
However, in other circumstances (where precision was paramount) we would not 
make the assertion that the table is 4 feet long, and so would render the first clause 
compatible with the first. In general, we are guided by the same considerations in 
making the assertion as in reporting the belief, and this is how the paradox is avoided, 
according to Clarke.  
The upshot of the reply is that I can assert that I believe that the table is four 
feet long while in fact believing not precisely this, but that the table is 3 feet, 11 and 
7/16 inches long. Buckareff takes to be evident that ‘Clarke has taken speech acts like 
asserting and mental events like accepting to be more similar than they may really 
be.’74 So my willingness, and the appropriateness of the assertion that I believe that 
the table is 4 feet long, is not indicative in a strong sense of any fact about the precise 
belief that I hold. Thus Clarke’s reasoning does not entitle him to the entailment 
thesis. 
 While acceptance does not entail belief, a state of acceptance makes the belief 
more likely to form. By accepting a proposition, one is led onto new lines of enquiry, 
and becomes open to new kinds of experience, new ways of feeling and acting, and 
one’s attention is directed towards new things. Additionally, belief may still be 
considered a preferable state. Emotions arise at the thought of even imaginary things – 
imagine for a moment that your latest work is considered for a prestigious prize, and 
note if any emotional reaction is experienced, perhaps stronger the more vividly you 
imagine it. Imagining extremely positive or negative scenarios may generate stronger 
emotions, and more quickly. But also notice that this feeling will pass rather quicker 
than you'd expect if you genuinely believed what you are now merely imagining. If 
we consider some religious truth it may stir our emotions, but the interaction with 
belief is important for sustaining emotional engagement.  
 
                                                 
73 Buckareff, p. 256. 
74 Ibid, p. 257. 
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4.4. Concluding remarks. 
In this chapter I discussed the nature of religious rituals, which are a form of praxis. 
Having considered both intellectualist and expressivist views, I concluded that neither 
view can adequately explain rituals, and that an integrated (and Wittgensteinian 
inspired) view is more robust than either and can capture some pertinent features of 
religious rituals. I considered a potential objection to my view, which claimed that my 
view would lead to a kind of subjectivism that would make understanding foreign 
rituals impossible, which would have negative consequences for our ability to 
understand and communicate with one another. I argued that this is not a consequence 
of my view, because genuine rituals (rather than singular ritual-like acts or one off 
ritualistic enactments) stem from impulses that are shared features of the human 
condition, and so where rituals stem from these impulses, they are likely to be 
understandable by others who share those impulses, and the way to get ‘inside’ the 
ritual to see which impulses are driving the symbolic actions is to take part, and to 
immerse oneself in the culture in which they occur.  
 While this recommendation to take part in rituals is key to understanding 
them, the mere performance of rituals is not sufficient to bring about a religious 
conversion. James quotes a journal, which says:   
You have been seeking, praying, reforming, laboring, reading, hearing, and 
 meditating, and what have you done by it towards your salvation? Are you any nearer 
 to conversion now than when you first began? Are you any more prepared for heaven, 
 or fitter to appear before the impartial bar of God, than when you first began to seek? 
 “It brought such conviction on me that I was obliged to say that I did not think I was 
 one step nearer than at first, but as much condemned, as much exposed, and as 
 miserable as before.75   
This suggests that action alone isn’t sufficient for a conversion, as here the right 
actions have been enacted but this hasn’t resulted in a conversion. At this point, we 
have considered three dimensions of religious conversion, so in this chapter I was able 
to discuss not merely praxis, but also the connections between the dimensions of 
praxis, belief, and affect. It is through the connection between action and the other 
dimensions that the fuller picture emerges. Having discussed the connection between 
emotion and belief in §3.2, in the present chapter I discussed the connection between 
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emotion and action, and between belief and action. I argued that emotions are both 
causally and conceptually linked to action. I argued that there is a two way-interaction 
between belief and action. I then considered an objection to the effect that because 
belief may lead to action and action may lead to belief, we yet have no way of 
understanding which would come first, or could start the chain of interactions, and so 
the process is still unexplained and unjustified. To remedy this, I considered one 
specific kind of action, which is that of acceptance. I distinguished acceptance from 
belief, and claimed that one can first accept a proposition for pragmatic or moral 
reasons, and that this may lead to belief formation at a later point. Acceptance 
involves both cognitive and non-cognitive components:  
 
 The reaction naturally called for by a message from the divine is acceptance. This 
 involves both an intellectual acceptance of its contents – belief that whatever 
 statements it makes are true – and obedience to the commands and exhortations it 
 contains […] faith in this sense means far more than the intellectual assent to certain 
 propositions. It also involves taking up an attitude on the basis of that affirmation and 
 expressing that attitude in action.75   
 
This integration of cognitive and non-cognitive elements has been a recurring theme 
to emerge from this research, and this will continue in the next chapter, where I offer 
a general account of conversion based on the conclusions drawn so far.  
                                                 
75 Alston, ‘Religion’, p. 144. Emphasis added. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE CONVERSION PROCESS 
 
“‘I can become a friend of God here and now if I want to.” Even as he spoke he 
was in labor with the new life that was struggling to birth within him.’ 1 
 
We have seen that religious conversion involves several dimensions, and these have 
been discussed in turn. I shall begin the present chapter by quoting from an extended 
first-person account of a religious conversion that illustrates the involvement of all 
three of these dimensions, with those aspects related to the doxastic dimension 
emboldened, those related to the affections italicized, and those related to the 
dimension of praxis underlined: 
  
I thought I saw the Saviour, by faith, in human shape, for about one second in the 
room, with arms extended, appearing to say to me, Come. The next day I rejoiced 
with trembling; soon after, my happiness was so great that I said that I wanted to die; 
this world had no place in my affections, as I knew of, and every day appeared as 
solemn to me as the Sabbath. I had an ardent desire that all mankind might feel as I 
did; I wanted to have them all love God supremely. Previous to this time I was very 
selfish and self-righteous; but now I desired the welfare of all mankind, and could 
with a feeling heart forgive my worst enemies, and I felt as if I should be willing to 
bear the scoffs and sneers of any person, and suffer anything for His sake, if I could 
be the means in the hands of God, of the conversion of one soul. […] One Sabbath, I 
went to hear the Methodist at the Academy. He spoke of the ushering in of the day of 
general judgment; and he set it forth in such a solemn and terrible manner as I never 
heard before. The scene of that day appeared to be taking place, and so awakened 
were all the powers of my mind that, like Felix, I trembled involuntarily on the 
bench where I was sitting, though I felt nothing at heart. The next day evening I went 
to hear him again. […] I will now relate my experience of the power of the Holy 
Spirit which took place on the same night. Had any person told me previous to this 
that I could have experienced the power of the Holy Spirit in the manner which I did, 
I could not have believed it, and should have thought the person deluded that 
                                                 
1 Augustinus, Aurelius, Confessions, New York, Fathers of the Church, Inc., (1953), p. 197. 
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told me so. […] I began to be exercised by the Holy Spirit, which began in about five 
minutes after, in the following manner:— At first, I began to feel my heart beat very 
quick all on a sudden, which made me at first think that perhaps something is going to 
ail me, though I was not alarmed, for I felt no pain. My heart increased in its beating, 
which soon convinced me that it was the Holy Spirit from the effect it had on me. I 
began to feel exceedingly happy and humble, and such a sense of unworthiness as I 
never felt before. I could not very well help speaking out, which I did, […] It took 
complete possession of my soul, and I am certain that I desired the Lord, while in 
the midst of it, not to give me any more happiness, for it seemed as if I could not 
contain what I had got. My heart seemed as if it would burst, but it did not stop until I 
felt as if I was unutterably full of the love and grace of God. In the mean time while 
thus exercised, a thought arose in my mind, what can it mean? and all at once, as if 
to answer it, my memory became exceedingly clear, and it appeared to me just as if 
the New Testament was placed open before me, eighth chapter of Romans, and as 
light as if some candle lighted was held for me to read the 26th and 27th verses of 
that chapter, and I read these words: ‘The Spirit helpeth our infirmities with 
groanings which cannot be uttered.’ […] After this, with difficulty I got to sleep; and 
when I awoke in the morning my first thoughts were: What has become of my 
happiness? and, feeling a degree of it in my heart, I asked for more, which was given 
to me as quick as thought. […] I went downstairs feeling as solemn as if I had lost all 
my friends, and thinking with myself, that I would not let my parents know it until I 
had first looked into the Testament. I went directly to the shelf and looked into it, at 
the eighth of Romans, and every verse seemed to almost speak and to confirm it to 
be truly the Word of God, and as if my feelings corresponded with the meaning of 
the word. I then told my parents of it, and told them that I thought that they must see 
that when I spoke, that it was not my own voice, for it appeared so to me. My speech 
seemed entirely under the control of the Spirit within me; I do not mean that the 
words which I spoke were not my own, for they were. I thought that I was 
influenced similar to the Apostles on the day of Pentecost (with the exception of 
having power to give it to others, and doing what they did). After breakfast I went 
round to converse with my neighbors on religion, which I could not have been hired 
to have done before this, and at their request I prayed with them, though I had never 
prayed in public before. I now feel as if I had discharged my duty by telling the truth, 
and hope by the blessing of God, it may do some good to all who shall read it. He has 
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fulfilled his promise in sending the Holy Spirit down into our hearts, or mine at least, 
and I now defy all the Deists and Atheists in the world to shake my faith in Christ.2 
 
I now propose (in §5.1) to offer a concise account of the conversion process by 
piecing together these aspects. I shall then (in §5.2) explore the role of understanding 
in religious conversion, which I argue involves an integrated appreciation of the 
significance of all three dimensions. In the penultimate section (§5.3) I will explore an 
important implication of the research so far undertaken. I claim that my research 
leaves room for the voluntariness of each aspect of religious conversion in a sense 
sufficient for moral responsibility. Thus, it is sometimes possible to choose to undergo 
a conversion to a sufficient extent to make us morally responsible for whether or not 
we do. We can therefore see religious conversion as a normative issue, and it becomes 
relevant to ask whether one should convert. Finally I consider the ethical status of 
religious conversion (in §5.4).  
 
5.1. The conversion process as a spiral. 
 
We have seen that there is no logical priority between the three dimensions of 
religious conversion, as they are intrinsically linked. 3  According to Cornwall, 
Albrecht, Cunningham and Pitcher, these dimensions are related as follows:  
 
in order to be committed to God, one must believe in Him, and commitment to God 
influences religious behavior. On the other hand, in order to feel committed to a 
church or organization, one must believe it to be a good and viable organization, and 
commitment to the organization influences participation and acceptance of the 
behavioral norms and expectations of the organization.4 
 
There is also no strict or universal temporal priority between these three dimensions. 
Sometimes one dimension will be temporally prior and other times a different 
dimension will be prior. Wynn draws on Plantinga, who claims that neither cognition 
nor affection is prior, as:  
 
                                                 
2 Quoted in James, Varieties of Religious Experience, pp. 188-92. 
3 In §§3.2 and 4.2. 
4 Cornwall, Albrecht, Cunningham and Pitcher, p. 228. 
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 The structure of will and intellect here is perhaps a spiral, dialectical process: 
 heightened affections enable us to see more of God’s beauty and glory; being able to 
 see more of God’s beauty and glory and majesty in turn leads to heightened 
 affections; there are certain things you won’t know unless you love, have the right 
 affections; there are certain affections you won’t have without perceiving some of 
 God’s moral qualities.5 
 
Rather than a single dimension having priority overall, there are many interactions. 
This may seem unsatisfying, but ‘the messiness is to some extent intrinsic to the 
subject matter: to speak in general terms, religions depends on discursive thought and 
also on feeling; and to speak of particular cases, it is sometimes thought which comes 
first, sometimes feeling, and sometimes neither.’6 Importantly, behaviour may also 
come first on some occasions.  
 While there is not a universal priority either in terms of significance or 
temporality of a single dimension, it is an empirical observation than in a given 
conversion, there may be one dimension that shifts first, or that dominates. This may 
be different for different individuals. One single change – either a belief, an action, or 
a feeling, can act as a ‘tipping point’ and can instigate large and widespread changes 
in the manner of a butterfly effect. This aligns well with accounts of conversion that 
have been documented. For example, one person describes a conversion that they 
claim occurred while they read something of religious significance:  
 
Immediately with the termination of this sentence, all darkness of doubt were 
dispersed, as if by a light of peace flooding into my heart.7  
 
Tipping points trigger a flurry of other changes, so that this particular cluster of 
changes is more noticeable, apparent, or cumulatively creates a more evident effect on 
the subject. However, nothing occurs in isolation – any single dimension that 
undergoes a shift will have implications for others that are related to it more or less 
directly. Hence it may happen that one gestalt switch can affect a wide network of 
                                                 
5  Wynn, Emotional Experience and Religious Understanding, p. 132, who cites Alvin Plantinga, 
Warranted Christian Belief, New York: Oxford University Press, (2000), p. 301. 
6 Wynn, Emotional Experience and Religious Understanding, pp. 147. 
7 Augustine, Confessions, p.225.  
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associated things. Where this doesn’t occur, what we have is not really a conversion, 
for conversion is widespread and sustained.   
 Depending on the order in which these things happen to occur, and which 
dimension predominates in terms of initiating the spirals, we might broadly classify 
the conversion differently. I offer the following typology: 
 
(1) Intellectual-Pragmatic:  Belief        →    Behaviour →    Emotion  
(2) Intellectual-Revelatory:  Belief        →    Emotion    →    Behaviour    
(3) Pascalian-Emotive: Behaviour →       →    Belief  
(4) Pascalian-Pragmatic: Behaviour →    Belief        →    Emotion  
(5) Emotive-Expressive:    →    Behaviour →    Belief  
(6) Emotive-Self-deceptive:    →    Belief       →    Behaviour   
  
 
In (1) the initial change, or ‘trigger’, will be the acquisition of a new belief, which 
will motivate some kind of religious behaviour, to which there will be an emotional 
response. From here, (and this applies to all types) any further series of changes may 
occur. In (2) the initially formed belief will stimulate an emotional response, which 
will motivate religious behaviour. In (3) some kind of religious participation will 
trigger an emotional response, which will lead to the formation of religious belief, 
while in (4) the religious participation itself leads directly to the formation of religious 
belief, which in turn stimulates an emotional response. In (5) a strong emotional 
experience (possibly a religious experience or possibly an aesthetic reaction to nature 
or to religious artefacts, architecture, texts, or symbols) leads to the urge to participate 
in religious behaviour which in turn leads to the formation of religious beliefs. 
Finally, in (6) a similar emotional experience leads to or influences the formation of a 
religious belief, which in turn motivates religious behaviour.  
 Ultimately, any genuine conversion is unlikely to be of only one type. We can 
think of any of the trios above as a micro-spiral, but the conversion process is a spiral 
comprised of many micro-spirals. We might usefully categorise a conversion by the 
typology I offered where one particular micro-spiral repeats most often, or where one 
particular micro spiral stands out in extremity (perhaps by being the first micro-spiral 
in a very sudden or dramatic conversion). However, we should expect that there are 
aspects of all or many of these types in an individual’s conversion process. In short, 
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the dimensions are interrelated and conversion happens by a spiralling re-enforcement 
between them.  
 Without this spiral to inculcate new behavioural and affective dispositions and 
new beliefs, (that is, if a single change occurs in a vacuum), either a conversion will 
not take place (old patterns will reign), or it will be very short lived – one will, in 
James’ words, ‘backslide’: 
 
religious virtues, including the relevant emotional dispositions, would be fragile. 
They would be susceptible to vicissitudes as they are elsewhere, or they would 
remain in place whilst their expression is blocked off by depression, apathy, 
weakness, accidie, sloth, tiredness, and so on, so that one’s religious life goes cold on 
one.8 
 
This is supported by the fact that some conversions are fairly short lived and others 
are life-long. Without belief or acceptance there will be insufficient momentum for 
one’s emotions, and insufficient motivation for one’s behaviour on a continued basis. 
If a conversion experience is not followed by participation in religious activities then 
the affect of the experience may dwindle and fail to be integrated into the life of the 
almost-convert. If, on the other hand, actions are performed of a religious nature 
following a conversion, this will reinforce the triggering experience and will be likely 
to trigger further changes. For example, if a conversion is followed by church 
attendance, there will often be emotive music, beautiful icons, and many symbols that 
tie into a complex network of associations that allow them to tap into the emotions 
felt on other occasions when those symbols have been present. Once I’ve had a 
strongly positive religious experience involving a particular symbol or icon, future 
exposure to religious icons will emote positive feelings too. This may trigger deeper 
feelings once personal connections are made within the religious community of that 
church, like feelings of acceptance, belonging, or even family. Post conversion, 
objects that before had no effect, or even a negative effect, will be comforting, 
inspiring, or in other ways positive, so attending church increases exposure to these 
and consolidates the associations and strengthens the significance for the convert.  
 This model, by integrating praxis along with affective and cognitive 
components, augments that of Wynn, who claims that ‘sometimes, conceptually 
                                                 
8 Goldie, ‘Intellectual Emotions and Religious Emotions’, p. 101. 
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inarticulate feelings may lead the way and then be deepened by concepts and the 
working of the imagination; and sometimes, discursive thoughts may lead the way, 
and then be extended by feeling. We might wonder if these two models can interact, 
so that some kinds of religious understanding arise from the reciprocal influence of 
these two movements’.9 The integration between these three aspects leads to what can 
be called ‘religious understanding’, to which I now turn. 
 
5.2. The role of understanding. 
 
Understanding is a combination of dimensions, and can be seen as a state reached 
when there is harmonious integration of dimensions working together, so that things 
are believed, felt and lived. When one has a religious conversion, one has a new 
understanding of the world, its nature, and our place in it. Understanding a 
proposition does not necessarily involve believing it (we can understand a proposition 
that we accept but don’t believe, or that we deny). However, accepting or believing a 
proposition probably presupposes that one understands at least in the most basic 
sense. There are various things that ‘understanding’ might mean: 
 
 Understanding-SM:  Comprehending the semantic meaning of a proposition. 
 Understanding-PM:  Comprehending the pragmatic meaning of an utterance. 
Understanding-C:  Comprehending the connection between a proposition or 
    utterance and a state of affairs.  
Understanding-WR:  Comprehending the connection between a wide range 
    propositions or utterances, or between various states of 
    affairs.  
 
To illustrate the difference between these types of understanding, take some 
examples. First, take an utterance of: ‘Please stand up’. I would understand this 
semantically in virtue of being familiar with the definition of each word involved and 
with the grammatical structure of these words. I might understand it pragmatically but 
not semantically if I can gather the desired result of the command despite not knowing 
the meaning of the words, for example, a non-English speaker might be said to have 
understood the command, in virtue of the fact that he heard the command and 
                                                 
9 Wynn, Emotional Experience and Religious Understanding, p. 101. 
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followed it, even if he did so because the tonality allowed him to infer it was a 
command and everyone around him stood up. We might call the combination of both 
of these types of understanding linguistic understanding. Now take the proposition 
‘God exists’. One understands this semantically if we know what the words mean, and 
pragmatically if we know what the expression is being used to do, and linguistically if 
we understand it in both of these ways. Linguistic understanding may well shift in a 
religious conversion for certain religious language, so that the linguistic meanings 
given to certain religious terms are different in various ways, ways which will vary 
with the religious tradition one converts to.  
 The other two types of understanding involve significance. We understand-C 
a proposition like ‘it is raining’ if we get that it is making an assertion about the 
world, and we understand-WR it if we get this, but also grasp its implications for our 
wider belief-set about the world, for instance that the ground will get wet and that 
there are clouds in the sky, and suchlike. We understand the significance of a 
proposition when we see it in its relation to other things, and as there can be almost 
limitless relations between a proposition and other things one can have progressively 
deeper and deeper understanding with each contemplation of new connections. A 
weatherman’s understanding of the proposition that it is raining is likely (unless you 
have a background in meteorology yourself) to be more extensive than yours or mine. 
For most people, the point at which further contemplation is no longer a useful way to 
spend time will occur before all connections have been explored, for some 
connections will be less significant or connect in more tenuous or less relevant ways. 
Likewise, those who spend time and effort contemplating religiosity (whether or not 
they have religious beliefs, feelings, or behaviours) are likely to have a deeper 
understanding of religion and religiosity than those who don’t. We may think of 
Mary, the star of the thought experiment in which we are asked to consider whether if 
Mary has spent her life in a black and white room studying everything about the 
nature of colour, she would gain new knowledge if she were to see colour for the first 
time.10 Depending on our response to this, we may see the difference between a 
student of religion and a participant in a religious life differently, or not. I would 
argue that there would be a difference in understanding. 
                                                 
10 Jackson, F., ‘Epiphenomenal Qualia’, Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 32, (1982), pp. 127–136. 
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 A difference in understanding involves a different arrangement of beliefs, or 
of the connections and relations between beliefs. In §2.3, we saw that intellectual 
arguments to religious conclusions are rarely convincing as they stand, even if they 
appear valid. In fact, using mere rational deliberation is a shaky guide, ‘because 
however much reason may try to weigh the various issues which seem relevant in 
choices of love, friendship, career, or any other life commitment, it may not see the 
real import of the information with which it is presented.’11 Emotion is a missing 
element, for instance, ‘in the case of musical appreciation, feeling is able to take us 
beyond a certain sensory input so as to pick out a reality that has yet to be fully 
revealed in sensory terms; and analogously, in the case of God, feeling is able to take 
us beyond a certain doxastic input, so as to relate us to a reality that has yet to be fully 
understood in doxastic terms.’12 So it is not merely a certain arrangement of beliefs 
that comprise understanding; emotions are necessary for full understanding. Consider 
this example offered by Wynn:  
  
 In crucial cases… repugnance is the emotional expression of a deep wisdom, 
 beyond reason’s power fully to articulate it. Can anyone really give an argument 
 fully adequate to the horror which is father-daughter incest (even with consent), or 
 … mutilating a corpse, or eating human flesh, or even just (just!) raping or 
 murdering another human being?’ [Kass, Leon, ‘The Wisdom of Repugnance’, 
 New Republic, Vol. 216, Iss. 22, (Feb., 1997). Kass’s italics.] In other words, the 
 full value significance of these various activities is not discernible from the 
 standpoint of discursive reason alone; the real meaning of such activities (the 
 ‘pattern’ that is presented by the ‘facts’) is evident in, and only in, the affectively 
 toned perception that is afforded in the response of repugnance.13  
 
This forcefully presents the involvement of both the cognitive aspect of belief in the 
wrongness of these things, and the felt experience of the wrongness of these things. If 
you truly understand that murder is repugnant, I would expect you to actually 
experience the emotion of repugnance. Sometimes there is a moral sense in which a 
feature of a situation or a quality of a person should be registered with a ‘resonance or 
                                                 
11 Wynn, Emotional Experience and Religious Understanding, p. 185. 
12 Ibid, p. 146. 
13 Wynn, Emotional Experience and Religious Understanding, p. 193. 
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importance that only emotional involvement can sustain’. 14  Therefore belief and 
emotions work together to lead to understanding, and religious conversion involves a 
shift, or a deepening of understanding of the religious sphere. According to Starkey, 
the reason that emotion can enable full understanding is that emotions affect our focus 
and the import of aspects of our experience, so our awareness of certain things is 
actually different when we are in different emotional states:  
 
an accompanying emotion may change the experience or state of awareness of the 
 event itself and as a result of this produce an understanding of the event that is not 
 possible without the emotion.15  
 
If you broke the news to someone you know that their loved one has died, you may 
reasonably expect them to linguistically understand you, but unless they have some 
emotional reaction, you may reasonably suspect that they don’t yet understand the 
significance of what you’ve said. In the absence of grief, we must either say that they 
don’t really understand what has happened, or perhaps that they didn’t really love 
them. This is true even if they are able to assert the proposition that their loved one is 
dead. They would merely have what James called ‘a cold and neutral state of 
intellectual perception.’16 Merely believing that a loved one has died, while this may 
involve linguistic understanding, and may involve to a certain extent understanding 
the significance, falls short of a full understanding. The suggestion here is that this 
link is conceptual – it makes no sense to talk of someone having loved a person for 
whom they feel no grief when they die. In this way, we might talk of that feeling of 
grief being a criterion of the value that the beloved had for the mourner. 
However, as we have seen in exploring the close interconnectedness of beliefs 
and emotions with action, I claim we need to supplement the account of 
understanding given so far. In addition to emotion, there is also a behavioural 
component that is necessary for full understanding. If you understand the repugnant 
nature of murder, I would reasonably expect you firstly, not to commit it, secondly, to 
recoil or intervene if you were witness to it, and also, to act in ways compatible with 
                                                 
14 Sherman, Nancy, The Fabric of Character: Aristotle’s Theory of Virtue, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
(1989), p. 47, as quoted in Wynn, Emotional Experience and Religious Understanding, p. 2.  
15 Starkey, p. 430. 
16 James, William, The Principles of Psychology, [1890], Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
(1981). 
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this understanding.17 If cognitive states were sufficient for understanding, including 
understanding the value that certain things have, many of our feelings and behaviours 
would be inexplicable. For instance, in The Odyssey, Odysseus chooses to leave a 
peaceful life of contentment and ‘perfection’ with Calypso, for the outwardly inferior 
Penelope. His feelings for Penelope and his actions in choosing her demonstrate that 
beliefs about her value are not sufficient for his understanding of her value. In loving 
Penelope over Calypso:  
 
[Odysseus] is also choosing the kind of life in which the emotions can help to 
 constitute certain values. […] the value which Penelope holds for him is not, it seems, 
 a matter of her outward qualities establishing her superiority over other women: as he 
 says to Calypso, she is ‘far beneath you in form and stature’. […] The value of 
 Penelope for Odysseus is in part constituted by his felt attachment to her: his feelings 
 mark her out as special in his life, and mean that she cannot easily be replaced.18  
 
We have already seen the link between emotions and full understanding, which is also 
exemplified in this story, for his understanding of Penelope’s worth is not intellectual, 
but feeling based. However, the story would make no narrative sense should we 
clearly see that he believes and feels the worth of Penelope as more significant to him 
than Calypso, and yet did not choose her. If his actions were unloving towards 
Penelope, if he did not spend his time with her instead of Calypso, and if he instead 
showed his affections to Calypso, this would make no sense – we would think that he 
didn’t really understand after all. Due to the close links between action and emotion 
and belief, embodied participation in certain activities will also contribute to full 
understanding, one that is not possible to achieve from an armchair. Thus we may add 
a final category to the typology of understanding, which we will call full 
understanding, which involves the previous forms of understanding but also a felt and 
lived response that is in line with this.   
 When we see understanding in the way outlined, we can see that 
understanding is something that we don’t gain all at once in a moment of 
apprehension, but is something that deepens and develops. There is often a need for 
                                                 
17 While there may be instances where a person might both find murder repugnant, and intentionally 
kill a person, this is likely to occur only in quite special circumstances, and I’d venture that we can say 
that where repugnance is the only emotional influence, the act of murder would be a marker of insanity.  
18 Wynn, Emotional Experience and Religious Understanding, p. 60. 
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appreciation of context, which can often only come once a pattern or series of events 
has been established. This implication is that understanding cannot be achieved 
immediately. There can of course be key moments. These can be key moments of the 
‘eureka’ type, where something clicks into place and a new belief changes the 
cognitive landscape in a significant way. These can also be of the affective type, 
where a strongly emotional (perhaps religious) experience causes a swift shift. This 
could also be of a practical type, where a significant behavioural event takes place, 
for example one ceases to be a spectator and begins actually to participate in a ritual 
or sacrament.  
 Full understanding is gained as a result of changes involving belief, emotion, 
and action, but depends not merely on these changes, but on the links between them, 
and the way they are ordered in relation to one another. Often full understanding 
comes not at the moment of a strong emotion or important event or new belief 
forming, but rather, once these have been reflected on and integrated into the life of 
the individual. Conversion involves a reflective reordering of the individual’s outlook, 
so that the changes undergone are incorporated into a new interpretative narrative of 
the subject’s life. Once the narrative of one’s life changes, one is likely to interpret 
future events, feelings, and beliefs in that new light, and this is where sustained 
change becomes possible, which is what genuine conversion looks like.  
One thing that tends to happen after a conversion is a retelling of one’s life 
story in terms of the transformative experience. One will re-interpret and attribute 
new significance to past life events in a way that makes sense in the new framework 
one has adopted. For example, I may have an encounter with a loved one that I don’t 
take to be significant at the time. However, if my beloved later dies, this same event 
will take on a new significance, that of ‘the last time I saw him’. Suddenly a parting 
gesture or phrase that held little meaning will gain importance for me – a harsh word 
that I may have ignored may now result in a heavy guilt, while a small kind word may 
become deeply comforting. This can transform the memory we have of the event, and 
how we relate it to other events. Until some later insight or event has occurred, (for 
example until after we are aware of the death of a loved one) we are simply unable to 
attribute the significance to that event that comes after that insight (for example the 
significance of being the last time the loved one was seen.) Some interpretations are 
only available from the perspective of hindsight – the significance of certain events 
can only be grasped retrospectively. This is exactly what we would expect given that 
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some emotions are to be understood not as states that occur at moments, but as 
processes that perdure.  
Conversion involves giving meaning (or new meaning) to one’s life, and 
emotions ‘may have a part to play in giving or recognising structure and meaning in 
human life.’19 The process can form a recognisable pattern, as in the case of grief, 
which involves different aspects that can occur in stages. Wittgenstein says that 
‘“Grief” describes a pattern which recurs, with different variations, in the weave of 
our life’. 20  According to Goldie, ‘[t]he pattern has certain features. It includes 
characteristic thoughts, judgments, feelings, imaginings, actions, expressive actions, 
habitual actions, and much else besides, unfolding over time, but none of which is 
essential at any particular time.’21 This is sometimes formalised within a religious 
tradition and plays an important part in a convert publicly demonstrating commitment 
to the new religion:  
 
A common method for publicly displaying commitment is the personal testimony, a 
narrative of the convert’s life before and after conversion. The testimony serves to 
reconstruct biographical information, integrating the convert’s and religious 
community’s story.22 
 
Having explored these crucial elements in the conversion process, I now turn to the 
question of the ethics of religious conversion, and to what extent conversion is a 
voluntary process. 
 
5.3. The ethics of religious conversion. 
 
In this section I evaluate the ethical status of religious conversion. I take it that actions 
and events are ethically evaluable in terms of being morally good (or permissible), or 
morally bad, and that the agents performing those actions or partaking in those events 
are evaluated as morally praiseworthy or blameworthy respectively. Where praise and 
blame are appropriate, so too are responsive acts of reward and punishment. When 
                                                 
19 Wynn, ‘Valuing the World – The Emotions as Data for the Philosophy of Religion’, p. 100.  
20 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, p. 174. 
21 Goldie, ‘Grief – A Narrative Account’, p. 125. 
22  Rambo, Lewis R., and Farhadian, Charles E., ‘Converting: Stages of Religious Change’, in 
Christopher Lamb and M. Darrol Bryant Eds. Religious Conversion: Contemporary Practices and 
Controversies, Cassell, (1999), p. 31. 
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asking whether some aspect of religious conversion is subject to ethical evaluation we 
are asking whether it might be morally bad or morally good (or permissible), and 
whether a person could be blameworthy or praiseworthy for their conversion, or lack 
thereof. The implications of the answer to this question are manifold, and have 
consequences for our view of our own religiosity and whether or not we are living 
good lives in this regard, as well as for how we understand the role of religion in the 
communities in which we live, not to mention more specific matters like the 
interpretation of scripture on the topics of salvation and damnation. 
I argue that whether religious conversion can be reasonably evaluated for its 
ethical status depends on whether or not it is voluntary. The argument is: 
 
(P1):  An agent P is ethically evaluable for an act/event x insofar as it is 
 legitimate to praise or blame P in respect to x. 
(P2):  It is legitimate to praise or blame P in respect to x only if P is 
 responsible for x.23 
(P3):  An agent P is responsible for act/event x iff P performs x 
 voluntarily.  
∴ (C4):  An agent P is ethically evaluable for an act/event x only if P performs 
 x voluntarily.24 
 
So if we are to hold someone morally accountable for, and respond with praise and 
blame for a religious conversion, we are doing so legitimately only if that person has 
done so voluntarily. I now address the question of whether religious conversion can 
be voluntary. 
 
5.3.1. The voluntariness of religious conversion. 
 
This section undertakes the task of arguing that religious conversion can be voluntary. 
James envisages the possibility of a voluntary conversion, when he discusses 
conversions of the volitional type. Volitional conversions are both conscious and 
voluntary, are usually gradual, and consist in ‘the building up, piece by piece, of a 
                                                 
23 This could be shortened to one premise: An agent P is ethically evaluable for an act/event x only if P 
is responsible for x. 
24 Something like these premises can be found in Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, [350BC], Penguin 
Classics, Trans. J.A.K. Thomson, (2004), Book III, Ch. 1. 
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new set of moral and spiritual habits.’25 My approach is to consider in turn each of the 
dimensions of religious conversion and ask how far each of them involves voluntary 
elements. With regard to the dimension of praxis, I claim that the behaviour we adopt 
is able to be voluntary and so we can be responsible for the relevant behaviour. With 
regard to the doxastic dimension I argue that forming religious beliefs is indirectly 
voluntary, meaning that while I may not be able to form a belief at will, I can choose 
to undertake activities that will make it more likely that such and such a belief will 
form. This level of voluntariness is sufficient for moral responsibility. Finally, with 
regard to the affective dimension of conversion, I shall offer an argument that claims 
that we can also be responsible for our emotions.  
If something is done voluntarily it is done as the result of choosing, deciding, 
intending or meaning to do it. If I intend to raise my arm and then successfully do so 
as a result of this intention, I raised my arm voluntarily. If I choose to eat fish for 
dinner and then order the fish as a result of this choice, I did so voluntarily. According 
to Aristotle, actions that are done under compelling conditions but are nevertheless 
enacted without force are still voluntary. Thus, if it turned out that Hitler only 
conducted himself the way he did because he was given a choice between that and 
something one hundred times worse, having made the choice that he did without 
external force, he would have still done so voluntarily.  
Involuntary actions can be of different kinds. Sometimes one might fail to 
carry out something that one intended, chose, or meant to carry out. For example, I 
may intend to raise my arm, attempt to do so, and fail because my arm is tied to a 
chair. In cases like this where there is some form of external compulsion we call the 
resulting act/event involuntary. If I am forced into some relevant act, for example, if I 
am physically dragged into a church, I am not responsible for this. We might view 
brainwashing as a kind of psychological force, in which case we could see people 
who convert as a result of indoctrination by brainwashing techniques as having done 
so involuntarily.  
Another case seems less straightforward: I may choose to eat fish because it is 
the healthy option, but when the waiter arrives and asks for my order my will might 
crumble and I may order a burger instead. This is an example of what Aristotle calls 
akrasia (weakness of will). However, in this and similar cases we might say that I did 
                                                 
25 James, p. 204. 
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not fully intend to choose the fish at the crucial moment, and if my first intention to 
order fish was genuine at all, then we must say that my mind changed at some point 
between then and the moment that I ordered the burger. Therefore the act of ordering 
a burger was under my voluntary control as it was a product of my intention at the 
time I ordered it. In cases where someone first intends to, for instance, attend church, 
but then suffers from akrasia and stays in bed instead, they are responsible for their 
non-attendance. If someone is aware that many people believe in God, and wants to 
look into this further to see if this is true, but instead spends their time on other things, 
they are responsible. 
Under conditions where I do not know what it is that I am doing, I am acting 
voluntarily if my ignorance is culpable. Ignorance is culpable whenever I could have 
easily found out, and should have tried to find out the fact that I am ignorant of. For 
example, if I were to administer an antibiotic to my friend who is allergic to penicillin 
because I didn’t read the label of the medication, I am responsible for the resulting 
allergic response, because I should have read the description on the label and could 
easily have done so. There are instances where our ignorance is inculpable. If for 
example I collect a safe antibiotic from a pharmacy, read the label, and administer a 
medicine according to the instructions, I would not be responsible if this has an 
adverse effect because a pharmacy error meant that penicillin was inside the 
mislabelled container. Here my ignorance would not be culpable because I could not 
reasonably have been expected to know that, nor would it have been reasonable for 
me to carry out tests on the medication or checks on the pharmacist. Part of what it 
means to be ignorant in relation to a certain action is to fail to recognise some of the 
descriptions that your actions fall under. In the current example, this might be to fail 
to recognise that your action falls under the description: ‘administer penicillin’. In a 
religious example, it might be that a person is aware that his action falls under the 
description ‘attends church’ but is unaware that his action falls under the description 
‘initiates religious conversion’. If one is aware of a religion but too lazy to read a 
religious text, talk about it, or engage in any religious practices, they are culpably 
ignorant, and may be held responsible for not converting. If on the other hand 
someone grows up in a community where no-one is religious, there is no access to 
outside communities that are religious, there are no materials or influences which 
would bring the existence of religion to this person’s attention, then this person would 
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be inculpably ignorant of the possibility of a religious life and as a result could not be 
held responsible for not converting. 
Some initial implications of this account of moral responsibility are as follows. 
If (assuming it is possible, which has yet to be shown) someone chooses, decides, 
intends, or means to convert, and then does so as a result of this, then they converted 
voluntarily. However, there are what we might call ‘excusing conditions’ which are 
conditions that exempt an agent from, or reduce responsibility. These include 
coercion or force, brainwashing, being under the age where one can exercise rational 
choice, or where one is inculpably ignorant and doesn’t fully realise what one is 
doing.  
To determine whether one can really be responsible for a religious conversion, 
we need to ask whether the elements involved in a religious conversion are or can be 
voluntary. In the following sections, I will consider in turn whether each of the 
dimensions of religious conversion, namely belief, behaviour, and emotion, can be 
voluntary. If all three dimensions can be voluntary, I shall take this as good support 
for the conclusion that religious conversion can be voluntary. However, I argue that 
there will also be support for this conclusion if even one of the dimensions can be 
established to be voluntary. I will make a distinction between direct and indirect 
voluntariness, and show that because the dimensions are interdependent in the way 
that my account has sketched, as long as at least one dimensions is directly voluntary, 
this can furnish the other dimensions with indirect voluntariness.  
 
5.3.2. The voluntariness and ethics of behaviour and of belief. 
 
The view that beliefs are not subject to voluntary control is called ‘doxastic 
involuntarism’ and this claims that forming religious beliefs can only occur 
involuntarily. On this alternative we do not have direct control over our beliefs, so one 
cannot, with an ‘inner mental straining or grunt of cognitive effort’,26 bring about the 
formation of religious beliefs. Doxastic involuntarism has an unwelcome consequence 
for traditions that posit a morally perfect God. Namely, if we assume doxastic 
involuntarism, an inconsistency arises for traditions where creedal assent is necessary 
for conversion, and conversion is necessary for salvation. The theological 
assumptions are that there is a perfectly good God, who awards salvation and 
                                                 
26 Cottingham, ‘Descartes and the Voluntariness of Belief’, p. 2. 
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damnation where this is morally appropriate. The non-theological assumption is that 
reward (salvation) and punishment (damnation) are only morally appropriate where 
the subject is responsible for what is being rewarded or punished. If doxastic 
involuntarism is true, ‘there can be people who cannot believe the salvation-relevant 
propositions’.27 Reasoning from the contrapositive of the maxim that ‘ought implies 
can’, Speak takes this to show that there can be people who do not have a moral 
obligation to believe the requisite doctrines, and so a perfectly good God could not 
punish them for this. Moreover, those who do believe the relevant propositions would 
likewise not be responsible for their belief, so God would be equally unable to reward 
these people with salvation while at the same time being perfectly good.28 Therefore 
one must dispense with at least one of the aforementioned assumptions and conclude 
either that one of the creedal propositions is false (which would undermine any 
religion to which they are necessary), or that doxastic involuntarism is false, or that 
the connection between voluntariness, responsibility, and praise/blame and 
reward/punishment are not as they have been expounded so far. 
 The opposing position is called ‘doxastic voluntarism’. If doxastic voluntarism 
is true, then our religious beliefs could be formed voluntarily, which would mean that 
someone could choose or decide to form a religious belief and could likewise choose 
not to and could resist forming the belief. On this view, one would be responsible for 
the beliefs that they hold, and so responsible for the religious beliefs they form as part 
of a conversion. Doxastic voluntarism is the position implicitly assumed in the New 
Testament which ‘is full of injunctions to believe, with the implication that this is a 
meritorious thing to do— which in turn implies it depends at least partly on the 
will.’29 It is also implicit in our use of certain expressions, for example ‘I refuse to 
believe it’.30 Cottingham points out that:  
 
 we plainly do have, uniquely among our fellow creatures on this planet, the power to 
 stand back from (given subsets of) the beliefs we ‘find’ ourselves having, and to 
                                                 
27 Speak, ‘Salvation without Belief’, p. 234. My emphasis. 
28 If Clifford’s principle is right, then not only would a good God not be able to punish an atheist for 
not believing, it would actually be wrong for an atheist to believe propositions unless they had 
sufficient evidence for them. A good God would therefore need to praise these atheists, and moreover, 
to blame any theist who had the ‘right’ beliefs but that were formed not to mention those theists on 
insufficient evidence. 
29 Cottingham, ‘Descartes and the Voluntariness of Belief’, p. 1. 
30 Although not in others, for example ‘seeing is believing’. 
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 inquire whether they are justified, with a view to modifying them in the light of 
 further evidence or comparison with other parts of our belief system.31 
 
This fact seems to suggest that whatever might bring it about that we come to have a 
certain belief (and even if this process happens without us deciding, or even being 
aware of it) we do have a certain amount of choice. 
 However, there is something highly unintuitive about the idea that we can 
simply decide to believe something. James asks: ‘Does it not seem preposterous on 
the very face of it to talk of our opinions being modifiable at will?’32 If we experiment 
with this ourselves we find that there are limits to our ability to form beliefs, and mere 
willing is not sufficient to bring about a belief. Look out of your window now, and try 
to believe that you are looking out at a cratered landscape on planet Mars. No matter 
how much you try (or what the stakes), the belief that you are on Mars will elude you. 
If it doesn’t, this is evidence not for doxastic voluntarism, but for a diagnosis that 
something is wrong with your belief forming mechanisms, as we think that beliefs 
need to be connected to reality in some suitable way, and the decision to believe is not 
a suitable way. Your inability to form this belief must show either that you are not 
really willing it, or that our beliefs do not respond to the will in the way that 
voluntarism seems to say. While it might be plausible to think that we weren’t really 
willing to believe that you are on Mars, I’m sure you can think of a situation (or 
potential reward) that would motivate you more strongly, but even in very clear cases 
where we strongly desire to believe something, it is still not clear we could bring the 
belief about by a ‘grunt of cognitive effort’.33 Instead, our experience is of belief 
formation just happening to us, irresistibly: ‘I do not, as it were, actively decide to 
perceive, or to believe, this or that; rather, the mechanisms of the mind do it for me.’34 
The kind of voluntarism sketched here is therefore highly implausible in light of our 
experience of belief formation. 
Given that the simple voluntarism claim cannot be reconciled with our 
inability to bring about beliefs at will, just like that, if we want to maintain a 
voluntarist position it will be necessary to qualify the simple claim in order to find a 
more plausible version. We can do this by utilising a distinction between things that 
                                                 
31 Ibid, p. 4. 
32 James, ‘The Will to Believe’, p. 4. 
33 Cottingham, ‘Descartes and the Voluntariness of Belief’, p. 2.  
34 Ibid, p. 3. 
  166 
are directly voluntary, and things that are indirectly voluntary. Things that are directly 
voluntary are things I can do without needing to perform any intermediary voluntarily 
action, so my will can act on that thing directly. I cannot directly control my heart 
rate. That is, I cannot decide for it to go faster or slower and have it respond to this 
will.35 However, I can slightly slow my heart rate by voluntarily staying still and 
voluntarily slowing my breathing rate, and I can increase it by voluntarily physically 
exerting myself. My will has not acted directly on my heart muscle in the way it 
might act on my arm muscle (which I can intentionally lift without having to perform 
a voluntary intermediate act36). Nevertheless, I did act in a voluntary way that had the 
known and intended result that my heart rate slowed. In this case it is (arguably) 
legitimate to claim that I have voluntarily slowed my heart, in the indirect sense. 
However, most of the time, the heart rate is still involuntary. So rather than two 
options, ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’, I propose that there are three: 
 
Directly voluntary:  If an action, A, occurs as a direct response to the will, 
   then A is directly voluntary. 
Involuntary:   If an action, A, is not a direct response to the will, and 
   has not been brought about as the intended consequence 
   of any other action that is directly voluntary, then A is 
   involuntary. 
Indirectly voluntary:  If an action, A, can be brought about by another action, 
 B, where A is an intended consequence of B, and where 
 B is directly voluntary, then A is indirectly voluntary. If 
 B is also indirectly voluntary, but is the consequence of 
 another action, C, where C is directly voluntary and A is 
an intended consequence of C, then A is indirectly 
voluntary. This chain can be extended to any length as 
long as it culminates in a directly voluntary action, and 
                                                 
35 Having said this, there are reports that some yogis have been able to slow their heart rate by the 
powers of their concentration and attention alone, almost to a stop, and then can increase it again at 
will. This occurrence, if genuine, doesn’t undermine my general point that for most people, heart rate is 
not under voluntary control in the direct sense. 
36 Although there may be other involuntary intermediaries involved on a biological level, this does not 
affect the conclusion here as long as we are aware of the fact that the voluntary act will have the 
consequence of effecting the slow in heart rate. 
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as long as A is an intended consequence of the directly 
voluntary action. 
 
In §2.3 I wrote that that there are various routes to belief formation, and one such 
source is through having certain experiences, which can be sought out by behaving in 
certain ways. I also argued in §4.2 that engaging in certain behaviour leads to belief 
formation too. Pascal’s interlocutor in Pensées asks ‘I am not released, and am so 
made that I cannot believe. What, then, would you have me do?’37 His reply is that 
one should act in the ways that religious people do, to act as though they do believe, 
and by participating in religious activities like going to church, taking holy water, and 
having masses said, to bring about the desired belief: 
 
You would like to attain faith and do not know the way; you would like to cure 
yourself of unbelief and ask the remedy for it. Learn of those who have been bound 
like you, and who now stake all their possessions. These are people who know the 
way which you would follow, and who are cured of an ill of which you would be 
cured. Follow the way by which they began; by acting as if they believed, taking the 
holy water, having masses said, etc.38 
 
Pascal thus prescribes religious practice for those who think it would be in their 
interest to believe in God, but nonetheless find themselves unable to bring about the 
belief simply by an act of will, which implies that it is in their power is to engage in 
activities that make belief formation more likely. 
 If behaviour is voluntary, then the beliefs that form as a result of the 
experiences the behaviour leads us to have will be indirectly voluntary. Behaviour is 
widely held to be voluntary whenever it is free from external constraint. So most of 
the things I do, will count as voluntary, unless they are brought about by the agency of 
another person, (they physically restrain me) by the laws of nature (I fall downwards) 
or by an unconscious mechanism (my heart beats). One objection to this would arise 
on the assumption that the universe is determined by the state of the present moment 
plus the laws of nature. This kind of determinism threatens to undermine the notion of 
voluntariness completely. Whether this determinist thesis is correct or not is beyond 
                                                 
37 Pascal, Pensées, p. 233. 
38 Ibid. 
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the scope of this work, and while cutting edge physics seems to favour the thesis that 
there is room on a quantum level for ‘chaos’ and that therefore the determinist is 
wrong, this cannot be deemed conclusive.39 However, if we assume that determinism 
is correct, does this imply that there is no meaningful application for the term 
‘voluntary’? I think that it would be both an unnecessary and unwelcome result if 
determinism led to the more radical claim that we should embark on a wide scale 
revision of our language to remove all talk of ‘freedom’, ‘choice’, and ‘voluntariness’, 
and by extension most moral discourse, and much else besides. Even if determinism is 
true, these terms distinguish markedly different things – even if all action is 
involuntary in some sense, there is still a relevant difference between an action that I 
seem to do voluntarily, and one that I am forced into by another agent. I will therefore 
continue to use these terms and assume that they have moral relevance (whatever that 
consists in at the meta-ethical level) whether or not determinism is actually true. 
Given that behaviour can count as voluntary, and can lead to belief formation, we can 
now say that some beliefs can indirectly voluntarily be formed.  
 This is not to say that all beliefs are formed indirectly voluntarily – some beliefs 
will still form automatically and so will count as involuntary. Yet, those automatic 
beliefs could be influenced by our behaviour. For instance, while an atheist may not 
be able to believe other than he does under his current circumstances, he could seek 
further evidence that might lead to his belief. The role of the will in this case concerns 
‘what Descartes called the directio ingenii—the voluntary and autonomous decision 
to direct the mind in ways which will allow its natural rational powers to operate 
properly and productively.’40 Thus, while we can only form the belief that it is not 
raining (and not that it is) when we look outside and see a sunny dry day, we can 
refuse to look out of the window, research weather data to find out the probability that 
it is raining at this time of year, and canvass for testimony from those who think that it 
is raining. This would have more chance of bringing about the formation of the belief 
that is raining than merely intending to form it while gazing at the clear blue sky 
would. While I cannot possibly form a belief about who was King of England in 1200 
AD under my current circumstances, if I decided to I could look for information 
                                                 
39 Hoefer, Carl, ‘Causal Determinism’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (Fall 2015 Edition), 
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL =  
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entries/determinism-causal/>. 
40 Cottingham, ‘Descartes and the Voluntariness of Belief’, p. 7. See also Cottingham, John, ‘Cartesian 
Autonomy’, in J. Cottingham and P. Hacker (eds.) Mind, Morality and Method, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, (2010), Ch. 8. 
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concerning this fact, and then I might come to form a belief on the matter. While we 
have control over what we focus on, which propositions we keep in mind, and what 
evidence we seek, we do have some form of control over the beliefs that resultantly 
form.41 Williams argues that this picture would not count as deciding to believe, but 
simply deciding to expose oneself to evidence that may in turn ‘by a route’ lead one to 
believe something, which is true, but need not count against one’s responsibility for 
the result.42 Therefore, ‘the problem is not that people choose to hold beliefs to which 
they know they are not entitled - choosing to believe against reason - but that they 
choose not to (or do not choose to) submit themselves to the conditions in which 
otherwise cherished beliefs might be challenged.’43 
So far I have concluded that belief formation is indirectly voluntary if 
behaviour leading to belief formation is voluntary, and that such behaviour can be 
voluntary. Therefore whenever it is under our voluntary control to act in ways that 
would bring about the beliefs involved in religious conversion, these beliefs are 
indirectly voluntary. As long as indirect voluntariness is sufficient for moral 
responsibility, we are morally responsible for certain beliefs. I now turn to the 
question of whether we can be responsible for things that are indirectly voluntary. 
Responsibility is transitive, meaning that if I am responsible for act A, and act 
A leads directly to act B which is not voluntary and which was not performed under 
inculpable ignorance, I am also responsible for B.44 I call the responsibility we have 
for B derivative responsibility. One might claim that not all of our actions are 
voluntary that contribute to a religious conversion. But the transitivity of 
responsibility means that for someone to be responsible for a religious conversion, 
they don’t need to be directly responsible for every act involved. We might be held 
derivatively responsible for what evidence we expose ourselves to, and be 
blameworthy ‘when we fail to attend, or relax the attention, letting the relevant 
propositions slip out of focus.’45 In some cases our lack of exposure to the evidence 
will not be blameworthy – for example, my lack of exposure to the evidence relevant 
to who shot JFK is not my fault: for one thing, it is kept secret and is not within 
reasonable reach, and for another, I cannot be expected to direct my expertise to every 
                                                 
41 Cf. Cottingham, ‘Descartes and the Voluntariness of Belief’, p. 7-8. 
42 Williams, ‘Deciding to Believe’, p. 148. 
43 Amesbury, ‘The Virtues of Belief – Towards a Non-Evidentialist Ethics of Belief-Formation’, p. 35. 
44 Cf. Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, Book III, Ch. 1.  
45 Cottingham, ‘Descartes and the Voluntariness of Belief’, p. 11. 
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discipline or every question that comes before me.46 For someone living in a non-
religious society or in isolation, they may be inculpably ignorant of the possibility of a 
formal religiosity, and would therefore not be responsible, while someone who is 
wilfully ignorant of, or aware of but uninterested in religion, is (whatever the truth of 
various religious claims) derivatively responsible for their belief or disbelief. The 
conclusion is that beliefs are able to be indirectly voluntary, and therefore we may 
under some circumstances have derivative responsibility for holding them.  
Amesbury points out that ‘This moral dimension is a result of the fact that 
belief is not a purely private matter, or one that can be partitioned off from other 
aspects of life: one's beliefs have consequences for others, as well as for oneself.’47 It 
is worth noting that our responsibility for beliefs is linked to the responsibility that we 
have for our behaviour because beliefs motivate behaviour. Kant highlighted the 
significance of motive in his ethics, by showing that there is a moral difference 
between two actions of the same type but where one has a bad motive. Thus which 
beliefs we hold, and the grounds on which we hold them, are ethically evaluable, and 
also contribute to the ethical evaluation of those things we base on them.  
 
5.3.2. The voluntariness and ethics of emotion. 
 
The question about the voluntariness of beliefs is linked to the question of the 
voluntariness of emotion because some beliefs (as we saw in §3.2) are influenced by 
emotions. In §3.2 it was argued that self-deceptive beliefs are those formed under the 
influence of emotion, so the thought might be that while we can be held directly 
responsible for our intentions, we cannot be so held for our emotions and desires, and 
therefore self-deceptive beliefs must be removed from the realm of moral evaluation. 
If emotions can be construed so that we are responsible for them, this consequence is 
avoided, while if emotions are involuntary then we must accept that beliefs that form 
as a result of strong emotion are not our responsibility either. Lazar admits that ‘[t]he 
assignment of a central role to emotions in the formation of self-deceptive beliefs is 
largely incompatible with the view of self-deception as an action. Emotions do not 
affect one's view of the world through deliberation: they do so immediately and in a 
                                                 
46 This would not hold if I were the chief investigator of that police file, however.  
47 Amesbury, ‘The Virtues of Belief – Towards a Non-Evidentialist Ethics of Belief-Formation’, p. 27. 
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way that, to a high degree, is not subject to our control.’48 This is an unwelcome 
consequence because we ordinarily see self-deception as a vice, and we do hold 
people responsible for their self-deceived beliefs as well as their ordinary ones, as this 
account shows: 
 
On a warm evening in May 2003, approximately 100 undocumented immigrants were 
loaded into a refrigeration tractor-trailer in south Texas: the driver had been paid 
$7,500 to smuggle his human cargo past a U.S. Border Patrol checkpoint. But 
temperatures began to rise inside the sealed trailer, and humidity quickly reached 100 
percent - the point at which the human body can no longer cool itself by perspiring 
and begins to overheat. By the time the driver stopped and unlocked the trailer, 17 
passengers were dead, and another two expired after being taken to a nearby hospital. 
Prosecutors argued that the driver “ignored screaming and banging from inside the 
trailer,” but his defense attorney “said his client did not know how many people were 
inside,” and that “the pleas for help were in Spanish,” which the driver did not 
understand (Rice and George 2006, p. 1). He simply did not believe that anything was 
wrong and so - it was claimed - bore no responsibility for the deaths of his 
passengers. […] In December 2006, the driver of the tractor-trailer was convicted on 
58 federal smuggling counts, and in January 2007 he was sentenced to life in prison. 
The jury concluded that if he was in fact ignorant of the plight of his passengers, he 
was culpably so. Believing that everything was alright did not excuse him of 
responsibility for what happened, because the beliefs on which he acted (or which 
nourished his inaction) - even if sincere - were not ones to which he was rationally 
entitled.49 
 
One might imagine that emotions of greed and self-interest were in play, in place of 
concern and compassion, which (no matter what the language) might more 
appropriate be elicited by screams and cries. And yet this does not alleviate his 
responsibility, or except him from punishment.  
 We make the accountability in the example more explicable by claiming that 
self-deceptive beliefs formed under the influence of vicious emotions are 
blameworthy in that one is responsible for the vice - this implies that our emotions are 
                                                 
48 Lazar, ‘Deceiving Oneself or Self-Deceived?’ p. 282. 
49 Amesbury, ‘The Virtues of Belief – Towards a Non-Evidentialist Ethics of Belief-Formation’, pp. 
25-6. The reference here is to Rice, H. & George, C. ‘Fatal smuggling trial halted after Washington 
takes ill.’ Houston Chronicle, 6, (Dec. 2006). 
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directly or indirectly voluntary. I argue that an episode of self-deception is not 
voluntary in the sense of being deliberate or intentional, but it is not involuntary 
either: emotions are indirectly voluntary, and so we have derivative responsibility for 
them. When our emotions lead to self-deceptive beliefs, and indeed, when our 
emotions motivate morally questionable behaviour, we should temper ourselves 
better.  
 One might claim that in order to be responsible for a mechanism, it needs to be 
responsive to reasons, and if one cannot be aware of this mechanism, it cannot be 
responsive to reasons; therefore one is not responsible for this mechanism. Given that 
we are not aware of how our emotions arise, we are not responsible for them. 
However, moral responsibility for an emotion comes about in cases where the 
emotion was avoidable, and it is not required that it was also intentional. Our 
emotional reactions and dispositions do change, but the question is whether all such 
changes are involuntary, that is, whether the avoidance is something we have some 
degree of control over. It seems as though our emotional dispositions can change as 
the result of changing our behavioural habits, and, as this can be voluntary, if this 
were true then emotion would be indirectly voluntary. Augustine writes that 
‘disordered lust springs from a perverted will; when lust is pandered to, a habit is 
formed; when habit is not checked, it hardens into compulsion.’ 50  When we 
experience emotion, it is under our voluntary control whether or not we act on it, or 
form beliefs while under this influence. We can (if we notice that we are emotional) 
think more carefully, or refrain from certain things until one is feeling less emotional. 
Perhaps by the time one has lost one’s temper or fallen into a pit of despair, one no 
longer has the requisite self-awareness. However, controlling one’s temper, and 
conducting oneself in ways that avoid despair (doing some exercise, talking to a 
friend, dividing goals into smaller tasks, or whatever might achieve this) are 
possible.51 Moreover, avoiding things that make us highly emotional (for instance, 
excessive drinking and tiredness) and cultivating things that make us more 
                                                 
50 Augustine, Confessions, p. 192. 
51 ‘[James Gross] found that whereas suppressing feelings is difficult and costly, people could more 
easily dampen emotion by reinterpreting events in a way that kept feelings from developing. The 
mentally taxing nature of emotional suppression was found to reduce people’s ability to remember the 
film they had watched, whereas reinterpreting it did not hamper memory. The fact that cognitive 
reinterpretation can change and hence dampen emotion is also evident at the neurological level. In 
brain imaging studies, benign reinterpretations of otherwise disturbing pictures were found to 
successfully reduce amygdala activity’ Clore, p. 332. 
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emotionally stable (for instance, regular exercise and meditation) are also within our 
direct voluntary control, making our resultant states (unless, as is sometimes probably 
the case, we are inculpably ignorant of the ways that our behaviour makes us feel) our 
derivative responsibility.  
 There is another response, highlighted by Rorty, which may be more useful in 
practical terms, especially in cases where the self-deception is entrenched and the 
personality defects that perpetuate it are particularly ingrained.52 This is that while we 
may not be in a good position to notice our self-deception, our friends, especially as 
they do not have the same emotional connections to the objects of our self-deceptive 
beliefs, often are. The counsel that we keep, our receptivity to observations and 
criticisms from others, our openness to others, and our choices about whether or not to 
spend our time with the morally corrupt or the morally good people of the world is to 
at least some extent, under our control. Thus (according to Amesbury) what self-
deceivers can be held responsible for (among other things) is keeping one’s own 
counsel, rather than appealing to the input of others.53 To avoid self-deception one 
needs ‘a deeper, more perspicacious self-understanding, a clear-sighted view of his 
own motives and interests and how they cloud his judgment.’54 Amesbury says it 
well:   
 
[E]thical belief has largely been assumed to be something that can be achieved in 
isolation. The problem with this, as we have seen, is that one can be blind to the 
biases in one’s own thinking. Thus, the injunction against beliefs to which one is not 
entitled often amounts to a command to pull oneself up by one's bootstraps – to 
examine oneself as if from the perspective of an outside observer. But while it is not 
possible to adopt a third-person perspective on one's own thinking, it is nevertheless 
possible to subject one's thinking to external critique. Others may be able to detect 
flaws in our thinking that we are unaware of, even though it is safe to assume that 
none of us is free from bias altogether.55 
 
This is especially interesting in light of the fact that a significant factor in the 
longevity of religious conversions (i.e. whether there is a backsliding after a 
                                                 
52 Rorty, Amelie, ‘User-Friendly Self-Deception’, Philosophy, Vol. 69, (1994), pp. 211–228. 
53 Amesbury, ‘The Virtues of Belief – Towards a Non-Evidentialist Ethics of Belief-Formation’, p. 36. 
54 Ibid, p. 35. 
55 Ibid, p. 36. 
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conversion and if so, how quickly) is whether the person integrates and is accepted 
into a religious community. Often, a person will have a conversion and become part 
of a religious community, and in these cases the counsel that they keep will be more 
likely to validate and support the continuation of religious beliefs. It is not contentious 
to claim that a person is going to be more doubtful, more thorough in their checks, 
and more likely to come into contact with and consider contrary evidence, if 
surrounded by militant atheists, than if people who also hold religious beliefs 
surround them. In the latter case, there is the possibility of ‘collective self-deception’ 
where members of a group (a jury, a company, or a religious sect) are all self-
deceived about the same thing for similar reasons, and then members of the collective 
mutually reinforce the self-deception. Self-deceptive beliefs are pervasive and take a 
life-long effort towards self-knowledge and moral improvement to avoid. Emotions 
have the quality of appearing to arise without our permission or intention; however, in 
so far as they are dispositional, we can affect both the quality and intensity of our 
emotions by modifying our behaviour.  
Emotion is not merely evaluable in ethical terms; it is necessary in the moral 
domain. The Aristotelian idea of virtue as the appropriate amount of the appropriate 
emotion in the right circumstances highlights the necessity of emotion in ethics:  
 
[H]aving the appropriate religious virtues would involve having the appropriate 
emotional dispositions so that one would not be able to act or think virtuously without 
having the right feelings, towards the right objects, at the right time, and so on. And 
without the virtues one would not be able to lead a good life; so emotional 
engagement wouldn’t merely be an optional extra but a necessary part of what it is to 
lead a good religious life.56 
 
In a case where two people perform the same action, and the consequences of the 
actions are the same in each case; it is not necessarily the case that they are both 
equally morally worthy. Experiencing certain emotions is morally relevant. It is 
virtuous to experience compassion in the face of affliction, and righteous anger in the 
face of the wrong actions of others. If people act completely without feeling, they are 
classed as psychopathic. As a thought experiment, take a psychopath, Fred, and his 
psychologically healthy twin, Frank. Fred and Frank both give to charity, but while 
                                                 
56 Goldie, ‘Intellectual Emotions and Religious Emotions’, p. 101. 
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Fred does this unfeelingly because he has copied this behaviour from others in order 
to appear to fit in, Frank is motivated by a sense of compassion. Are these two equally 
good? Without the appropriate feeling, something important is missing. For example, 
in the absence of a feeling of respect for the humanity of another person, something is 
missing in Fred, even if he acknowledges the humanity of others in an intellectual 
way: ‘moral understanding, at its deepest and most effective in action, may be lodged 
in our felt responses to others (how we think of them ‘in our hearts’), rather than in 
some more discursive account of their significance.’57 A more radical claim is that ‘it 
may be that our felt responses offer our only mode of access to certain values’.58 
 The account sketched has shown that religious conversion can be indirectly 
voluntary, which means that we have derivative responsibility for the state of our own 
religiosity, and that whether or not we convert is of moral significance. Adams says 
that:  
 
 The deepest reason for accepting this responsibility […] is that it is rightly ours. It is 
 important for a correct ethical appreciation of one’s own life. To refuse to take 
 responsibility for one’s emotions and motives is to be inappropriately alienated from 
 one’s own emotional and appetitive faculties. But we are also interested here in 
 another reason for accepting responsibility for our states of mind-namely, that it is 
 useful for moral improvement to do so.59  
 
The idea of moral improvement is the final aspect of religious conversion I shall 
discuss in the present work. 
 
5.4. Religious conversion as a moral change. 
 
Religious conversion has many dimensions, which we’ve explored individually and in 
their interactions. We have also, in the current chapter, explored a view on which the 
integration of all three dimensions allows for a conception of religious conversion as a 
shift in religious understanding. In this section I’ll explore the quality of this shift as it 
manifests itself in the lived experience of the convert and of those with whom the 
covert comes into contact. James claims that the mark of a true convert has to do with 
                                                 
57 Wynn, Emotional Experience and Religious Understanding, p. 31. 
58 Ibid, p. 9. Emphasis added. 
59 Adams, Robert Merrihew, ‘Involuntary Sins’, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 94, No. 1, (Jan., 
1985), p. 16. 
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the quality (rather than, for instance, the duration or the origin or causal explanation) 
of the change that occurs in conversion. He thinks that the question of what impact 
conversion has on the life of the convert, more specifically, the moral change that this 
brings about in his life, is more important than the question of whether the change was 
brought about by some kind of divine providential intervention. James argues more 
generally against the view that ‘the worth of a thing can be decided by its origin.’60 To 
apply this to conversion, it follows that whether the conversion originates in divine 
action of some kind is not of primary importance. The worth conversions should be 
deemed as having, resides in their ability to improve the lives of the converts.61  
 There won’t be any specific criterion, in terms of any aspect of morality, that 
will allow the differentiation of converts from non-converts. This is partly because a 
moral improvement may look very different depending on the starting point of the 
individual. There might be converts who have made a terrific improvement and 
greatly increased the quality of their moral lives, but who are nevertheless more 
despicable than another person who has always been pious and had no conversion. 
James says that ‘[i]f we roughly arrange human beings in classes, each class standing 
for a grade of spiritual excellence, I believe we shall find natural men and converts 
both sudden and gradual in all the classes.’62  
 It will also be difficult to use the idea of ‘moral change’ to distinguish 
converts from non-converts because of the subtlety of the balance and ordering of 
both doxastic, affective, and practical aspects of morality. Morality involves each of 
the same dimensions as religiosity. We have seen that there is an ethics of belief, and 
of emotion, and most obviously, of behaviour. When Kant’s shopkeeper gives his 
customer correct change, this is ethical at the behavioural level. However, if the 
shopkeeper is resentful, it is not ethical at the emotional level. If the shopkeeper 
believes that giving the right change is worthwhile only because if he failed to do so 
he might harm his reputation, and if he doesn’t believe that honesty is intrinsically 
valuable, then we might question the morality of his beliefs.  
                                                 
60 James, p. 233. 
61 James references Professor Leuba, who ‘subordinates the theological aspect of the religious life 
almost entirely to its moral aspect.’ (Professor Leuba, ‘Studies in the Psychology of Religious 
Phenomena’, American Journal of Psychology, vii. 309 (1896)) ‘In much of Prof. Leuba’s empirical 
research there is little doctrinal theology involved in the conversion process, and in some cases (as 
recorded) there seem to be no theological beliefs involved at all – the change is purely ethical’ (James, 
p. 201). 
62 James, p. 235. 
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 Sometimes a moral change may occur in only one of these dimensions. When 
my sister was younger, she went to church in order to be a good daughter, never 
feeling what the other churchgoers felt or having any religious beliefs, but merely 
turning up and singing the hymns. She prayed at the dinner table when she was a 
guest at a home when it was the ‘done thing’. She gave to charity because she 
believed in the good work done and that it was her social obligation to contribute to 
that work, and she was kind to strangers. Then she had a religious conversion, and she 
still attends church, prays, gives to charity and is kind to strangers. Viewing the 
behaviour she adopts, she is still doing the same things at the physical or behavioural 
level, so it may appear that nothing has changed. While her charitable or kind actions 
would be described as good or right before the conversion, this picture is incomplete, 
and there is room for a fuller or deeper or more integrated state. Whereas she used to 
attend church and sing the hymns, since her conversion she feels like she belongs 
there, and she feels stirred by the music that she sings. The words have taken on a new 
significance, and she has different beliefs about her participation. Likewise, she has 
different beliefs about her prayers, and she is more sincere and emotionally engaged 
when she makes them. She still gives to charity, but now there is a stronger sense of 
moral obligation, a new sense of compassion for those she helps, and also new beliefs 
relating to it. Her kindness to strangers is now underpinned by a deeply felt 
connection between herself and all of humanity under God, as though the worth of all 
people is now felt in a way that it wasn’t before, when it was perhaps merely 
understood intellectually. So while we may say that she was a good person prior to 
her conversion, these added dimensions still constitute a significant moral change, and 
we can say of her that her moral life is richer and deeper because it encompasses these 
added dimensions. To get a full picture of the quality of the moral life of an individual 
we therefore need to consider each dimension and how they look when viewed 
together, with their many points of interaction. 
 I have already shown that there is an ethics of belief, an ethics of emotion, and 
an ethics of action. Given that these are dimensions of religious conversion, there is 
too an ethics of religious conversion, meaning that we can evaluate conversions on 
moral grounds. It may appear as though this reasoning commits a composition fallacy. 
This would be the case if we were equivocating over the term ‘ethics’ so that the 
premises that each dimension has an ‘ethics’ would not validly entail the conclusion 
that conversion has an ‘ethics’. However, as long as we construe ‘ethics’ in the latter 
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case with a wide enough scope, so as to encompass the more specific uses in each 
premise, it is a legitimate claim that if the conversion process involves several other 
processes which we can evaluate ethically, then we can evaluate conversion ethically 
by compounding our evaluations of each of those processes that comprise it.  
  In my discussion of the ethics of belief I concluded that a belief was ethical if 
it was morally justified, which is the case whenever it is either epistemically justified 
(meaning based upon sufficient evidence) or is a genuine option (meaning that it is 
live, forced, and momentous).63 I claimed that emotions are morally justified if they 
are appropriate, which meant reasonable and proportionate given the stimulus. 64 
Actions are justified when they accord with what is morally right. What this turns out 
to be will depend on the meta-ethical and normative views that turn out to be true, but 
on a practical level there is an extensive consensus between most views about the 
rightness and wrongness of most actions. While this is very vague, our intuitive ideas 
of right and wrong will allow us to gauge whether there has been a moral 
improvement when we see all the actions of a particular agent. So we can say that a 
conversion will be morally justified when the beliefs, emotions, and actions are 
morally justified.  
 
5.5. Concluding remarks. 
 
This chapter has outlined my model of religious conversion, and established an 
important implication of this research: by showing that religious conversion can be 
undertaken voluntarily, I concluded that religious conversion is a process for which an 
individual can be responsible, and we can therefore see religious conversion as a 
moral issue. We can usefully see religious conversion as both a shift in one’s full 
understanding of the world, and also as moral change. Full understanding is a state 
reached through integration of one’s beliefs, emotions, and actions, and when these 
aspects all align with respect to religious understanding, one may achieve a full (or at 
least fuller) religious understanding, which we would expect to be part of a religious 
conversion. Moral change can occur when the moral status of any of the three 
dimensions changes. 
  
                                                 
63 In §2.4.1. 
64 In §3.4.  
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CONCLUSION  
 
This thesis has shown the areas of uncertainty and complexity involved in the concept 
of religious conversion and has also shown many points of contact between religious 
conversion and other core questions in philosophy. I have touched on epistemology, 
philosophy of language, of mind and of psychology, philosophy of emotion and 
action, and moral philosophy. This broad approach is necessitated by the breadth of 
the subject matter. It is my hope that the many connections to other areas of 
philosophy may spark interest and further research in such a way as to further 
illuminate, and also to challenge and improve upon, the account here offered.  
 In Chapter One I elucidated some of the difficulties presented by trying to get 
a solid and definitive grasp of what we mean when we ask what ‘religious conversion’ 
is, and concluded that the terms involved are both vague and context sensitive. The 
lesson here was that we should be as clear as possible in communication to specify 
pertinent aspects of the context (for example be clear about which tradition’s ‘God’ 
we are discussing); but that for many purposes, the rough and ready intuitions and 
judgements we all have as part of a linguistic community will suffice. I also proposed 
a model on which there is an interesting analogy between scientific revolution and 
religious conversion.1 The conclusion of this chapter proposed a model of religious 
conversion on which it involves different dimensions, working in interaction. 
 In Chapters Two, Three, and Four, I explored the role of beliefs, emotions, and 
behaviour respectively. Each of these involved consideration of the nature of these 
aspects, and the role that these aspects play in conversion, as well as the interactions 
between them. I gave special consideration to the role of religious experience in belief 
formation, as I argued that experience is a more foundational mechanism for belief 
formation given that testimony is the delivery of a second hand belief derived from 
experience, and that in both the direct and indirect forms of belief formation via 
analytic methods, the premises that arguments are based upon are themselves 
ultimately grounded in experience (or if not, are only capable of proving analytic 
truths).  
                                                 
1  Cottingham in ‘Religious Conversion as Moral Change’ presents a model on which religious 
conversion is analogous to psychoanalysis, which also has interesting illuminations to offer.  
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 The discussion led to an appraisal of what conditions might lead one to rule 
out religious experiences being accepted as justified, although it was recognised that 
the beliefs might gain justification in different ways, or via different mechanisms. 
Specifically, I outlined three ways in which something can be justified: epistemically; 
pragmatically; and morally. Additionally, beliefs can gain justification in part through 
emotions, so the question of religious experience broadens from simply discussing the 
way that beliefs may or may not meet epistemic standards for justification, to the way 
that beliefs and emotions may or may not meet any kind of justification.  
 The emotions can be assessed in terms of rationality, and they influence belief 
formation. The interaction between belief and emotion gave rise to a discussion of 
self-deception, and it turned out that some (but not all) religious beliefs are self-
deceptive due to the influence of the emotion separating the belief from the evidence. 
However, if the emotions which drive the self-deceptive beliefs are themselves 
rational, their influence on belief formation might be seen as a pragmatically useful 
tool, and have a legitimate place in the rational functioning of an agent. Therefore, 
given that religious experiences involve strong emotions, this influence will be 
capable in theory of bestowing additional justification on the resulting beliefs where 
certain conditions are met.  
 Discussion of the interactions between praxis and the doxastic and affective 
dimensions took the form of a consideration of the role of belief and emotion in 
action. I concluded that both belief and emotion are involved in behaviour, and that 
our behaviour influences both emotions and belief. The interactions formed the basis 
of my account of the dynamics of religious conversion, which I likened to a spiral, 
and I gave a typology of ways in which particular sequences of affect can be 
dominant or prior in some conversions. Although most conversions will be a mixture 
of these types, there may nevertheless be value in classifying conversions according 
to their emphasis and weight.  
 To summarise some of the aforementioned conclusions and fill in some gaps 
to gain a fuller picture: 
 
(1) A belief, B, is epistemically justified iff B is based upon sufficient 
 evidence. 
(2) A belief, B, is morally justified iff B is either epistemically justified or 
 is a genuine option. 
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(3) A belief, B, is pragmatically justified iff the belief is a hinge belief and 
 that belief leads to overall better consequences than the non-adoption 
 of that belief or than the adoption of the negation of that belief. 
(4) An emotion, E, is epistemically justified iff E has as a component a 
 belief, B, and B is justified. 
(5) An emotion, E, is morally justified iff E is appropriate and 
 proportionate given the stimulus. 
(6) An emotion, E, is pragmatically justified iff E is able to affect better 
 overall consequences than would be possible without E. 
(7) An action, A, is epistemically justified iff the beliefs connected to that 
 action are justified. 
(8) An action, A, is morally justified iff that action accords with what is 
 morally right. 
(9) An action, A, is pragmatically justified iff in situation S if that action 
 leads to overall better consequences than the non-performance of that 
 action.  
(10) A conversion, C, is epistemically justified iff the beliefs, emotions, and 
 behaviours are epistemically justified. 
(11) A conversion, C, is morally justified iff the relevant beliefs, emotions, 
 and behaviours are morally justified. 
(12) A conversion, C, is pragmatically justified iff the relevant beliefs, 
 emotions, and behaviours are pragmatically justified. 
(13) A conversion, C, is justified iff the relevant beliefs, emotions, and 
 behaviours are either epistemically, morally, or pragmatically justified. 
 
 I have also argued that each of the three dimensions involved in conversion 
has an ethics. We can morally evaluate beliefs and emotions as well as actions (and 
indeed action itself involves both belief and emotion). In order to establish my 
conclusion about the ethical evaluability of the beliefs, emotions and actions involved 
in conversion, I first argued that there is at least an indirectly voluntary component in 
these domains. Having established these results, I was in a position to argue that 
conversion itself is ethically evaluable. This means that whether or not we convert is 
our moral responsibility (whatever the value, positive or negative) and that when we 
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convert, the conversion itself might be evaluated positively or negatively depending 
on whether the beliefs, emotions, and actions involved are morally good, or not.  
 I don’t pretend that this account means that it is clear which cases of religious 
conversion are justified, and which are not. Likewise, I don’t pretend that this account 
means that it is clear when a person is ethically responsible for their conversion, or 
whether a specific case involves self-deception, inappropriate emotions, inauthentic 
behaviour, or some kind of pathology. This isn’t surprising. Moral philosophy’s best 
efforts can tell us that the right thing to do is that which has the best consequences, 
but not what the consequences of each action we consider will be or how to judge 
which count as best; or that the right thing to do is that which the virtuous person 
would do, but not who should count as virtuous; or that the right thing to do is that 
which accords to some universal laws, but not which laws hold. Of course, this may 
seem simpler to a religious person who believes that their religion offers an objective 
morality. But one cannot defend the moral status of their religiosity by first assuming 
the truth of the content of the religion to which they adhere, without begging the 
question against their interlocutor. This thesis has aimed to give a general account of 
conversion that avoids restriction to any one faith or sect, and thus it would be 
inappropriate to presuppose the validity of a specific religious ethic. What we can say, 
is that whichever meta-ethical and normative view turns out to be right will be 
applicable to religious conversion. 
 What I have shown is that there is philosophical room for religious 
conversions that do count as justified. I have also shown that there is philosophical 
room for ethical responsibility for religious conversion on a personal level. What this 
means, is that while I, sat at a computer, and you, sat in a chair, may not have a 
blueprint for deciding whether any person we may know, or think of, is right or wrong 
with regard to their state of religiosity, both you and I are able to engage in honest and 
sincere self-reflection to ensure that as far as possible we are happy to take the burden 
of responsibility for our own religiosity. We all must, as part of a life’s work, ensure 
that we have scrutinised our beliefs, examined the evidence, taken into honest account 
the stimulus we’ve experienced, sought out the experiences that we can to create the 
most balanced state possible, measured our emotions and engaged in self-moderation 
where we can, sought the counsel of those we would emulate in their morality and 
religiosity, and ensure that we act as best we can to live good and moral lives. We 
must because it is our responsibility to do so, and we are accountable. 
  183 
 In §1.1.2 I used Dali’s painting ‘Gala Contemplating The Mediterranean Sea 
Which At Twenty Meters Becomes The Portrait Of Abraham Lincoln’ as an 
illustration. What we noted was that one’s worldview changes during a religious 
conversion, and an analogy was drawn between on the one hand the change that 
occurs from seeing Dali’s painting as of Gala to seeing it as a painting as of Lincoln, 
and on the other hand the change that occurs in moving from a non-religious to a 
religious outlook. We can extend the analogy in the following way. The painting is on 
the wall of the art gallery and we are all in the gallery. Some people never walk past 
the picture so there is no way they could convert – they will see neither Lincoln nor 
Gala. These people will be inculpably ignorant of whatever truths they’d glean from 
viewing the picture, and religious belief is not a live option for them. Some may walk 
by and glance at it, or casually view the painting, but may fail to see Lincoln at all. 
This may be because they somehow walk by the picture altogether, don’t read the 
instructions on the wall, or pay insufficient attention or attend in the wrong ways. 
Attention is key in a conversion – if we are not present we cannot be moved by the 
experience we are having, and it cannot transform us. But even for those who 
apprehend Lincoln suddenly appearing in the painting, not everyone will be moved by 
the magnificence of this – not everyone will appreciate the skill and mastery of the 
vision required to manifest this image on the canvass. For those who are so moved, 
not all will be converted by the experience – some will rationalise away the 
magnitude of the aesthetic experience, or analyse it to obscurity, won’t trust the 
memory of it and will doubt its significance, or will simply pay it no further attention 
and so allow the effects to dwindle to nothing, remaining unchanged. I am thus 
drawing an analogy between a profound aesthetic experience where people may be 
transported, moved, inspired, or silenced by great beauty, in such a way that it 
changes them, and allows them to have a deeper, richer, more engaged and aware 
appreciation of beauty thereafter, and religious conversion. Just as the painting is 
made up of brush strokes, objects, and colour so conversion is made up of actions, 
beliefs, and emotions, and none of these trios can be completely separated while the 
others remain intact. Seeing how these things hang together are ways of 
understanding.  
When one journeys back to view the painting from a different and newly 
acquired perspective, what happens is analogous to a conversion process. There will 
come a point on one’s walk backwards where suddenly Lincoln is apprehended for 
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the first time. But this is not all there is to it. Art moves us not just at the moment we 
first grasp it but when it begins to reach us at the deepest level. From the new angle, 
different light shines on the painting and we can appreciate it in ways that were not 
accessible to us at the closer angle. So here is an analogy to the moral change 
involved in conversion. It is as if we do not merely stand still and become aware of 
new pixels on the image we are contemplating, but start to move ourselves, to change 
our own position so that the image seems, feels, and is qualitatively different to us. 
And whether we seek out this painting, whether we sustain our attention or not, and 
whether we appreciate the significance of the shift in image in a way that changes our 
beliefs, our feelings, and our actions, and the course of our whole life thereafter, is 
something that we must answer for, if not to a higher being, then at least to ourselves. 
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